The Meta-theories of Development Ethics

The construction of development values is not a simple pre-fabricated design. There is no one blue-print to be applied. In this section I trace the philosophic sources of development values. The principle writers on development ethics (Goulet, 1973; Crocker, 1996; Gasper, 2004) all acknowledge the influence of significant themes in the history of social and moral philosophy. The following summary draws substantially from Smith & Duffy’s text on the ethics of tourism (2003), following a chronological outline of principal philosophic influences on development values.

3.4.1 Aristotle on ‘Virtues’

Aristotle’s ideas on ‘virtues’, on the traits that allow us to flourish as humans, continue to influence contemporary writers on development (Smith & Duffy, 2003:44). This perspective has been taken up in the work of Nussbaum (1992; 2000), promoting a ‘feminist principle’ in a ‘duty of care’. Champoux (2006) highlights the importance of ‘ethics of care’ in relation to behavioural values in organisations. As O’Leary explains, ‘virtues’ represent a focus on ‘moral character’, addressing the question ‘What should we be?’ which leads to a “moral sensibility about what he or she ought to do” (2006a:1). Furthermore, the theory of virtues is a reminder of the ‘both-and’ premise of the humanist paradigm, in which

living a life in accordance with [behavioural] virtues helps the individual maintain a proper balance between their own individual flourishing and the well-being of the community (Smith & Duffy, 2003:45, emphasis added)

3.4.2 Kant on ‘Rights’ and ‘Duties’

Eighteenth century philosopher Immanuel Kant introduced the notion of ‘principle ethics’, addressing the question of ‘What should we do?’ For Kant there was a categorical imperative in reason, leading to ethical standards, as in a code of conduct, and concern with ‘rights’ and ‘duties’ (Smith & Duffy, 2003:79). In terms of ‘duties’ Kant is mindful of ‘obligations to others’. Once again the implications and importance of relationships between the individual and community are highlighted. There are contradictions in Rights Ethics, as Champoux (2006) acknowledges: in a negative sense legal and moral rights can mean ‘don’t interfere with others’ (as in cultural relativism), or a positive duty to help others. As noted

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in Chapter 2, ‘altruism’ is not always governed by a pure sense of duty. But while David (2004) argues that Kant’s intention was to give political expression to humanity and a moral dimension to politics, he notes that the UN Declaration of Human Rights and subsequent international human rights agreements can be criticised for their individual and Northern focus, reflecting another form of cultural imperialism. Smith & Duffy are more outspoken:

Kant’s arguments should stand as a salutary reminder of the unethical and flagrant opportunism of those governments, institutions and individuals that try to hide their self-interests behind a language of morality

(2003:80).30

3.4.3 Bentham and Mill on ‘Utilitarianism’

The ‘human rights’ discourse continues to intersect with the global scheme of development. It is evident in this brief introduction to Kantian ideas that rights are closely associated with development values and their different interpretations.

The philosophy of utilitarianism as propounded by Bentham and Mill argued for the pursuit of happiness, for minimal pain and maximum pleasure and for rational deliberation on actions (Smith & Duffy, 2003:55). Smith & Duffy go on to describe the appeal of utilitarianism in its universality, rationality, impartiality and versatility, offering potential for “a cross-cultural method for objectively resolving ethical conflicts” (2003:57). There is a distinction to be made between ‘act utiltarianism’ (the rightness or wrongness of a particular action) and ‘rule utilitarianism’ which focuses on the rules governing evaluation of consequences. Yet not all consequences can be pre-determined: evaluations can change according to social and political conditions, and the question of how to measure happiness remains (Smith & Duffy, 2003:68). There is a strong link here to the economic development paradigm: “utility is often defined in modern economic analysis as some numerical representation of a person’s observable choices” (Sen, 1999:60). Sen is challenging the reductionist assumptions of the economic development paradigm. Ultimately, as Smith & Duffy argue (2003:72), utilitarianism is a

30 _{As exemplified in Chapter 2 in reference to US Presidential pronouncements about ‘good}

intentions’. Another stand-out example would be US, UK and Australian tacit approval of the Indonesian invasion of Timor L’Este, and subsequent supply of UK military aircraft to Indonesia (Martinkus, 2001).

