Introduction
With this framework in mind, this chapter also locates the methods and approaches used in this study, namely policy analysis, online community observation and interviews that were employed to explore the aftermath of Candlelight 2008. This section supports the rationale for adopting a multi-sited approach by explaining the impossibility of using one methodological approach to delineate the tripartite relationship between the Lee administration, the Korean web portals and the internet users. This section will examine the ways in which I collected data for the research project. The research deals with the Korean political and economic sectors of the internet industry as well as the users of Korean cyberspace. I adopted three methodological approaches for data collection, because these multi-methods of data collection serve best to open up a new landscape in terms of understanding the perceptions of the three actors of the aftermath of Candlelight 2008.
Each data collection method had distinct implications. Firstly, I collected documents relating to the government policies on the internet after Candlelight 2008, focusing on a series of measures announced between 2008 and 2010. This enabled me to check what legal-developmental aspects of the internet the government paid attention to in particular, for example malicious content on the web. I also collected documents relating to Korean web portal’s policy announcements. For example, the official announcement posted on their web sites as well as annual reports since the Lee administration started to pressurise the web portals were selected in order to check their reactions to government policies and internet users. This selection criterion used was if there were any significant changes in their enterprises after Candlelight 2008.
Furthermore, I gathered articles and media reports in order to grasp how the discourses relating to government actions after the events of 2008 were formed. The secondary data was helpful to comprehend the socio-economic context of the specific issues relating to the internet between 2008 and 2010. However, one of the issues that I encountered during the secondary research was that the documents of the government bodies and that of Korean web portals did not appear to be enough to
examine the situation behind the scenes in terms of defining the logics of the two institutions’ implicit rationale for announcing measures on the internet. However this limitation was covered by the subsequent interviews, which enabled me to verify the motivations of government announcements. For example, interviews with the government officials enabled me argue the measures announced by the Lee administration were not only aimed at regulating malicious contents online but also to control the voices expressing this content online. The interviews with Korean web portal representatives enabled me to conclude that the Korean web portals’
compliance resulted from the fact that they had no legal and institutional power to act against the government.
Secondly, I conducted interviews and email correspondence between 2009 and 2010.
All the face-to-face interviews were carried out during my visit to Korea in the summer of 2010. The interviewees were a diverse group: I met not only officials in government departments relating to internet regulation, but also stakeholders and officials involved in Korean web portals together with media activists, Korean professors in media communications, journalists, and ordinary people.
The adoption of the interview method was helpful, because it enabled me to find examples of the government’s and the Korean web portals’ perspectives that I checked in policy documents. However, there were several issues regarding research ethics (See Appendix: Ethics Form). One of the main issues that I came up against were difficulties in contacting government officials and stakeholders in the Korean internet industry, because the research topic was politically sensitive and the interviewees were reluctant to accept my interview requests. These issues will be narrated case by case. Email correspondence was also conducted, due to the geographical distance between the interviewees and me. For example, an administrator of the online community lived in Canada and I was not able to meet him due to time and budget constraints.
Thirdly, I conducted online participatory observation. The online communities that I observed were ExileKorea.net and Agora Justice Forum. The main priority of the online participatory observation was to investigate ‘cyber asylum seekers’ who planned to change their main online platform from a Korean based web portal to a non-Korean one since Candlelight 2008. Problems arose because these online
communities were either closed or stopped their cyber asylum project by the time I gained permission from the online communities. This issue was covered by interviews with the members of the online communities, which will be discussed in more detail later.
The interviews were conducted on the basis of research questions, which are as follows:
1. How did the Korean government react to the 2008 Candlelight demonstrations?
2. How did Korean web portals react to the government’s actions?
3. How did Korean internet users respond to these two institutions’ actions?
(See Appendix III: Basic Interview Question)
During the interviews, I found something in common between the interviewees. The interview topic tended to focus on issues relating to the aftermath of the demonstration and I gained the impression that they all remembered the events of 2008 and the series of events after this clearly. This brought me to the hypothesis that Candlelight 2008 had a great effect on the state, non-state actors and Korean intent users.
