See map, Appendix B,: below

2. See Qur’an, 9:103, 1:15^» 73:20. On how the zakat can best be distributed, see Qur’an 9%60o

themselves in a dilemma and could not comprehend the idea of paying it to such a government. Paying it directly through their religious shaykhs and faqihs was the easiest way out of this dilemma. In the first few years of the Condominium rule, the zakat was a very good source of income and economic power to all the shaykhs and faqihs throughout the Sudan. The income from this zakat was so recognizable that an intelligence report of 1908 had even suggested that those shaykhs and faqihs were actually collecting more money in this way than the

government itself from taxes.^ In Kordofan, much of that income was going to the Isma’iliyya in the early days of Anglo-Egyptian rule. As time went by, the Isma’iliyya income from this source began to decline gradually. On the one hand economic pressures and new social attitudes made the people less enthusiastic to pay this zakat, and on the other, there was now more organized competition with the Isma’iliyya for the collection of this zakat, especially from the Mahdists under the new leadership of ’Abd al-Rahman al-Mahdi, and also from the Tijaniyya.

Another source of income, closely related to the zakat was that of the ziyarat (pious gifts of pilgrims), and al-nudhur (fulfilments of conditional vows and offerings) which were paid sometimes in cash, and at others in kind. Though payments for the ziyara of the qubba or the head of the order was by no means obligatory, it grew into a custom and no visitor would come there empty-handed. Though the income from this source was not sizeable, it was enough to maintain some of the shrines and to keep those who guarded them happy.

In addition to...all these sources, there was also the contribution of the wealthier members of the order for the big occasions, such as the hawliyya of the shaykh or thQ'Mawl'Ld of the Prophet.

1. See jS.J.i?.j No. 162, January 1908, Appendix C.

Though the income from all these different sources was fairly large, the Isma’iliyya did not manage it in such a manner as to make a central financial establishment like Da’irat al-Mahdi or Da ’irat al-Mirghani.

Instead of investing this income in capital expenditure, the Isma’iliyya used it in their daily maintenance of the tariqa duties, the upkeep of the khalifa's household, and the feeding of the numerous disciples who made their lodgings in the khalwas and zawiyas of that order. Up to 1906, although there was no central da'ira to organize the finances of the Isma'iliyya, al-Makki, as the unchallenged head of the order and the family, was taking care of that fairly well. After his death, and following the gradual disintegration of the family, there was a growing

I

tendency to tear the income from these sources apart, and for each household to insist on its share from it rather than pool it centrally.

The lack of such financial management and the absence of a central d a H r a to control their income, left the Isma’iliyya less capable of developing their resources, and as time passed these grew more and more inadequate. With a declining financial power, the political and social influences of the Isma’iliyya were also in decline. They could no longer cope with the increasing demands of a central tariqa and the

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requirements of a big holy family, and therefore had to accept a secondary position after the Ansar and the Khatmiyya in political and social

affairs.

Social and Political Change and the Isma’iliyya

The third influence on the development of the Isma’iliyya during this period is related to the changing social and political trends in the Sudan

at that time and the response of the tapiqa and the members of the family to those changes.

The reconquest of the Sudan by the Anglo-Egyptian forces brought about two important developments which greatly affected the society:

the first was that Sudanese people had come in contact with outside influence in a more effective way. Up to the first half of the

nineteenth century, the only influences to which they were exposed came in small doses through Egypt and the Hijaz, and even those were stopped during the Mahdia. With the conquest, there was a dramatic change and Sudanese society was once again exposed to foreign influence on a wider scale. Though the effects were not felt immediately, some tendencies

i

towards an impending change began to be apparent. Many young people started to appreciate the material benefits of modern education and European technology. They began to look for inspiration and guidance towards a new "modern” type of leadership rather than their traditional tribal or religious shaykhs. The introduction of a new system of

education, improvement of transport and the development of new economic tastes and trends had all fostered these tendencies and encouraged the emergence of some new social groups with modern attitudes and goals.

Modern education gave the young Sudanese access to new ideas and introduced them to new concepts. Better communications and new economic trends

tempted many of them to urban centres and big towns where they could hope to get better opportunities for employment and greater chances for an improved and modern life. New social relationships and organizations were created which cut across tribalism and religious ties. Social

clubs, thus, replaced zawiyas, takiyyas and khalwas as places for social gatherings in big towns. Economic interests were also beginning to take

the place of tribal and religious relationships as bases for social groupings. New social and political ideas, such as nationalism, progress and enlightenment, were also finding their way into the minds of those young men.

The second development arising from the conquest was of a

psychological nature. The crushing defeat of the Mahdist-state and the imposition of a rule which was partly Christian in the Sudan, generated a feeling of frustration amongst the people who were brought up to believe that as Islam is the true religion of God, it should dominate the world. The victory of the infidels was seen not only as evidence that something had gone wrong with the universe, but also as proof that they themselves had deviated from the right path. This frustration was deepest among the religious people, and especially the Sufis. They reacted in two ways: the first was a violent reaction finding expression in the numerous religious uprisings against the government after 1900 which were inspired by the Sudanese popular beliefs about the NabL fIsa and a ’l-Masih al-Daddal,^ The victory of a Christian power over the Mahdists led many Sudanese to associate the British administration with al-Masih al-Dagjal (anti-Christ) and brought to life the prophecy of al-Shaykh Farah Wad Taktuk: "At the end of time

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the English will come to you, whose soldiers are called police: they will measure the earth even to the blades of the sedge grass. There

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will be no deliverance except through the coming of ’Isa". The second one was a passive reaction: that of accepting the blame for what had