Meeting CSP Goals

The meeting of CSP goals: “rewarding the best” land stewards, “attracting the rest” and “promoting conservation”, was addressed by the first two research questions, “What characteristics define Iowa producers who are aware of and enroll in the CSP and the patterns of participation for enrolled producers?” And “how consistent is the CSP at compensating Iowa producers for their conservation efforts?” The degree to which CSP contracts awarded by Iowa NRCS are “rewarding the best” Iowa stewards and “attracting the rest” is the primary goal for the measurement of CSP progress. Results surrounding the analysis of CSP contracts implementation also has implications for the broader CSP and green payment missions of increased awareness and application of “land stewardship,” ongoing preservation of natural resources such as soil, water, air, energy and wildlife habitat, and

“multifunctionality,” adjacently providing agricultural, environmental and social services within Iowa agriculture.

Mail survey responses by Iowa producers in CSP eligible areas suggests that producers were in agreement with the term “land stewardship” being used to describe “responsible farming,” and thought “land stewardship” should focus on the impact of farming on the surrounding environment, farming for future generations and production maximization, the latter possibly as a means of risk management. Over half of all respondents were likely to rent some of their land, with most cash renting. Most were

demographically similar to producers in the remainder of the state in terms of enterprise mix, age, education, income and household composition.

Over three-quarters of survey respondents had between 1 and 5 stewardship practices in place on the farm and were as likely to attempt CSP enrollment, as they were not to. Most respondents had neutral feelings about the implementation of CSP and about one-quarter of

all respondents were enrolled in the CSP, as compared to about 14 percent of eligible producers across Iowa. It was also proposed to all respondents that the CSP had been aimed at “rewarding the best” land stewards “and attracting the rest” and the watershed-by-

watershed approach to program implementation was a necessary pilot phase; responses to both statements had a tendency towards agreement though the most popular choice in both instances was “not sure.”

CSP Enrollees were mostly corn and soybean farmers with 91 percent growing corn, 88 percent growing soybeans. Beyond the typical corn and soybean rotation 38 percent of respondents indicated they grew alfalfa/hay, and 17 percent raised pastured livestock. There was a tendency for enrollees to also be generally neutral about the program’s rule and payment structures while those in higher tiers tended to feel better compensated for the costs of enrollment.

The logit regression analysis identified a group of variables that were of most influence on the level of survey respondents’ awareness of CSP, the likelihood of their enrollment and the tier at which they were participating. The perception that production maximization should be a component of “land stewardship” was linked with increased CSP involvement. The number of stewardship practices, amount of crop acreage and lack of pasture acres were positively correlated with increased CSP awareness and likelihood of enrollment, which suggests most stewardship practices employed by enrollees were limited to those specific to cropping. Demographically, younger males were more aware of the program, while education beyond high school was positively correlated with enrollment and a higher tier of participation. Also producers grossing above $50,000 per year in farm income and earning less than $25,000 gross income off the farm were positively correlated with increased program involvement.

The budgetary model analysis and case studies suggested that compensation levels were not consistent among enrolled producers, or relative to other incentives such as the commodity programs. These results suggest CSP offers minimal support to increases in stewardship through enterprise diversity. This is particularly pertinent to findings that suggest nitrification of Iowa’s waterways is in large part due to tilled land that is left uncovered for

large parts of the year (Keeney and DeLuca, 1993). Increases in set-aside acreage and pasture raised livestock were two diversification options that offered slightly better payment

incentives than a stewardship approach that depended completely on a four crop rotation. Interestingly both of these approaches are already covered to some degree by other conservation programs: the CRP and EQIP. In fact the Government Accounting Office evaluation of the CSP was titled “Despite cost controls, USDA management is needed to ensure proper payments and to reduce duplication with other programs;” and concluded, “that producers can receive duplicate payments… because of similarities in the conservation actions financed through these programs” (GAO, 2006). It also suggests that previous studies (Vondracek, Zimmerman and Westra, 2003; Westra, Vondracek and Zimmerman, 2004; Westra, 2005) that found combinations of CRP and CSP payments would compensate producers for crop and livestock income forgone on increased land retirement acres were possibly relying more heavily on CRP payments than CSP payments to achieve this.

The producer’s consensus on a definition for “land stewardship” included a

responsible approach to farming that includes production maximization and accounts for the impact of farming on the surrounding environment and farming for future generations. This definition also appears consistent with the action of most producers enrolled in the program. Still the need for risk protection often sought through maximized production from corn and soybeans combined with government price supports is proving a tough adversity for more holistic alternatives, such as those described in CSP goals, to overcome. The program does appear to offer some incentive to the “rest” for basic improvements in “land stewardship” with increased adoption of conservation tillage practices and reduced nutrient application. Beyond this, encouragement for transitioning to a more multifunctional enterprise mix, even the more proven options of increased set-aside and pasture raised livestock, appear to be less available through the program payment structure, despite the risk reducing, value-adding and environmental benefits these practices provide. Previous studies (Dobbs and Streff, 2005) suggest that program payments are heavily dependent on the level of income forgone from what would otherwise be corn and soybean acres to generate the incentive to diversify. Since prices and commodity payments contribute income forgone and with grain prices rising,

there is clearly more to conservation reward incentives than the cash amount of CSP payments.

Even with the challenges of promoting “land stewardship” and “multifunctionality,” the most striking issue is the disproportionate nature in which the limited funding is being dispersed. The example from this study of a corn and soybean producer (Rac3) with no hay or pasture achieving tier 3 at the first enrollment attempt with payments compensation at an estimated 205 percent of total conservation costs while other producers many of them similar in size scope and approach to conservation are compensated at rates of well under 50 percent the total cost of conservation. Included in this group was a tier 2 organic producer whose certification requirements included the absence of synthetic fertilizer or pesticides, four crops in rotation and pasture livestock (Wapsi3).

Even with this disparity, all producers who were interviewed described program payments as a reward for practices they, for the most part, would have implemented anyway. The resulting implications for working lands conservation that stems from such conflicting incentives is that CSP is in most instances rewarding the “status quo” (SWCS, 2007) and still lacks the funding and political support to move beyond this position.