In this dissertation a have used a diverse set of methods to capture the coordination dynamics during emergency response operations in different ways. As each research method has a specific focus and is tuned towards a particular goal, these choices also come with a cost. I will reflect on the consequences of three important methodological choices I have made.
First, in three empirical studies I have taken an actor perspective and observed and interviewed officers in command about the challenges they experienced when practicing cross-boundary coordination. This gave insight into coordination practices, on scene conversations, actions, and considerations. While zooming in on the cross-boundary coordination dynamics between different actors, I lost overview on the other sections of the response operation. In that respect it’s important to consider that the actor view is also a partial view. As I learned in retrospective interviews, these micro level observations are –alone– not sufficient to explain the coordination dynamics, since responders are also limited by access to information and their involvement in decision making cycles. Therefore, I chose in a later stage to develop a combination between detailed micro level data and studying coordination patterns on a network level.
Second, in different chapters I have reflected on the use of exercise observations versus real-life response operations. Scenario-based exercise sessions approach the reality of the disaster response operation as they start with a predefined script, but continue in any possible direction as the events unfold. These exercises differ from training sessions in that events are not interrupted for moments of reflection. Still, the scenarios are removed from reality and therefore may lack the same emotional aspects, decision impact and in some cases delay in the recruitment of units (Latiers and Jacques 2009). The advantage of studying field exercises is that it allowed me to roam around the terrain freely, shadow officers in command, and listen in on their conversations. This would have been impossible to do during real-life response operations, since I would be in the way and risk jeopardizing the response operations itself. To account for the difference between exercises situations and real-life response operations I interviewed the officers in command in retrospect and asked them to reflect on their involvement in recent emergencies. In addition, I have studied disaster reports from the Turkish Airlines crash, Schiphol train tunnel fire, Moerdijk Chemical Fire, and others, to compare the coordination dynamics I observed with the analysis made in these reports. The similarities
between the coordination issues described here, and the once I witnessed in the field exercises convinced me important parallels could be drawn, despite of the differences in pressure and decision impact.
Third, I have researched coordination in emergency response in the Netherlands. While there are mid-sized emergencies in the Netherlands on a regular basis, there are (luckily) no big disasters. Still, it’s important to ask what the scope of my findings is in relation to studies on larger disasters. Disaster management literature generally analyses and draws lessons from response operations to large-scale catastrophic events, such as the earthquake in Haiti, the hurricanes Katrina and Sandy in the United States, and the Typhoon Haiyan in the Philippines (Morris et al. 2007, Solnit 2010, Tierney et al. 2006, Van de Walle et al. 2015). During these disasters ‘regular’ disaster response structures, such as Incident Command Systems, are likely to be compromised. In all of the previous disasters the main challenge was that a large part of the local emergency response infrastructure was also hit and taken out by the disaster. Needless to say the response operation then comes to lie in the hands of other social structures, such as emergent citizen communities, or even international NGO’s and United Nations involvement. These response dynamics occur at a total different scale as the response dynamics witnessed in the Netherlands. Still, the micro level and network dynamics that I have witnessed can be of importance, even to these situations. In large-scale catastrophic events actions still have to be coordinated by the remaining networks of communities and the responding international community. Studies of colleagues in the aftermath of Typhoon Haiyan indicated that, for instance, local on-site coordination meetings were set up, that showed similarities to the negotiations in field command meetings I have studied (Van de Walle and Comes 2015). This indicates that field command coordination dynamics are, at heart, not that different, despite the larger magnitude of a disaster. Even in these meetings the same issues are at stake, such as problems with situational awareness, information overload, and coordination neglect. Therefore, despite of the large differences in the magnitude of the situation, I am convinced that analyzing coordination dynamics in field command meetings on a conceptual level, in situations with a smaller scale, also helps to build knowledge that is relevant for explaining coordination dynamics at the incident level during large scale disasters. In addition, fragmentation might be an even more relevant perspective during these large-scale catastrophic events, as the response operation literally takes place in different geographical areas, and is therefore very difficult to coordinate.