The logic of equivalence: the discursive articulation of social

The ordering of discourses and discursive fields relies upon the

complementary logics of difference and equivalence. To this point we have been primarily concerned with the logic of difference. Semiotics, for example, refers to this logic when it concludes that the identities of signifiers are defined solely by their difference from one another within a particular discourse. The expansion of relations of difference is checked, finally, by the lack of a center that could impose a final totalization upon the field of discursivity. The surplus that accompanies any partial fixation of meaning is not, however, the only force that subverts the transformation of elements into moments (Torfing 96).

As Laclau and Mouffe explain, one of the factors barring the totalization of the logic of difference is the countervailing logic of equivalence:

the condition for a full presence [e.g., a structural-discursive totality] is the existence of a closed space where each differential position is fixed as a specific and irreplaceable moment. So the first condition for the subversion of that space, for the prevention of that closure, is that the specificity of each position should be dissolved. (127)

The logic of equivalence carries out just this dissolution by linking the differential positions together into a new signifying chain within which they are made

equivalent. In order to be equivalent, two terms must first be different from each other. Equivalence, then, “creates a second meaning which, though parasitic on the first, subverts it: the differences cancel one another out insofar as they are used to express something identical underlying them all” (Laclau and Mouffe 128). The discourse of the global justice movement, for example, does not fail to articulate differences between its constituent groups: organized labor; students;

environmentalists; feminist, queer, and anti-racist activists; “black bloc”

anarchists; etc. These movements and their particular struggles are not rendered identical, but are made equivalent by virtue of their common opposition to neoliberal discourse and to the excesses of global capitalism.

The interplay between the logic of difference and the logic of equivalence provides the basis for the structuring of the social and political field. Although the logic of difference plays the primary role in establishing the identities of objects and subject positions within discourses, the logic of equivalence plays an equally crucial role in establishing the limits of concrete discourses. It does so not by reference to a center that unifies all of the differential positions, but “by means of excluding a radical otherness that has no common measure with the differential system from which it is excluded, and that therefore poses a constant threat to that system” (Torfing 124).

Chains of equivalence are also attempts to discursively articulate those forces of social antagonism which prevent the closure of the social field:

“antagonisms [. . . ] constitute the limits of society, the latter’s impossibility of fully constituting itself” (Laclau and Mouffe 125). In discourse theory,

antagonism does not refer to mere hostility or to an objective or logical relation between terms. As Zizek explains, antagonism “is neither contradiction nor opposition but the ‘impossible’ relationship between the two terms: each of them is preventing the other from achieving its identity with itself, to become what it really is” (Zizek “Beyond” 251). This radical alterity, signified through chains of equivalence, acts as an ineradicable obstacle to the expansion of the differential logic of discourse.

A contemporary example can serve to clarify these points. The response of the Bush administration to the attacks upon the World Trade Center and the Pentagon represents the articulation of an antagonizing force through the

expansion of a chain of equivalence. In a state of the union address delivered in January of 2002, President Bush declared that Iran, Iraq, North Korea “and their terrorist allies, constitute an axis of evil” (par. 21). The President also suggested that this alliance of nations represents the “world’s most dangerous regimes,” an affiliation of rogue states that “threaten us with the world’s most destructive weapons” (“Delivers” par. 23). In an earlier speech, delivered to the United Nations General Assembly one month after the attacks, Bush argued that

“civilization, itself, the civilization we share, is threatened” by “enemies that hate

not our policies, but our existence” (“Remarks” par.12, 37). In this new global war, it is claimed, there is no neutrality: “nations are either with us or against us in the war on terror” (“Calls” par. 14).

In his speech to the nation, Bush signifies the differential entities “Iran,”

“Iraq,” and “North Korea” in terms of a chain of equivalence. The term “axis”

suggests an alliance between states with a set of shared interests and objectives such that they can be understood as constituting a single identity. In order to regard these nations as an “axis,” the differential identities of each must be subverted. Within the discourse of the war on terror, these regimes are equivalent by virtue of being “evil,” that is, by developing weapons of mass destruction that threaten the United States (whether wielded by the nations themselves or by terrorists who somehow acquire these weapons from them).

In order to articulate this equivalence, the specific political, social, and cultural differences between each country must be undermined. To regard these states as an “axis” the particular relations between them (or their indifference to one another) must also be suppressed. Iran and Iraq have a long history of conflict and remain bitter enemies. For its part, North Korea has never had

significant diplomatic or military associations with either Iran or Iraq. Within this discourse, each discursive moment that once signified Iran, Iraq, or North Korea is transformed by the logic of equivalence and “acquires the floating character of an element” (Laclau and Mouffe 127).

The more moments that are pulled into the chain of equivalence, the more that each is drained of its specificity and meaning. The result is not the creation of a new identity that would provide a legitimate place for the antagonizing force in the discursive system. The emptiness of the term “axis of evil” is due to the fact that within the discourse of the war on terror, it is constructed as a negation of the discourse rather than as a moment within it—the only positive characteristic assigned to these regimes is that, collectively, they represent a threats to “us” and

“civilization.”

