provoke the 1959 risings, as
Iargued in section two.
(d) The Problem of Authority,
After his exile, the kabaka was increasingly the source of authority in Buganda. The most effective institutions available for its exercise were those of the B u g anda Government: ministers,, Lukiiko and chiefly hierarchy. During the colonial period, these carried traditional titles,, though their functions had changed, and claimed to be t h e 'n e o t r a d i t i o n a l ' heirs of precolonial chiefs.
It was through these institutions that the B r i tish attempted to exercise authority. But their n e w functions undermined their legitimacy. The problem was most serious at muluka level (see above). The B a t a k a Party had sho\m that it was possible for specific grievances against lower chiefs, and vaguer ones against
different pattern of neotraditionalism. This culminated in 1949 i the demand for elected chiefs, which threatened the political monopoly of the elite class and the means of its corporate activity. Moreover, it undermined the ideology of the kabaka's supremacy and might have marked the end of popular hopes in him (Apter, p.279)*
The Kabaka Crisis provided the opportunity for a 'rite’de passage1 for all these institutions, analogous to that of the Chief of the Hausa and the great landlords in Sabo, Ibadan, who, in Cohen's analysis (1969, pp.l70--17l) passed from "Witch to Bajji" (i.e. became virtuous in their subjects1 eyes) by going on a pilgrimage to Mecca. Although the change was personified in Buganda by the kabaka, and it was his new authority which was given to the other institutions, the latter also went through a ritual of re-evaluation in the people's eyes. Initially, they changed personnel as the kabaka changed persona, and the 'King's Friends* came to power.
Prior to the kabaka's return, the chiefly hierarchy was supervised according to the tradition of authoritarian, efficient, 'progressive' katikkiros like Kagwa and Nsibirwa, who sought legitimacy as much in
pursuing British criteria of 'progress* as in the neotraditional symbolism of their office. Under the two most recent katikkiros, Kawalya-Kagwa (1945- 5l) and Kavuma (1951-55) 't^ie bureaucracy had been tightened by a remarkably strict system of supervision and inspection by officials of both the Buganda and Protectorate Governments working together (Richards, 1964* p.368).
Until 1953, the kabaka had been dominated by the British and not posed the question of the source of authority in Buganda. During the kabaka's exile, Kavuma and his followers continued to meet the demands of the Protectorate Government, albeit reluctantly, as in welcoming the Queen in 1954 despite the Lukiiko's refusal. So the way was open for a
'shadow government* of 'King's Friends* to organize itself informally around the symbol of the kabaka as the sole source of authority.
The 'King's Friends' did not come together as an apparently'anti
progressive* group, including
"Protestants, Catholics, Mohammedans, as well as chiefs, radical followers of the Bataka Union, and a number of
...younger, educated men" (Low, 1962, p.2 4)
simply because they were more "atavistic" than most, as Low suggests.
While other elite factions sought authority mainly by production of specific programs, they sought it through monopolizing the king's friendship and
elevating him as the sole source of authority. They succeeded because the kabaka became the dominant symbol fora 'political religion* (cf. Davies,
I97O, p.5 9) in which people with disparate intentions could unite politically.
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The programs of the new political parties had no such symbolic power, and did not acquire any from association with groups of western-educated elite politicians. Even 'Independence Wow* had little symbolic potency (Low, 1962', pp.4 0-4 3), partly because it was known to be coming, and partly because in Uganda its ambiguities were consciously recognised and not contained within the symbol. When the parties tried to attach themselves to the kabala symbol they were at a disadvantage to those who had no other commitments — his 'friends*. On the kabaka's return, his clear domination of the Buganda Government, the purge of disloyal1 officials and replacement with 'friends* made way for a reversal of its previous unpopularity and its
use in the exercise of the kabaka's authority in Buganda.
I am concerned here with the authority of the higher chiefs and their change of role. Their main function was now the informal s'party* organi
zation of the kingdom; under the katikkiro M. Kintu they no longer sought legitimacy in terms of the formal bureaucratic efficiency demanded by the Protectorate Government. The previous system of intensive inspection and chiefly co-operation with British officials came to an abrupt end.
Richards misleadingly analyzes the change in administrative practices in terms of lack of training in British notions of efficiency, and ,'reversion*
to traditional customs. I suggest that in terms of 'party* efficiency, the following instances of 'inefficiency' given by Richards (1964, pp.368-9) were quite appropriate:
"after the return of the Kabaka a number of county chieftainships have been filled by political appointees..Some seem to have
reverted to the traditional custom of, sitting in their homes, waiting to be visited rather than going on tours of inspection.
