Other Measures Aimed at Developed and Developing States

10) Preventing Additional Developed/Industrialized Market Nations from Developing Nuclear Weapons

If developed or newly industrialized countries decide to pursue nuclear weapons or build sensitive nuclear facilities, they pose a particular challenge. These nations already possess the industrial base, technological know-how, and domestic scientific capacity to build nuclear weapons within a relatively short period of time. They may also possess domestic nuclear energy and research programs and regularly import or produce nuclear and nuclear dual-use goods. They would not rely heavily on illicit nuclear trade to obtain needed materials and equipment because they supply these high technology goods or regularly and easily procure them for their industries without attracting suspicion by supplier companies and governments. Nevertheless, gathering certain goods on the open market for a covert nuclear weapons effort may be detectable, particularly if suspicions of such activity existed and the attempts involved distinctive “watch list” types or large quantities of dual-use goods. Most attempts may turn out to be legitimate and not part of a covert nuclear weapons program, but intensified surveillance and awareness may reveal illicit trade.

Therefore, the U.S. government should:

 Deploy new and existing measures including closer government and U.S. corporate vigilance to detect suspicious activities in these countries.

 Actively discourage any such country from developing centrifuge or other enrichment plants or plutonium separation plants.

 Work to dissuade any supplier from providing parts or goods to sensitive facilities in that country. In the case of foreign suppliers, a direct approach could be made to that

government where the supplier is located. For domestic suppliers, the U.S. government could impose sanctions on any supplier providing goods to the sensitive program.

 Provide strong diplomatic pressure and as appropriate, security guarantees, to the

developed country as further incentives to remain within the nonproliferation regime. U.S.

security guarantees or nuclear umbrellas can also apply to developed nations.

11) Reinvigorating a U.S. Policy to Discourage Uranium Enrichment and Plutonium Separation Capabilities in Regions of Tension

In the next five to ten years, additional states in regions of proliferation concern may seek

advanced, civilian nuclear technology including uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing capabilities. Some countries that have announced or implied intentions to do so are developing nations or emerging markets that are of particular concern for proliferation or are at risk as diversion and illicit trade hubs. At least one, South Korea, is a developed country that has earlier forsaken the development of these capabilities.

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Additional enrichment plants and reprocessing facilities are the most proliferation-sensitive parts of the fuel cycle, and more of them are unnecessary during the next decade for creating robust civilian nuclear power capabilities. The United States should as a matter of policy:

 Actively discourage additional countries from building enrichment or plutonium separation plants in regions of tension, whether the country is a developing or advanced industrialized country. The United States should increase outreach efforts by the Department of Energy to facilitate this policy’s implementation.

 Require that countries without reprocessing or enrichment facilities commit not to enrich or separate plutonium domestically in new or renegotiated peaceful nuclear cooperation agreements with the United States, known as Section 123 Agreements under the Atomic Energy Act. Exceptions could be made for internationally controlled, safeguarded enrichment or reprocessing plants used for the production of energy.

 Seek in other nuclear security related agreements, such as those involving North Korea or Iran, the specification that the Middle East and the Korean Peninsula are regions that should be free of uranium enrichment and plutonium separation facilities. A key aspect of this goal in the Middle East is achieving an agreement that verifiably cuts off the

production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons.

 Continue working through the NSG to gain new restrictions against members sharing enrichment and reprocessing technology with additional states. The new guidelines on enrichment and reprocessing in NSG Guidelines for Nuclear Transfers are a significant accomplishment but represent the lowest common denominator of the members of the NSG.¹¹⁹ In the interim, the United States should work with like-minded states in the NSG or those outside it to set up a coalition of states that voluntarily commit to no further exports of enrichment and reprocessing technologies to countries in regions of tension, such as the Middle East and North Asia.

 Support, with respect to preventing the spread of laser uranium enrichment capabilities, amendments to Annexes and 1 and 2 of the Additional Protocol (which is based on revision 2 of the Part 1 list of INFCIRC/254 in 1995, reflecting laser systems used then). These annexes define what is contained in a state’s declaration and is subject to state export and import reporting. The manufacturing of key lasers should also be included in Annex 1 either by modifying Annex 2 or adding this condition directly into Annex 1.¹²⁰

 Provide fuel supply assurances for new and existing nuclear power and research reactors so countries have no incentive to seek enrichment and reprocessing capabilities.

119 Nuclear Suppliers Group, Nuclear Suppliers Group Guidelines, http://www.nuclearsuppliersgroup.org/A_test/01-eng/09-guide.php?%20button=9

120 Under Article 16 of the Additional Protocol, the list of activities specified in Annex I, and the list of equipment and material specified in Annex II, may be amended by the Board upon the advice of an open-ended working group of experts established by the Board. Any such amendment shall take effect four months after its adoption by the Board.

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 Block, and encourage allies to block, acquisitions by any enrichment or reactor program in a non-nuclear weapon state that contributes to the development or production of nuclear fuel or reactors for a naval nuclear program. Naval nuclear programs in non-nuclear weapons states are unjustified and are inherently concerning because of their potential for proliferation.

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