Within the discourse of the war on terror, the “axis of evil” does not represent a physical force opposed to “civilization” in the same way that two colliding objects are opposed to each other. Social forces are not physical objects, and any discussion of them in terms of opposition is entirely metaphorical (Laclau and Mouffe 123). Discursively articulated social forces are not simply conceptual either, and the antagonisms between them cannot be explained in terms of logical contradiction. As Laclau and Mouffe observe, “we all participate in a number of mutually contradictory belief systems, and yet no antagonism emerges from these contradictions. Contradiction does not, therefore, necessarily imply an

antagonistic relation” (124). The “axis of evil” does not simply contradict the logic of civilization; it threatens the existence of civilization.

The relationship between “civilization” and the “axis of evil” cannot be expressed in terms of A / B. The “axis of evil” does not possess a positive and complete identity, the characteristics of which can simply be contrasted to

“civilization.” Neither can the axis be reduced to “non-A.” That which is not “A”

simply differs from “A” in some way. Such a difference could be domesticated as a moment within a discourse of “civilization.” Here, however, the axis of evil is actually “anti-A,” the active negation of civilization. According to the discourse of the war on terror, the antagonizing force does not represent a counter-discourse opposed to “our policies,” but a force of radical negation, an incarnate evil that

“hates our existence.” The differences between these countries only matter in the chain of equivalence insofar as they express the same identical “evil” and

“hatred.” At the extreme of absolute equivalence identity becomes purely negative.

What the ideological understanding of antagonism overlooks is the impossibility of closure. Prior to any antagonistic force threatening it, every discursive identity is already incomplete: “if identities are only differences within a discursive system, no identity can be fully constituted unless the system is a closed one” (Laclau “Discourse” 433). “A,” in the first place, is never completely

“A.” The discursive articulation of antagonism relies upon the illusion that it is possible for society to achieve complete self-identity as a closed system of differences. It is further posited that that this (imaginary) closure and stability is threatened and subverted only by an external, antagonistic force. With the annihilation of the antagonist, it is promised, the constitution of that impossible object, “society,” is assured. Or, as President Bush expresses it, “we know that evil is real, but good will prevail against it” (“Remarks” 39).

Within a given social field, neither the logic of difference nor the logic of equivalence will dominate completely (Torfing 125). Although chains of

equivalence may subvert the differential character of discursive positions,

“equivalential condensation is never complete. If society is not totally possible, neither is it totally impossible” (Laclau and Mouffe 129). With the expansion of the logic of difference, identities proliferate and the social field becomes more complex. By contrast, the expansion of the logic of equivalence results in “the simplification of the political space” (Laclau and Mouffe 130).

Within the present national rhetoric we find precisely this condensation of the discursive field. The war on terror reduces the complexity of international relations to “a clear-cut political frontier” which divides the world into two antagonistic camps, those who are “with us” and those who are “against us” (Torfing 126). Clearly, the impact of the expansion of the logic of

equivalence is not limited to those who are “against us.” We are called on, in the war on terror, to “act, first and foremost, not as Republicans, not as Democrats, but as Americans” (Bush “Delivers” par. 27).

The threat posed by evil forces imposes “a certain sameness” upon the two political parties (Torfing 125). As articulated in the discourse of the war on terror, the two parties are united as “Americans,” equivalent in their common

commitment to “justice,” “liberty” and “freedom.” Yet, the differential identities of these terms is also subverted by the chain of equivalence. They begin to acquire the character of floating elements, signifying only the fullness of

community that is threatened by evil (Torfing 125). The disarticulation of these signifiers from their partial fixations within concrete discourses has produced disturbing results. Those suspected of committing acts of terrorism may be denied due process and detained indefinitely in the name “justice;” wiretapping and other forms of electronic surveillance may be used against protestors in the defense of

“liberty;” and dissenting journalists and intellectuals may be intimidated, harassed, or fired because of the threat that they pose to “freedom.”

It is a mistake to dismiss the discourse of the war on terror as cynical manipulation or “empty rhetoric,” as a distortion of political reality (although it is certainly that as well). We should recognize it as an attempt to reformulate the discursive bounds of (Western) “civilization” and the United States (“us”).

Whether or not it finally succeeds in stabilizing the social field in terms of the nodal points “good” and “evil,” “civilization” and “terror,” “us” and “them”

depends entirely upon the outcome of a political struggle for hegemony. Because of the open and incomplete character of the social, a variety of hegemonic forces compete to fix floating elements as moments of their own discourses. The role of political struggle in the articulation of social reality is more or less pronounced depending upon the relative fixity of a given social order. That is to say, “the hegemonic dimension of politics only expands as the open, non-sutured character of the social increases” (Laclau and Mouffe 136).

The collective trauma of the September 11 attacks acted to dislocate the social field, disturbing the fixity of differential relations and expanding the field

of discursivity. Thus far, it appears that the political right has been better able to recognize and take advantage of this opportunity to rearticulate the social in terms of its opposition to an antagonistic other—“we are all Americans now.” As we will see in our next section, this projection of the impossibility of structural closure onto an antagonistic other that prohibits it is precisely the structure of social fantasy.