Methodological reductionism

Th e fi nal question that we should consider is methodological. Is it a good idea to try to reduce things if you want to explain them? Th ose who think that seeking reduction is a good tactic can be termed “methodological reductionists”. It is important to note that methodological reductionism is a comparatively weak position. Th e methodological reductionist claims not that all attempts to reduce phenomena will be successful, but merely that attempting to reduce them is a reasonable way to proceed. Typically, methodological reductionists will seek to justify their stance by considerations drawn from the history of science. Th e history of science indicates that sometimes reductions can be successful, and that even when attempts fail much can be learnt in the attempt.

Still, although methodological reductionism is a very weak thesis, at least in certain quarters methodological reductionism has a bad reputation. Many writers think that seeking reductionist explanations is somehow politically suspect. For a particularly clear example of such worries consider the following:

Th e real problem with reductionism, though, is that as a way of looking at human beings it is both negative and misleading … We need to look at explanations on a social level, as well as on an individual one … the fact that reductionist arguments comfortably avoid questions like this is one reason for their popularity among the very right-wing sectors of

society. (Hayes 1995: 16–17)

I think that seeking reductionist explanations is frequently justifi able and need not commit one to reactionary political claims. Reductionist explanations can be useful, because sometimes they give us a true account of why people behave in certain ways. Suppose, for example, that Steve is thrashing around on the fl oor, and we want to know why he is doing this. And, let us suppose that in this case Steve is thrashing around because he is having an epileptic fi t.

Explaining thrashing in terms of fi ts (and then in terms of brain processes) is a reductionist strategy. It is also the right strategy to adopt in this case. Th e

psychiatry and philosophy of science

reductionist explanation enables interventions that will make things better.

Once Steve has been diagnosed as suff ering from epilepsy, he can start taking drugs that will control his condition.

Nor need we restrict reductionist explanations to non-intentional behav-iours (such as fi tting). Suppose I go to pick up my friend at the airport and that she unfairly blames me for her fl ight delay. I am about to complain about her ingratitude, but then I refl ect that she has been on an overnight fl ight and has not eaten for hours. Now I know that people frequently turn nasty when they are tired and hungry, and so I give her some food and let her sleep, and she becomes nicer. Once again this is a reductionist strategy. In eff ect I am explain-ing my friend’s meanness in terms of physiological processes. Here too, though, the approach is justifi ed. Oft en food rather than rational argument is the best remedy for irritation. Th ere is nothing dehumanizing about recognizing that human beings are also biological animals.

All this being said, sometimes reductionist explanations do seem out of place. In his book Crime and Disease (1973), Anthony Flew discusses a young man who had shot his girlfriend nine times at point-blank range. His defence team argued that he was insane and did not understand what he was doing.

Under questioning the defendant refused this explanation. Over and over again he was asked whether he had really meant to kill his girlfriend. Finally, he replied, “I fi red to blow her fucking head off . How many times do you want me to tell you?”, and then explained his motives for the attack (ibid.: 90). Here seeking to explain the defendant’s actions using a reductionist explanation does indeed seem inappropriate. I suggest that the reason why reduction-ist explanations are out of place here is that in this case they do not explain the phenomenon very well. Explaining the defendant’s actions in terms of motives yields a better explanation than does explaining his action in terms of illness and so to say that he was overcome by a fl ood of brain chemicals is dehumanizing.

I conclude that sometimes we are able to fi nd good reductionist explana-tions (i.e. reductionist explanaexplana-tions with explanatory power) and that such explanations can be useful for guiding eff ective interventions. Th ere is nothing wrong with looking for reductionist explanations, and it is reasonable to be a methodological reductionist. What we need to be wary of is imposing reduc-tionist explanations in situations where they fail to explain phenomena as adequately as do higher-level explanations. Th ere is nothing wrong with good reductionist explanations; it is only bad reductionist explanations that should be avoided.

7.4 Conclusion

To summarize, at the metaphysical level, within psychiatry the big question is whether the mind is anything metaphysically over and above the physical. We saw that there are various accounts of the mind on the philosophical market.

Despite the claims of some writers, psychiatric research has not disproved dualism and it is still an open question whether the mind can be reduced to the brain. In any event, as long as one rejects eliminative materialism, mental states, whether reducible or not, will be real and talk of psychological states will be safe.

At the level of theories, the important question is whether psychological explanations can be reduced to neurological explanations. Th is question is dis-tinct from the metaphysical question about the nature of the mind. One can be a materialist about the mind while also thinking that psychological theories cannot be reduced to theories in a more basic science. Fodor and Davidson both give arguments that might persuade one to adopt such a position. Th e argu-ments of Fodor and Davidson are widely accepted. However, I have argued that the implications of their arguments for psychiatry are limited, and that projects within psychiatry that aim to reduce psychological theories to theories at a lower level may prove successful.

Finally we considered methodological reductionism. I argued that methodo-logical reductionism is a weak and reasonable position. Writers who argue that reductionist projects are in general politically dubious are mistaken.