They are also said to spend much time in their town houses,
engaged in political discussions, Lukiiko meetings or the search for high office..In these circumstances it is not surprising that
the standard of county, subcounty and parish administration is generally agreed to have fallen rapidly.. In the meantime government has, rather naturally, become more centralized, along traditional lines, rather than less."
It was essential that the chief's role-conflict should be resolved if they were to be used in 'party* (rather than "natural") centralization. The only challenges to the authority of the kabaka's political officials came from outside Buganda and, very briefly, in the UNM boycott. The KY,
Buganda*s mass party, upheld neotraditional authority organized in this way.
As in Buganda, during most of the colonial period the authority of Tutsi political officials was guaranteed in Rwanda by the Administration, which possessed overwhelming military superiority. They also derived
authority from fulfilling traditional roles of patronage at the local level.
It was the political organization of the Tutsi caste, making both necessary
and. legitimate the role of patron with extensive powers over the persons and property of clients, which made their use for cheap administration attractive to the colonial powers. When the Belgians rapidly withdrew authority from the Tutsi as a caste,the latter were still alole to derive the neotraditional authority of patronage from their superior political organization. However, their use of this superiority to eliminate new rivals for authority, the Hutu intelligentsia, was prevented by the continuing overrule of the Belgians.
The Hutu intelligentsia were demanding a new basis for authority in direct elections. Since the Hutu could not be intimidated, such elections would enable the intelligentsia to penetrate the "encapsulated1' (Bailey, 1969 ) hill level with their caste-based party. Tutsi authority, resting on their capacity to act as patrons on the isolated hills, would be destroyed. The adopted solution was to deny authority to the Belgians, and thereby their right to switch proteges. The Tutsi political leaders claimed that elections were unnecessary - indeed, a colonialist plot to delay Independence and divide Rwanda - since the,1traditional* governing in
stitutions already represented and embodied the authority of the people.
In particular, they claimed that the rawami was the sole source of authority in Rwanda, and it was only colonialism which had perverted this uniquely Rwandan mode of democracy (see section 3(©) ). Thus the Tutsi claimed the authority of an ideal past supposedly embodied in customary modes of ruling as against the "foreign" and "abstract" authority derived from
elections.
Like the Baganda elite class, that in Rwanda sought a. re-evaluation of its political institutions by an ideological re-systematization of
traditional symbolic forms. The monarchy and Tutsi chiefs were to receive popular authority as the quintessential defenders of Banyarwanda custom and identity. In Buganda these processes were made possible by changes in the role-behaviour of political officials after a rite de passage and the sacrifice of persons who had made the roles unpopular by interpreting them i*wrongly*, i.e. ’bad chiefs*. Thus ^progressive * chiefs were replaced by
•conservative populist* chiefs (Apter, p.214-). Rut in Rwanda the •conserva
tive* chiefs were not ,*populists*, and insisted far more than the *progressives*
on Tutsi distinctiveness and Hutu subordination. Although the Tutsi elite class attempted a rite de passage in UNAR, as defenders of the monarchy and all Banyarwanda against Belgian colonialism, this remained merely a change in ideology. Role-behaviour at hill level could not be altered (even if poor Tutsi, who were afraid of losing status, had allowed it) without
endangering the hill chief*s controlcf Hutu mobilization. At the national level, the use of neotraditional symbolism merely re-emphasized the instruments of Tutsi domination - the army chiefs,-, the education of noble Tutsi at
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court, and above all, the royal symbolism. As Gitera pointed out in APROSOMA propaganda, the royal drum (Kalinga),which was said to be the main symbol of the unity of Rwanda,was decorated with the genitals of
conquered Hutu petty kings (d ‘Hertefelt, 1964). Moreover, there was no purge of ‘bad* Tutsi chiefs, which might have restored legitimacy to the neotraditional political system. The failure of straightforward appeal to traditional sources of authority in Rwanda, even when they were
ideologically reinterpreted, shows that this factor cannot operate independ
ently of the contemporary situation. In Buganda, out-of-office elite factions adopted popular interpretations, of traditional custom, and enabled grievances to be expressed in terms of change of personnel - a "rebellion"
in Gluckman*s terms. In Rwanda, all Tutsi showed great cohesiveness against Hutu - Chief Stoanakweli being distrusted by Hutu for that very reason - and not one poor Tutsi leader emerged. Popular ideas of the (*good patron1 included the requirement of Tutsi caste membership only so long as Tutsi controlled supra-local contacts. When this monopoly was ended it was possible for a change of personnel, to achieve ‘good patrons\
to be projected to bring in Hutu; then "rebellion" became "revolution".
