elements are present in the present controversy. The complaint for estafa
was dismissed outright as the prosecutor did not find any probable cause
against respondents. A suit for malicious prosecution will prosper where
legal prosecution is carried out without probable cause.
ULPA CRIMINAL
PEOPLE VS. DE LOS SANTOS G.R. No. 131588 March 27, 2001
355 SCRA 415
FACTS:
As part of the Special Counter Insurgency Operation Unit Training held at Camp Damilag, Manolo Fortich, Bukidnon, several members of the Philippine National Police were undergoing an “endurance run” on October 5, 1995 which started at 2:20 am. The PNP trainees were divided into three columns and were wearing black t-shirts, bl;ack short pants, and green and black combat shoes. There were two rear guards assigned to each rear column. Their duty was to jog backwards facing the oncoming vehicles and give hand signals for other vehicles. From Alae to Maitum Highway, Puerto, Cagayan de Oro City, about 20 vehicles passed them, all of which slowed down and took the left portion of the road when signaled to do so.
While they were negotiating Maitum Highway, they saw an Isuzu Elf truck coming at high speed towards them. The vehicle lights were in the high beam. At a distance of 100 meters, the rear security guards started waving their hands for the vehicle to take the other side of the road, but the vehicle just kept its speed, apparently ignoring their signals and coming closer and closer to them. The rear guards told their co-trainees to “retract”. The guards jumped in different directions. They saw their co-trainees being hit by the said vehicle, falling like dominoes one after the other. Some were thrown, and others were overrun by the vehicle. The driver, Glenn de los Santos did not reduce his speed even after hitting the first and second columns.
After arraignment and trial, the court convicted accused-appellant guilty of complex crime of multiple murder, multiple frustrated murder and multiple attempted murder, with the use of motor vehicle as the qualifying circumstance. ISSUE:
Whether or not the incident was a product of a malicious intent on the part of accused-appellant
The Supreme Court held that the incident, tragic though it was in the light of the number of persons killed and seriously injured, was an accident than of a malicious intent on Glenn’s part. Glenn showed an inexcusable lack of precaution. Since the place of the incident was foggy and dark, he should have observed due care in accordance with the conduct of a reasonably prudent man, such as by slackening his speed, applying his brakes, or turning to the left side even if it would mean entering the opposite lane.
Wherefore, the Supreme Court convicted Glenn de Los Santos of one complex crime of reckless imprudence resulting in multiple homicide with serious physical injuries and less serious physical injuries and sentenced him to suffer an indeterminate penalty of four years of prision correccional, as minimum, to 10 years of prision mayor, as maximum; and 10 counts of reckless imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries and sentenced for each count, to the penalty of 2 months of arresto mayor. The awards of death indemnity for each group of heirs of trainees are reduced to P50,000, and the awards in favor of other victims are deleted.
CONTRAVENTION OF THE TERMS
VICTORINO D. MAGAT, petitioner,
VS. HON. LEO D. MEDIALDEA and SANTIAGO A. GUERRERO, respondents G.R. No. L-37120
April 20, 1983 FACTS:
Sometime in September 1972, the defendant entered into a contract with the U.S. Navy Exchange, Subic Bay, Philippines, for the operation of a fleet of taxicabs, each taxicab to be provided with the necessary taximeter and a radio transceiver for receiving and sending of messages from mobile taxicab to fixed base stations within the Naval Base at Subic Bay, Philippines. Since herein petitioner is known of his good reputation as a businessman, the defendant, through his agent, entered into a contract with the former. In said contract, the defendant must open a letter of credit in favor of the petitioner, since the latter would also engage a foreign company for such taximeter.
Defendant and his agent have repeatedly assured plaintiff herein of the defendant's financial capabilities to pay for the goods ordered by him and in fact he accomplished the necessary application for a letter of credit with his banker,
but he subsequently instructed his banker not to give due course to his application for a letter of credit and that for reasons only known to the defendant, he fails and refuses to open the necessary letter of credit to cover payment of the goods ordered by him. After some time, herein defendant failed to comply with his obligation, and several demands were made by petitioner so as to reinforce such contract, and even communicated if defendant would like to rescind contract, but said defendant did not reply to such demands. The defendant even used as a defense that the petitioner was delayed in delivering the taximeters when the former was apprehended by U.S. Navy Exchange for not complying with their agreement. As a consequence, petitioner filed a case against the defendant but respondent judge dismissed such petition in a minute order for lack of cause of action.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner has a cause of action against the defendant for the latter’s contravention of the terms of contract.
