M atter serves as the substrate for substantial change, but m atter is never an in d ep en d en t substrate. Even as substrate, m atter is in com position with form. A substrate is that which persists (1) through a change from one opposite to an o th er or (2) from the lack to the presence of a featu re or (3) from a presence to a lack. Aristotle developed the notion of a substrate by observation of accidental change. White does not sim ply become black. A w hite surface becomes a black surface. There is a surface w hich persists through the change. In accidental change, the substance is the obvious substrate. But w hat happens w hen the substance changes? A ristotle refuses to accept th at it arises from nothing and vanishes into nothing. It m ust arise from som ething. For Aristotle this m eans both that som ething was there w hich has now become a new substance an d that som ething of the old substance persists in the new substance.30
Aristotle develops the notion of substrate for change in the first book of the Physics. He explicitly states his use of analogy in applying the notion of
substrate to substantial change:
The underlying nature is understood by analogy. As bronze is to a statue or wood to a bed or m atter which is formless is to anything else w hich has form (before it receives form), so the underlying nature is to substance and to the particular and to being. (Physics
A 7,191 a 8-12)31
“ Charlton tries to draw a firm distinction between the upokeim enon and the upomenon. H e takes th e upokeim enon as the substance from w hich change arises exclu sively, and the upom enon as that w hich persists through change, Charlton, 1970, p. 131 f. A ristotle however d oes not observe a strict distinction in his use of the term upokeimenon.
31cos yap 7rpos a v S p ia v x a xaAicbs f| 7rpos kAivt|v ^ijAov fj 7rpos xwv aAAcov xi xwv e%ovxcov popOi'iv [f] uAt| icai.] xo apop^ov t 7tpiv Aapeiv xfiv pop<t>Tiv, ouxcos auxT] 7tpos oucriav e%ei icai xo xo8e xi icai xo ov. ed. W. D. Ross, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1950.
In accidental change, the subject for change is clearly com posed betw een substance an d accidental feature w hich changes. A ristotle uses the term
wroKeipevov (substrate) to refer to the composite of substance and accident:
It is necessary th at som ething alw ays is a substrate, th at w hich becomes and even if this is one in num ber, form ally (eiSei) it is not one (I say th at "form ally" and "in account" (Aoyco) are the same). For the being of the hum an and the being of uneducated are not the same, an d [after the change] one rem ains and the other does not. (Physics A 7190 a 14r-18)32
Even though the person and his educational status are num erically identical in the substantial unity of the person, they are not the sam e formally. The being of each is distinct. To be hum an is not to be educated or uneducated and, therefore, the educational status of a person can change, while rem aining hum an. Since th eir being differs, A ristotle can d istin g u ish betw een the substance w hich rem ains (to wropevov) and the accidental form which does not. Together in com position they are the subject of change, the U7roKei|ievov.
The same distinction applies analogously to substantial change:
Everything comes to be from a substrate and from form (|i6p<t>T|). For the educated person is som ehow com posed of the person and being educated. For you will analyze the whole into accounts of each. It is clear that w hen things become, they are composed of these. There is a substrate which is one in num ber and formally tw o (first there is the person or the gold or in general, the num erically distinct m atter. For it is more particular and it is not accidental that th at w hich becomes becomes from it. The privation or the opposite form is accidental). (Physics A 7 190 b 19-27)33
^oxi 5ei xi d e l U7roiceicx0ai t o yiyvopevov, icai t o u t o ei icai apiGpcI) ea x iv ev, a \ X eiSei ye o\)% £v' t o yap e i8 e i Adyca icai Aoyco T auxov oii yap xa o x o v t o dvGpconcp icai t o apoucrco t iv a i. icai t o pev w ropevei, x6 S ox>x wropever
o x i y i y v e x a i 7r a v eic x e t o o w r o ic e ip e v o u ic a i x fjs p op ^ 'n g1 a o y i c e i x a i y a p o pou cn icot;
46
Here Aristotle draw s an analogy, m ade obscure because he mixes the analogues together. The form w hich changes is either a privation or an opposite form. "Opposite form " should be understood as a term only in the accidental change analogue. A ristotle m akes it clear a little later th at the com ponent w ith m atter in the case of substantial change is the privation of the new substantial form (191 a 14). W hen A ristotle says the subject is com posed of m atter and privation, p riv a tio n m ust be understood not absolutely b u t in relation to the new substantial form. The subject for change is com posed of m atter and the privation of the new substantial form. W hatever the m atter is beforehand, it cannot be the same substance w hich it is to become w ithout contradicting the genesis of a new substance. At the same time the privation cannot be absolute, because there is no m atter w ithout some form. The plant is generated from a non-plant, nam ely a seed, not from som ething absolutely formless.