Nevertheless, there was an attempt by the Tutsi elite class to solve the problem of authority by denying it to the Belgians and mobilizing traditional sources of legitimacy in the monarchy. In July 1959 Mutara died suddenly in circumstances which were easily represented as assassination by the Belgians, supposedly in a plot with Hutu leaders. ‘Progressive1 chiefs, led by Kayihura, Mungalurire, and Rwangombwa, took the opportunity to install a ‘puppet* ruler, thereby commanding authority over the .‘conservatives**.
Clear opposition to the Belgians on the issue of sovereignty gave much more credibility to their claim to the authority due to leaders of a nationalist, democratic movement. This claim was recognised, even after the Hutu revolution began, by some anti—colonialist countries, particularly in the UN, but had
little meaning for Hutu whose local political organization remained under the control of the Tutsi hill chief until November 1959*
Mutara‘s funeral was the occasion for a Tutsi coup d*etat to preempt Belgian authority. Without consulting the Administration, the abiru announced in traditional fashion that Mutara‘s successor would be another of Musinga‘s sons, 21-year old Jean-Baptiste Ndahindurwa, with the dynastic name Kigeri V. This had clearly been agreed by the chiefs, and stage- management of the funeral included a speech by Kayihura explaining the
customary duty of the abiru, followed by a dramatic .‘spontaneous* demand from a Hutu in the crowi£ for the name of Mutara‘s successor. The Belgians
Tutsi monarchists. Within three weeks UNAR was founded under the nominal leadership of the Hutu who participated in the coup, P. Rukeba, but was in fact directed by the three Tutsi chiefs mentioned above (Lemarchand, 1970, p.159). As I showed above, UNAR had available the political institutions of the kingdom. A period of intense organizational activity followed the founding of UNAR, which began to act in defiance of the Administration as if authority had finally been won by the installation of Kigeri V.
The Administration tried to recapture the initiative gained by UNAR, which was developing rapidly into a millenarian sense of invincibility (ibid, p.l6l), by disciplining its leaders under a back-dated law for attendance at the Kigali mass rally. The UN visiting Mission saw this as a "decisive turning-point" (quoted ibid, p.l6 2), which only increased the sense of urgency among UNAR supporters. Both UNAR and PARMEHUTU represented the other as insidiously taking over the state authority and stressed the need for urgent counteraction. For UNAR to claim democratic authority against the Belgian Administration it was necessary to remove the Hutu party leaders. The party leaders now thought they had the authority to do this without Belgian interference. I suggest that the November risings of Hutu were provoked by an apparent Tutsi offensive,and show that the Tutsi elite class had not solved the problem of authority at the local level by mobilizing neotraditional ties.
(e) The Problem of Ideology
The ideological process which legitimated the Buganda Government, and the kabaka in particular, may be summarised as a re-interpretation of the ‘Bataka* ideology and its systematization with the "dominant symbol"
of the kabaka (see above; and Turner, 1964). He was seen as the
guarantor of the cosmic rectitude of hierarchical order and of all Baganda.
This found expression in their politico-military supremacy I which in the 1950s had the proportions of a myth and also seemed immediately true from the kabakajs ‘victory* over the British in 1955 (.Richards, 1964? P»324) - under his autocratic leadership. Prom the kabaka*s deportation onwards it was claimed that Buganda*s supremacy was under attack by foreigners, and his politico-military leadership was necessary.
The symbolism expressing these ideas was neotraditional, employing forms current in the 'precolonial period and recalling the kabaka*s authority then. Two main themes were apparent in the 1950s, both ex
pressing the unity of the kingdom in dependence on the kabaka. Firstly, he possessed the legitimate use of terror: he could .‘forge* the kingdom as the blacksmith*s fire forges iron; at his accession ritual he ritually
conquered Buganda in a board game against his chiefs. He was also 'namunswa*, the queen termite that feeds on her subjects (Fallers, 1964, p.68). This symbol was used in the campaign against the BP, and a
contrast made with the illegitimate use of force - BP members were referred to as .'nnabbe.' the red ant which destroys termites (Welbourn, 1965 p.2 5).