RULING:
Article 1170 of the Civil Code provides:
“Those who in the performance of their obligation are guilty of fraud, negligence, or delay, and those who in any manner contravene the tenor thereof are liable for damages.”
The phrase "in any manner contravene the tenor" of the obligation includes any ilicit act or omission which impairs the strict and faithful fulfillment of the obligation and every kind of defective performance. The damages which the obligor is liable for includes not only the value of the loss suffered by the obligee [daño emergente] but also the profits which the latter failed to obtain [lucro cesante]. If the obligor acted in good faith, he shall be liable for those damages that are the natural and probable consequences of the breach of the obligation and which the parties have foreseen or could have reasonably foreseen at the time the obligation was constituted; and in case of fraud, bad faith, malice or wanton attitude, he shall be liable for all damages which may be reasonably attributed to the non-performance of the obligation.
The same is true with respect to moral and exemplary damages. The applicable legal provisions on the matter, Articles 2220 and 2232 of the Civil Code, allow the award of such damages in breaches of contract where the defendant acted in bad faith. To our mind, the complaint sufficiently alleges bad faith on the part of the defendant. In fine, the Supreme Court held that on the
basis of the facts alleged in the complaint, the court could render a valid judgment in accordance with the prayer thereof.
SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE: NECESSITY (Art. 1165, CC) 1. VDA. DE MISTICA VS. NAGUIAT, 418 SCRA 73 2. CO VS. CA, AUG. 17, 1999
VDA DE MISTICA VS. NAGUAIT 418 SCRA 73
FACTS:
Eulalio Mistica, predecessor-in-interest of herein petitioner, is the owner of the parcel of land which was leased to respondent Bernardinio Naguiat.
Mistica entered into a contract to sell with respondent over a portion of the aforementioned lot containing an area of 200 square meters. This agreement was reduced to writing in a document. Pursuant to said agreement, respondent gave a down payment of P2,000. He made another partial payment of P1,000 on February 8, 1980. He failed to make any payments thereafter. Mistica died sometime in October 1986.
On December 4,1991, petitioner filed a complaint for rescission alleging, among others that the failure and refusal of respondent to pay the balance of the purchase price constitute a violation of the contract which established her to rescind the same. That respondent have been in possession of the subject matter, should be ordered to vacate and surrender possession of the same.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in the application of Article 1191 of the Civil Code, as it ruled that there is no breach of obligation in spite of the lapse of their stipulated period and the failure of the respondent to pay.
RULING:
NO. The failure of respondent to pay the value of the purchase price within ten (10) years from execution of the deed did not amount to a substantial breach.
In the agreement, it was stipulated that payment could be made even after ten (10) years from execution provided that the vendee paid 12% interest. The stipulation of the parties constitute the law between them, thus court have no alternative but to enforce them as agreed upon and written. Thus, the Supreme Court ruled that the Court of Appeals did not commit an error in deciding this issue.
SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE: NECESSITY (Art. 1165, CC)
SPS. HENRY CO AND ELIZABETH CO AND MELODY CO, petitioners, VS. COURT OF APPEALS AND MRS. ADORACION CUSTODIO, represented
by her Attorney-in-fact, TRINIDAD KALAGAYAN, respondents Aug 17, 1999
G.R. No. 112330 FACTS:
On October 9, 1984, the spouses Co entered into a verbal contract with Custodio for her purchase of the their house and lot worth $100,000.00. One week thereafter, and shortly before she left for the United States she paid amounts of $1,000.00 and P40,000.00 as earnest money, in order that the same may be reserved for her purchase, said earnest money to be deducted from the total purchase price. The purchase price of $100,000.00 is payable in two payments $40,000.00 on December 4, 1984 and the balance of $60,000.00 on January 5, 1985. On January 25, 1985, although the period of payment had already expired, she paid to the defendant Melody Co in the United States, the sum of $30,000.00, as partial payment of the purchase price. Spouses Co’s counsel, Atty. Leopoldo Cotaco, wrote a letter to the plaintiff dated March 15, 1985, demanding that she pay the balance of $70,000.00 and not receiving any response thereto, said lawyer wrote another letter to plaintiff dated August 8, 1986, informing her that she has lost her ‘option to purchase’ the property subject of this case and offered to sell her another property.
