Having examined each of the four metaphysical systems, I now turn to a comparative analysis, examining how well each answers the phenomena evil based on the following criteria:
(A) Factual Adequacy (B) Logical Consistency (C) Explanatory Power (D) Explanatory Scope (E) Ad hoc-ness (F) Plausibility
(1) How Plausible of an explanation is the theory/hypothesis in itself?
(2) How plausible of an explanation is the theory/hypothesis relative to the other hypotheses?
(G) Livability
Factual Adequacy
Regarding factual adequacy (A), to what extent can the naturalist or pantheist make sense of the salient facts of evil—the types and kinds of evil in the world (moral and natural), along with the quantity and intensity of such evils? It would seem that, if one were take a position such as Levine’s, a pantheist may have a better time of making sense of moral evil in the world than those forms of pantheism which deny the reality of good and evil altogether, or at least see evil as nothing more than an illusion. One would have to adopt some kind of principle which always promotes the good. But making sense of how a principle enforces or promotes the good is difficult and needs further explication on the part of the pantheist. Given something like the karmic system, how can such a law or principle judge as to whether a person has done the right or enough good, especially since laws, principles, and forces are not the kinds of things that can judge?
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For naturalism, in order to make sense of evil, apart from adopting some ad hoc hypothesis, such as Platonism or moral supervenience—both of which are not a given from naturalistic assumptions—it seems that all the naturalist can do, given her system, is to say that evil (if we can call it that) is a by-product of the way things are. Richard Dawkins has this to say about evil, pain, and suffering in the world:
The total amount of suffering per year in the natural world is beyond all decent
contemplation. During the minute that it takes me to compose this sentence, thousands of animals are being eaten alive, many others are running their lives, whimpering with fear;
others are slowly being devoured from within by rasping parasites; thousands of all kinds are dying of starvation, thirst, and disease. It must be so. If there ever is a time of plenty, this very fact will automatically lead to an increase in the population until the natural state of starvation and misery is restored. . . . In a universe of electrons and selfish genes, blind physical forces and genetic replication, some people are going to get hurt, other people are going to get lucky, and you won’t find any rhyme or reason in it, nor any justice. The universe that we observe has precisely the properties we should expect if there is, at bottom, no design, no purpose, no evil, no good, nothing but pitiless indifference.1
It would seem that naturalism is, at bottom, incapable of providing a satisfactory understanding of evil. Moreover, both pantheistic and naturalistic systems deny such a thing as natural evil in the world. No doubt that the effects of things like hurricanes or disease are tragic, but those kinds of things cannot be properly called evils, despite how it affects either the human or the animal realm. Naturalism also has a difficult time explaining moral evils, since a world like “evil” where moral evils are considered is hard to square with its determinism or near determinism.
But what of process panthentheism (PPT) and theism? Here, I take it that both Process panentheism and theism fare better at explaining the salient facts of evil than either naturalism or pantheism. Each system recognizes that there is such a thing as evil in the world and both have unique ways of answering the question of evil. Moral evil, given libertarian freedom, is not at all surprising in either system. For the defender of PPT, while it possible to explain the notions of
1 Richard Dawkins, River Out of Eden: A Darwinian View of Life (New York: Basic Books, 1995), 131-133.
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good and evil in the world, there are some central difficulties. One difficulty is that the PPT view of good and evil depends heavily on process metaphysics. While certain aspects of process metaphysics may turn out to be true, it is difficult to understand how we can have events without things. Moreover, the whole process metaphysic centers on creativity, but, even, here, there is nothing that underlines or grounds the creativity necessary for the various occasions to take place. A second difficulty is that Process thinkers must couch good and evil primarily in aesthetic terms rather than moral ones. This goes against how good and evil are usually understood, despite the fact that there may well be all manner of organic connections between the good and the beautiful. But even more so, if aesthetic principles take priority, then a number of moral principles may be violated in order to achieve the aims of those aesthetic principles.
Even more damaging, however, is the fact that it seems the sufferings and pains of creatures become a means to an end in order for God to achieve certain aesthetic purposes.
Perhaps, the greatest difficulty for theism is explaining the existence of natural evil, and particularly animal pain, although a world that operates according to certain stable natural laws is better than one ruled by unpredictable miraculous intervention. Furthermore, as argued in the previous chapter, such a world that has elements of risk, as our world does, has greater significance than ones without such risks. Lastly, theists recognize that such a world, finite, dynamic, and limited, inevitably leads to imperfection, especially if God has granted the creation to have a certain amount of freedom to be and to operate as He created it to be. This
understanding demonstrates an important metaphysical principle recognized by theists that there is a significant difference between the Creator and the creature, which theists base on the
contingency of the world (whether logically or temporally) and the necessity and eternality of God. Regarding animal pain, while theists face difficulties, there are resources within theism that