In particular, it was recalled that the life of a subject was at the military disposal of the kabaka, and that after battle cowards had been humiliated and killed. Secondly, Richards noted at the time of the Kabaka Crisis an apparently contrasting theme which emphasized his harmlessness, innocence and embodiment of pleasurable aspects offemily relationships.
Whether or not this was traditional, as Richards says, its attachment to the dominant symbol of the kabaka accords well with Turner 's theory (1964) that such symbols unify disparate meanings and, in particular, that their
"ideological referents" harshly demanding the sacrifice of sectional interests to the good of the group are made acceptable by the infusion of emotion from "sensory referents" like gentleness and pleasurable family relationships. Both these themes were united in the kabaka alone - for
instance, he was unique in not observing a clan totem (i.e. he was not ideologically a rival), yet he was head of all the clans (ssaabataka).
The other dominant symbol of the colonial period was the butaka, the estate on which the ancestors are buried. Indeed, Welbourn argues that the clans retained much power in the 1950s because of their control of inheritance (1961, p.2 9); but Southwold (1956) points out that while this was formally true, wills and the kabaka's order of 1926 had made the bataka little more than administrators of clear inheritance rules. Much more important was the ideological function of clanship in establishing relationship with the kabaka, particularly since 1953. Thus the bataka outlawed persons joining political parties (see above) against the kabaka's wishes, and they organized annual rituals celebrating his return. I
have already dealt with the arguement of Fallers and others that the butakaTs use as a symbol by opposition movements in the colonial period were part of a traditional conflict between bataka and the kabaka.(chapter 6). In fact, Fallers is much more accurate when he analyzes the butaka as a symbol of a popular "birthright" in the land of Buganda (l964» p.152 ).
The common element in the Bataka movements was a response to some threat to this birthright - from Baganda landlords and educated elite, alien
immigrants, the Protectorate Government, or potentially from white settlers an African government. The birthright might be extended from land to other.business — rural traders, fighting Asian competition were an important element in later Bataka and Kabaka movements. The butaka symbolized the
absence of an institutionalized hierarchy of groups, and the popular element in the Bataka movements was essentially a defensive, *commun>al*
response from the bakopi when they perceived the existence of such priviliged groups (Low, 1962, p.1?)* But they did not. oppose unequal dyadic relations, and they looked back ideologically to the ’Golden Age’of traditional Buganda, with ’good’ chiefs and kabakas.
Hie Kabaka Crisis enabled these two dements to be systematized. The kabaka became the dominant symbol as the expression of the unity cf Baganda,
in defence of the birthright and in opposition to privileged groups,
After his ’rite de passage * of exile and return as leader, he was the personal guarantee of the legitimacy of his government of ’king's men', because as the focus and source of authority he was guarantor that power relations were ’traditionally’ dyadic. The privileged groups were foreigners. And
in the words of one Muganda peasant to Richards in 1955 (1964* P*332):
"Everything is back as it should be.,The Kabaka is giving out government as he used to do". Neotraditional forms were not used because of ’atavism*, in a haphazard meaningless fashion; they were directed to specific and systematic meanings, relevant to contemporary grievances and divisions.
Ideology was the field in which the Tutsi elite class made its major effort to organize the Banyarwanda as a political group. Since the other organization problems were to be solved by reliance on existing neotraditional institutions, which embodied great inequalities of power between the castes, much depended on the development of a successful justification for those inequalities, for they were being challenged by the Hutu intelligentsia.
The purpose of new ideology was to minimize caste distinctions and unite all Banyarwanda under monarchical institutions which would preserve Tutsi caste privileges de facto, at least until the mwami became the sovereign power in Rwanda.
The ideology of Tutsi ’natural superiority’ had been (taken up by the colonial administrates in the first half of the colonial period to
justify their support for continued Tutsi domination (see Official Report 1938, chapter 6). Yet by 1945 Tutsi intellectuals, composed mainly of clergy led by Abbe Kagame, were giving serious attention to the implications of ’progress’ for the power structure and developing ancideology of
’cultural nationalism* which was intended to constrain all modernization within the neotraditional institutions under which all Banyarwanda were
’cultural nationalism* which was intended to constrain all modernization within the neotraditional institutions under which all Banyarwanda were