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contentious form of welfarism, judging ‘moral goodness’ on the basis of maximising ‘social benefit’, providing justification for the oppression of minorities, personal injustices and other ignoble social outcomes. Post-developmentalists such as Escobar (1992) would argue that utilitarianism is yet another expression of Northern domination and cultural imperialism.

3.4.4 Rawls on ‘Social Justice’

Rawls’ theory of justice (published 1971) is primarily concerned with ‘fairness’ in the distribution of goods, rights and power in society, based on principles of ‘equal liberty’, ‘difference’ (in terms of balancing social and economic inequalities) and ‘fair equality of opportunity’ (Champoux, 2006:58). Gasper (2004), David (2004) and Smith & Duffy (2003) all acknowledge how these principles draw on utilitarianism, Kant’s notions of rights and the humanist values of Aristotle, and point out major flaws in Rawls’ arguments. Smith & Duffy’s interpretation indicates:

Rawls is trying to avoid imposing a particular model of a morally good life on people. He recognises the diversity of ethical opinion but argues that this means that every person would want to be free to frame their own ideals, to decide on their own priorities. This in turn means that people would want the freedom to choose, and … we would want to ensure that everyone had these basic liberties/rights (2003:97).

The critiques of Rawls’ theory draw attention back to the dialectics of development. Smith & Duffy (2003) and David (2004) point to the theory’s individualism, amounting to the laissez-faire version of contemporary capitalism. Questions on who deserves what and why in terms of distributive justice counterpoint the human needs of vulnerable people with the economic needs of capital to ‘reward’ enterprise. Both these writers acknowledge the theory is an idealistic vision, more relevant to advanced economies than applicable to the needs of developing nations. In an extended chapter

on ‘equity’ Gasper (2004) exposes Rawls’ philosophic analysis as an attempt to derive a unifying set of principles for policy choices from diverse criteria. Bell (1993) labels Rawls’ approach as ‘neo-Kantian liberalism’, in which liberal theory is reformulated and systematised with little cognisance of a communitarian

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(humanist) perspective. The history of development would suggest ‘fairness’ in distribution of goods, rights and power belongs to a remote Utopia.

Nevertheless, questions of social justice, of distribution and rights remains lodged in the consciousness, the policies and practices of NGDOs.

3.4.5 Sen on ‘Development as Freedom’

In Sen’s philosophy (published 1999) he postulates human rights as ‘freedom from’ and ‘freedom to’, in both instrumental and constructive application. His ‘capabilities’ approach incorporates aspects of human well-being and quality of life and the ‘functionings’ of how people live – what is valued and how values are applied. Sen’s work has proved appealing both to mainstream economists and NGDOs, and is embraced in particular by Oxfam. Gasper’s summary of Sen’s achievements reads thus:

Overall, Sen provides us with an advance beyond mainstream economics and utilitarian philosophy: a focus on more than income and felt utility, by examination of the contents of the life options available to people. He does so in ways that maintain a conversation with mainstream economists and hence have been able to influence them (2004:179).

In David’s view, “Sen’s vision of development is defined in terms of the expansion of people’s entitlements and capabilities, the former giving life sustenance and the latter generating freedom” (2004:233). “Capabilities”, according to Gasper’s interpretation, are “substantive functionings” such as life expectancy, health and education, mobility and other ‘opportunities’ – as opposed to particular skills, aptitudes and abilities (2004:179), suggesting some ambiguity in normative use of language. Gasper also finds fault with Sen’s concept of freedom as choice relating to what ‘people have reason to value’, especially in a market-driven and money- oriented world that has captured its consumers.

Giri (2000) offers a more critical view:

Sen’s agenda of human well-being suffers from a fundamental problem of dualism between self and other, egotism and altruism. Overcoming this dualism is crucial for realising human well-being but calls for the work of a creative and reflective self, a matter which has received little attention from Sen. The lack of an ontological striving and a quest for self-development in

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his picture of persons limits Sen’s conceptualisation of human well-being and his sociology of multicultural toleration and epistemology of positional objectivity as well (2000:1015).

The question of self-reflection in development is addressed in Chapter 4 in discussing the ‘learning organisation’.

3.4.6 Summary of Ethical Theory

This presentation of the meta-theories of development ethics shows the complexity of each theory. It indicates some of the interconnections between them, as well as the impossibility of determining absolute development values. As an introduction there are also omissions31