A ristotle uses the term i)7roice'i|Lievov both for the w hole substance out of w hich the new substance is m ade and for the m aterial com ponent alone w hich persists through change (e.g., Physics A 7,190 b 2 & 14).34 For clarity I
will refer to the composite \)7roice'ipevov as "subject" and refer to the material com ponent as "substrate."
Before and after substantial change, m atter is the Suvapei xo5e n . It is that w hich is potentially both substance and privation. It can become a new substance and it can subsequently lose its new substantial form.
avBpcoTtos avGpomou m i poucmcoO zpdnov xiva- SiaAiicreis yap [xoi>s Amyous] els xous A.6yoDS xous diceivcov. SfjAov oov ojs ylyvoix' d v x a Y iyvopeva die xouxwv. e a x i 5e xo pev wroiceipevov apiGpco pev ev, eiSei 8e Siio (o pev ya p dvGpcoiros m i o xpuuos m i oAco? fi uAr| dpiGpiynY Y®P t l pdAAov, icai oi> m x a auppepr|ic6s aiixou YiYvet a i t o Yiyvopevov- t] 5e (JxepT|cris m i f] dvavxlcoais croppeprims)-
34A lan C ode, 'T h e Persistence of Aristotelian Matter," P hilosophical S tu d ie s 29,1976, pp. 357-67, distinguishes "the primary substratum of the change" (matter) from "the substratum of the change" (lack and matter), p. 364.
Aristotle states in quite general term s that all change is from a being in potency. H e includes substantial, quantitative, qualitative, an d locomotive changes in the dom ain of his principle:
Since being is double, everything changes from being in potency to bein g in act, as from w h ite in potency to w h ite in act.
(Metaphysics A 2,1069 b 15 ff)35
White doesn't come from just anything, but only from that w hich is potentially white. In Aristotle's analysis, it comes only from its opposites or from something in the m iddle (1069 b 3 f.). In this case opposite should be taken quite broadly, in the sense of opposites as those "differences of a genus w hich cannot exist in the same subject together" (Metaphysics A 10,1018,26 f.) an d not in the more
narrow sense as the greatest differences of a genus (27 f.). A ristotle doesn't m ean th at black only comes from w hite and vice versa, b u t th at w hite can come from its direct opposite (black), from alternative colors (reds and blues), or even from the absence of color (white smoke in clear air). In the last case, colored is the opposite of colorless. In short, white m ust come form something that is not w hite, b u t of the same genus as w hite. It m ust be from some surface, colored or colorless. It does not come from sound or from another genus (Metaphysics A 2,1069 b 5).
A ristotle argues that since change is from opposites, there m ust be a i)7r o K e i|ie v o v for the opposites. Opposites cannot produce each other because they are not potentially each other. W hite cannot be black and black cannot be white, but there can be a surface which can be w hite or black. The surface is
i 8e 5ixxov xo ov, pexafktAA.ei 7rav die xoO Suvdpei ovxoj eis xo evep yeia ov (oTiov
ck /Veutcou S u v a p ti t is xo e v e p y d a A.t\>KOV . . .). ed. W. Jaeger, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1957, p. 244.
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the i)7roKei|ievov for the tw o opposites in a change. M atter as substance in potency m ight or m ight not be the new substance. It can be the substance if so inform ed. It can also be w ith o u t the new inform ation i.e., p rivation of the new substance w hich allows it to be the subject of the generation for the new substance and the subject of its eventual decay (Metaphysics H 11042 b 2).