9. C ONCLUDING REMARKS
9.1. Main fi ndings of the report
The fl exicurity agenda attracts a number of criticisms and some of its aspects are highly ques-1)
tioned, not so much as regards its guiding principles – the need to strike a balance between the fl exibility needs of business and organisations, and the security needs of the workforce is not seriously disputed- but rather for its controversial policy content and implementation. Three are the main points of criticism:
it is a trade-off between unequal partners (business and labour);
a)
it does not specify who pays the bill for improving the security of the workforce;
b)
its success heavily relies on the soaring numbers of the precarious workforce with few (if c)
any) employment and social security rights.
Despite its shortcomings, the fl exicurity agenda remains the only articulate policy agenda in 2)
the EU, without a credible alternative. It also constitutes a defi nite improvement compared to the labour market deregulation approach popular in many OECD countries. However, it is more suitable for countries with good economic performance and strong institutions than for countries with major structural weaknesses, segmented labour markets and residual welfare states.
The success of the fl exicurity policy agenda boils down to 2 fundamental requirements:
3)
re-sources and trust. Rere-sources to fi nance the costly active and passive labour market policies, and trust to build up consensus and enable mutual concessions between the social partners. If a country lacks either or both of these ingredients, it does not qualify for a successful policy outcome.
There is no single recipe or path to follow to increase economic competitiveness and enhance 4)
social cohesion: countries with a very different welfare regime (like, for example, Denmark and Austria) have been successful in pursuing both goals.
Overcoming opposition to the fl exicurity agenda is possible only through social dialogue and 5)
participation of all the stakeholders in the decision-making process. Otherwise, fl exicurity will continue to incite the same opposition as pure fl exibility, despite its notable security dimen-sion and success record in some countries.
Building broad coalitions is of paramount importance in view of pushing through diffi cult 6)
reforms that put into jeopardy vested interests and with an uncertain outcome. In a context of adversarial relationships and of low mutual trust, it is hard to expect the social partners to reach an agreement on labour market and welfare reform,
Additionally, the cross-country analysis of Denmark, the Netherlands, Spain and Greece, illustrates that:
countries with a long tradition in social consultation and negotiated change, like Denmark i)
and the Netherlands, are better placed to successfully address challenges and pursue reforms.
However, even in these countries, the balance of power between business and labour at any given time can lead to an asymmetric exchange of concessions;
the presence of a “culture of compromise” is the result of historic factors and is more likely ii)
to be encountered in countries where the social actors share a common awareness of vulner-ability and of the real issues at stake (i.e. Denmark and the Netherlands);
although the process of European integration has given a signifi cant impetus to the social iii)
consultation process in both Spain and Greece, there is still a long way to go, especially for the latter. Exogenous pressures alone are not enough to trigger off a substantial shift in the attitudes of social actors towards concertation and cooperation;
the scope and the effectiveness of social consultation also depend on the quality of the inter-iv)
locutors engaged in the concertation process: how forward looking they are, to what degree they can grasp the real challenges and opportunities, and whether they can transcend narrow interests and mistrust to develop a new partnership approach;
the increasing heterogeneity of the workforce raises the question as to how suitable are tra-v)
ditional unions, by defi nition representing the interests of the more established and pro-tected workers who form their constituency, to negotiate the fl exicurity agenda and ensure the employment and social security rights of the more vulnerable segments of the workforce
(non-standard workers). Is it their responsibility to fairly distribute the risks and costs asso-ciated with greater fl exibility across the various segments of the workforce? In the case of segmented labour markets, this dissonance of interests is even more striking;
the prevalence of an individualistic culture, or of a narrow collectivism, prevents the develop-vi)
ment of collective action and cooperation for the benefi t of the wider community;
institutional adaptability and the capacity of social actors to learn from previous mistakes has vii)
allowed Demark and the Netherlands to adjust successfully to contemporary challenges;
dysfunctional domestic institutions –in particular a low legitimacy of institutional rules and a viii)
poor enforcement of regulations- reproduce the vicious circle of mistrust, lack of consensus and individualism. Overcoming this fundamental dysfunction requires agreement between the social actors on both the causes of the problem and the remedies to apply;
the positive labour market performance in Denmark and the Netherlands has been mostly ix)
attributed to their successful implementation of the fl exicurity agenda: low employment protection and intense activation policies in Denmark, high incidence of fl exible but fairly protected employment in the Netherlands, a social partnership approach in both countries.
However, other factors have also contributed to their success, such as: wage restraint in the Netherlands, effective enforcement mechanisms in Denmark, a supportive welfare state, the demographic composition of the workforce and an increased awareness of their vulnerability in both countries, to mention just a few. These factors are path-dependent and non-trans-ferable as such to any other national context. They can be useful, however, from a learning perspective;
by contrast, a highly segmented labour market and a residual welfare regime, compounded x)
by substantial structural economic weaknesses, have undermined the chances of successful economic and social reforms and of a strong and lasting economic performance in Spain, and particularly in Greece.