As briefly summarised, the adaptation of these three methods has not only sharpened my understanding of the issues and phenomenon relating to Candlelight 2008 and its aftermath, but also helped me to not have a prejudice when I came to evaluate the significance of each set of data. Thus considering the consolidation of each method in terms of finding the logic operating in each institution, the way in which I examined the issues of method will unfold institution by institution (community by community) rather than method by method (i.e. the issue of interviews compared to online participatory observation).
1. Government Bodies: Review of the Government Policies on the Korean Internet
The project began with a review of Korean government policies on the internet, because I assumed that the events such as the cyber asylum seeker’s project after Candlelight 2008 must have been considered as a reaction to the government’s
changed views on the internet and consequent actions to intervene in cyberspace. The collection of documents relating to the changing internet regulations was not difficult to find although I was in UK, because it was the government’s obligation to publish their announcement on the web. The websites that I visited to gather data are as follows:
- Korean Communications Commission:
http://eng.kcc.go.kr/user/ehpMain.do
- Korean Communications Standards Commission:
http://www.kocsc.or.kr/eng/Message.php
- Korean Internet Security Agency: http://www.kisa.or.kr/eng/main.jsp - Fair Trade Commission: http://eng.ftc.go.kr/
- The National Assembly of the Republic of Korea:
http://korea.assembly.go.kr/index.jsp
However, the document analysis was difficult because I was concerned that my views on the government plan for reforming bills on the internet could be biased by dominant views. The dominant views on the reform bills were focused on two principal tensions that were identified in the policy announcements. First, the media, particularly that on the left, criticised the rationale of the government for announcing
‘Internet Information – Security Comprehensive Countermeasures’ and the ‘Cyber Defamation Law’ that were published by the KCC in July 2008 and the Ministry of Justice respectively, because these were announced immediately following the 2008 Candlelight protest. The criticism of the left-wing media exhibited tensions between a promise of freedom of expression and the necessity to implement more regulations for the welfare of the public in cyberspace. Despite my strong sense of scepticism resulting from the timing of the government announcement, I left the rationale of the government bodies’ announcement unconfirmed until after the interviews with government officials. However, my concerns were helpful in constructing an interview questionnaire and were resolved after the interviews were conducted during the summer of 2010. Through the interviews, I was able to suggest that there has been an intentional intervention in an attempt to control the Korean web portal companies as well as Korean internet users since 2008.
Interviews with Official from Korean Government Bodies related to the Internet Based on the exploration of government policies and their implementation, I conducted interviews with officers of government bodies relating to internet regulation. The aim of the interviews (See Appendix: Interview List) was not only to enhance the policy analysis by including government officials’ points of view, but also to fill the gap between the policy planning objectives and the implementation of the policies in reality. However, several problematic issues arose.
Firstly, the most difficult task was to contact the interviewees. It was not difficult to find relevant interviewees in government bodies for my research, because names and contact details of the officials were on each department’s website. Based on the contact details that I acquired via websites, I tried to contact potential interviewees and requested interviews. However, my requests were met with a flat refusal. It was assumed that this resulted from the potential adverse consequences to the interviewees. Due to the fact that the proposed interviewees work for a government department, and that their statements will be quoted in this project when it is published, it might adversely affect their positions due to government pressure. Even if the anonymity of research participants and the confidentiality of the interview materials as a precautionary action were considered as of utmost importance for all participants, there would have been no reason for them to take risks and spend time on the interviews. I still managed to interview relevant interviewees in government bodies. Some of them expressed their frustrations in the gap between their own ideological views, the reaction of the government to Candlelight 2008 and their obligation to follow orders from the regime. These issues will be discussed further in Chapter 3.
