B. MARITIME SECURITY AND ITS TASKS
3. Maritime Security Tasks
There are three key tasks for achieving maritime security laid out in the 2010 Naval Operations Concept: Response operations, national and regional maritime cooperation, and awareness.53 This section will identify the main activities in each task.
49 USNORTHCOM, Department of Defense Homeland Defense and Civil Support Joint Operating Concept, 20.
50 George W. Bush, National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) - 41/ Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD) -13: Maritime Security Policy (2005), 2.
51 MSPCC, National Strategy for Maritime Security 1.
52 Ibid.
53 Naval Operations Concept 2010, 36.
20 a. Response Operations
Response operations (or direct approach operations) actively employ naval vessels to confront maritime threats and are the most commonly thought of as naval maritime security operations. Two types of actions make up response operations: patrols with forward presence and ship interdiction operations.
Patrols and forward presence means placing a ship or platform in an area to provide physical presence to offer deterrence, protection, and situational awareness.
Naval assets can be tasked to specifically for MSO, or they can be conducted in concert with other operations.
Interdiction operations are the most direct maritime security operation because they physically involve intercepting a vessel by ship or aircraft, and if need be to board a suspect vessel. There are two main types of interception operations: Maritime interception operations (MIO) and law enforcement operations (LEO).54 Both types of interdictions involve the same techniques of visit, board, search, and seizure, but the purpose behind both of them is different.55
b. National and Regional Maritime Cooperation
Maritime cooperation is an indirect approach to maritime security. It is an indirect approach because it does not directly disrupt a maritime threat, but it is meant to improve direct operation or the maritime security process as a whole. Cooperation is important because its purpose seams in maritime security between different agencies and different nations. Three types of maritime security operations fall under maritime cooperation: Maritime Operational Threat Response (MOTR), National Fleet Policy, and Theater Security Cooperation (TSC).56
54 Naval Operations Concept 2010, 43.
55 MIO is considered a military operation for a specific national security objective, while LEO is specifically meant to enforce U.S. or other nation’s laws at sea against a criminal threat, typically with the objective to prosecute the offenders in court. Department of the Navy (DON), Naval Warfare Publication (NWP) 1-14M: The Commander's Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations (Washington, D.C.: Dept. of the Navy, 2007), 3–8, 4–6.
56 Naval Operations Concept 2010, 37–38.
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Maritime Operational Threat Response is an interagency process, “which establishes protocols that facilitate coordinated, unified, timely, and effective planning and execution by the various agencies that have maritime responsibilities…to respond to a full range of maritime security threats.”57 The MOTR process calls for an interagency council to delegate lead authority and recommend appropriate actions to pursue a desired effect.58 This is essential because it ensures that different agencies work with a unified purpose in an attempt to close capacity and capability gaps and to eliminate jurisdictional overlaps, which can create competition and confusion.
There are two inherent problems with MOTR. First, any type of bureaucratic council or interagency coordination of this magnitude is a slow process that does not proactively address emerging threats. Second, these documents still rely on the current division of labor and framework of PCA and DODD 5525.5(c) in order to mitigate the maritime threat, unless otherwise directed by presidential authority.59 The Maritime Operational Threat Response process still does not provide an effective solution because the current rules, policies, and laws reinforce the gaps and seams. Despite MOTR’s shortcomings, it does begin to address the complexity and variable nature of the maritime domain that requires close coordination between maritime security stakeholders to be effective in MSO.
The National Fleet Policy attempts to integrate the Navy and Coast Guard unique platforms and capabilities to support operations close to home and abroad.60 This is an important step in recognizing the different attributes each organization brings to
57 Naval Operations Concept 2010, 38.
58 Department of Homeland Security, Maritime Operational Threat Response Forces: Establishing Integrated Maritime Counterterrorism Operational Threat Response Capabilities in the Atlantic, Pacific, and Gulf of Mexico Operating Areas (Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security), 3. This is a supporting plan to the MOTR plan.
59 As JP 3-27 states, “these protocols are based on existing law, desired USG (U.S. Government) outcome, greatest potential magnitude of the threat, response capabilities required, asset availability, and authority to act.”59 Department of Defense (DoD), Joint Publication 3-27:Homeland Defense (Washington, D.C.: DoD, 2007), V–1.
60 Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) and Commandant of the Coast Guard, National Fleet: A Joint Navy/Coast Guard Policy Statement (March, 2006),
http://www.navy.mil/navydata/cno/2006_national_fleet_policy.pdf.
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maritime security. For example, the Coast Guard has broad law enforcement powers and civil maritime expertise, while the Navy has many ships and robust equipment.
Combined, the “National Fleet” becomes a potent weapon of authorities, capabilities, and capacity in combating maritime security threats. While the policy is a step in the right direction, different mission focus and different resources reduce the integration and interoperability of the services. This will be discussed in later chapters.
Theater Security Cooperation is the chief mechanism to build and ensure maritime security abroad, and indirectly at home. Because no nation has the capability of achieving global maritime security on its own, only the combined efforts of maritime nations can achieve maritime security. As the 2010 Naval Operations Concept states,
“The responsibility of individual nations to maintain maritime security within their waters is the foundation upon which global maritime security is built.”61 The purpose of TSC is to, “collaborate with allies and partners alike to develop the expertise, infrastructure, awareness, and capacity to respond to the full range of maritime security threats and irregular challenges.”62 The global reach of U.S. naval forces puts them in a good position to reach allied and partner nations in order to build partner capacity for maritime security.
c. Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA)
The National Plan to Achieve Maritime Domain Awareness defines MDA as: “the effective understanding of anything associated with the maritime domain that could impact the security, safety, economy, or environment of the United States.”63 To achieve this, MDA, “requires persistent monitoring of vessels, cargo, people, and
61 Naval Operations Concept 2010, 38.
62 Naval Operations Concept 2010, 41.
63 CNO, 2011 Navy Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) Concept (Washington DC: Dept. of the Navy), 1.
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infrastructure within and adjacent to the maritime domain.”64 The Navy and Coast Guard play a key role as data providers and consumers of MDA.65
Maritime Domain Awareness is essential in maritime security, because MDA attempts to prevent crimes before they happen through transparency, and allows a more calculated and efficient employment of limited resources.66 As many maritime security threats conceal their activities within normal civil maritime operations, it becomes even more important to use all sources of information to try to pick out the threats from normal traffic. To do this requires collaboration, coordination and information sharing among interagency and international partners. For example, the Navy has robust collection and sensor capabilities, while the Coast Guard and other agencies are well tuned into the happenings in civil maritime operations.
Despite MDA’s importance to naval forces and maritime security, there is an abundance of literature on the subject; therefore, this study does not offer any further insight into the subject than already exists, and it will not be a main topic of discussion for this thesis.