Atty. Estrella O. Laysa, counsel of Custodio, wrote a letter to Atty. Leopoldo Cotaco informing him that Custodio ‘is now ready to pay the remaining balance to complete the sum of $100,000.00, the agreed amount as selling price’ and on October 24, 1986, plaintiff filed the instant complaint.”
The trial court ruled in favor of Custodio and ordered the spouses Co to refund the amount of $30,000.00. Not satisfied with the decision, the spouses
Co appealed to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the decision of the RTC. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in ordering the Cos to return the $30,000.00 paid by Custodio pursuant to the “option” granted to her.
RULING:
An option is a contract granting a privilege to buy or sell within an agreed time and at a determined price. It is a separate and distinct contract from that which the parties may enter into upon the consummation of the option. It must be supported by consideration. However, the March 15, 1985 letter sent by the COS through their lawyer to Custodio reveals that the parties entered into a perfected contract of sale and not an option contract.
A contract of sale is a consensual contract and is perfected at the moment there is a meeting of the minds upon the thing which is the object of the contract and upon the price. From that moment the parties may reciprocally demand performance subject to the provisions of the law governing the form of contracts.
The elements of a valid contract of sale under Article 1458 of the Civil Code are (1) consent or meeting of the minds; (2) determinate subject matter; and (3) price certain in money or its equivalent. As evidenced by the March 15, 1985 letter, all three elements of a contract of sale are present in the transaction between the petitioners and respondent. Custodio’s offer to purchase the Beata property, subject of the sale at a price of $100,000.00 was accepted by the Cos. Even the manner of payment of the price was set forth in the letter. Earnest money in the amounts of US$1,000.00 and P40,000.00 was already received by the Cos. Under Article 1482 of the Civil Code, earnest money given in a sale transaction is considered part of the purchase price and proof of the perfection of the sale.
Despite the fact that Custodio’s failure to pay the amounts of US$40,000.00 and US$60,000.00 on or before December 4, 1984 and January 5, 1985 respectively was a breach of her obligation under Article 1191 of the Civil Code, the Cos did not sue for either specific performance or rescission of the contract. The Cos were of the mistaken belief that Custodio had lost her “option” over the Beata property when she failed to pay the remaining balance of $70,000.00 pursuant to their August 8, 1986 letter. In the absence of an express stipulation authorizing the sellers to extrajudicially rescind the contract
of sale, the Cos cannot unilaterally and extrajudicially rescind the contract of sale.
Accordingly, Custodio acted well within her rights when she attempted to pay the remaining balance of $70,000.00 to complete the sum owed of $100,000.00 as the contract was still subsisting at that time. When the Cos refused to accept said payment and to deliver the Beata property, Custodio immediately sued for the rescission of the contract of sale and prayed for the return of the $30,000.00 she had initially paid.
Under Article 1385 of the Civil Code, rescission creates the obligation to return the things, which were the object of the contract, but such rescission can only be carried out when the one who demands rescission can return whatever he may be obliged to restore. This principle has been applied to rescission of reciprocal obligations under Article 1191 of the Civil Code. The Court of Appeals therefore did not err in ordering the Cos to return the amount of $30,000.00 to Custodio after ordering the rescission of the contract of sale over the property.
Since it has been shown that the appellee who was not in default, was willing to perform part of the contract while the appellants were not, rescission of the contract is in order. The power to rescind obligations is implied in reciprocal ones, in case one of the obligors should not comply with what is incumbent upon him, (Article 1191, same Code). Rescission creates the obligation to return the things which were the object of the contract, together with their fruits, and the price with its interest x x x x (Article 1385, same Code).
In the case at bar, the property involved has not been delivered to the appellee. She has therefore nothing to return to the appellants. The price received by the appellants has to be returned to the appellee as aptly ruled by the lower court, for such is a consequence of rescission, which is to restore the parties in their former situations.
Petition denied. Decision affirmed.
RIGHT TO RESOLVE/RESCIND: REQUISITES 1. UFC VS. CA, 33 S 1
2. UP VS. DELOS ANGELES, 35 S 102
3. FRANCISCO VS. DEAC CONST. INC., 543 S 644 4. CANNU VS. GALANG, 459 S 80
5. VILLANUEVA VS. ESTATE OF GONZAGA, 498 S 285 6. PAGUYO VS. ASTORGA, 470 S 33
7. CASINO VS. CA, 470 S 57
8. CARRASCOSO VS. CA, 477 S 666 9. GOLDENROD VS. CA, 299 S 141