2. Korean Web Portals
The Korean web portals’ annual reports, announcement via their websites, interviews with the stakeholders (see Appendix I: Interview List), and other media reports were adopted for data gathering relating to the Korean web portals.18 My approach to the
18 For major sources were found in URLs below.
For Daum.net: http://bbs.notice.daum.net/gaia/do/service/top/list?pageIndex=5&bbsId=00015 For Naver.com: http://www.naver.com/NOTICE
For other sources: http://www.kiso.or.kr. Please see Appendix for other resources.
secondary resources focused on their announcements as political reactions to the Lee administration and the users. However, Google Korea as a foreign-affiliated firm does not have an obligation to publicise their annual report. Rather, the profit from Google Korean becomes that from Google corporate so no detailed information relating to the profit of Google Korean could be found. Limitations in the empirical research on the web portals was evident as the secondary data was insufficient, making it difficult to define the logic of the web portals.
Interviews with the officers at the Korean Internet Industry
Based on the analysis of public statements of the Korean web portals, interviews with officers (policy makers) and stakeholders in the Korean internet industry were conducted in Korea during the summer of 2010. The aims of the interviews were to find out if respondents had noticed any alterations since Candlelight 2008 such as the changing characteristics of users of their web portals, and if there had been any intervention from the government regulatory body since then. This was also checked to establish if the Korean web portals had changed their R&D strategies as a consequence.
The recruitment of the relevant interviewees was as hard as that of government participants. It was difficult to find officials at Korean web portals who were willing to be interviewed. My interview requests were often rejected. For example, an official turned down my request to have an interview by writing an email that ‘We officially do not accept an interview in any request of which the purpose is for personal research’. Some were quite clear about their frustration with the current government and its approach to the internet. Others were worried about their positions in their institutions, but gave me clues to distinguish official statements from personal opinions, when they stated, for example, that ‘Well, on this question, I can officially answer’ (N.B. Appendix 1: Brief Descriptions of Interviewees).
In contrast, one interviewee told me that Candlelight 2008 was just one important events that happened in Korean history. She suggested to me that I should be careful attaching any significance to the events relating to the Korean web portals, because many of them were exaggerated by the press. The interviewee stated that:
The internet has always taken the role of a liberal space. However, due to the Korean government’s excessive reaction and a political dynamic, it seemed that the Internet was considered as a special space during a period of the Candle Demonstration. The internet activities of users were neither different nor explosive compared to their other Internet activities (Interview 08 July 2010).
It was at this moment that I questioned myself as to whether my stance on the event of 2008 and its aftermath was very biased. However, my anxiety was relieved when I met other interviewees. Several interviewees stated that the role of the internet was special during the events of 2008. For example, an interview with B, an ex-official at a Korean web portal company who worked for an association relating to the internet industry, made me realise that the negative perception of cyberspace was so embedded in Korean culture, which was revealed by the events of 2008. B exemplified an episode that the big press companies such as Chosun, Jong-Ang and Dong-A19 stopped providing for Daum.net, due to the boycott campaign of Chosun, Jong-Ang and Dong-A that were in favour of the beef import and against the demonstration. B stated that
The press companies criticised the reaction of the Daum.net to the users’
movement. That is, they saw us from the perspective of Old Media enterprise…
From their perspective, we were the service runner and they thought we could erase any postings if we wanted to. After the 2008 Candlelight demonstration, Daum.net suffered a bit [laughs]… The misconception could have been made in the way that Daum.net encouraged the activism of its users... This misunderstanding may come from the lack of the understanding about the Internet as a medium (Interview, 13 Aug 2010).20
Three other officials told me similar stories, which will be discussed in chapter 5 and 6. The interviews with the officials in the internet industry were useful, because I was able to find new ways to evaluate documents on internet policy. I would not have been able to find an appropriate way of conducting secondary data analysis if I had not met them. The most important ethical point here was privacy and anonymity protection. I informed the interviewees in advance that the anonymity and confidentiality of them would be guaranteed and the informed consent was signed by
19For detailed information about the boycott campaign, see Section 1 of Chapter 2 and Chapter 4.
20 As B had been working for a Korea internet industry for a long time, his explanation of the history of Korean internet policies suggested that government policies were a form of cyber control (see Appendix 1: Brief Descriptions of Interviewees).
the interviewees. However, I had the impression that they were worried about the potential adverse consequences, because most of them did double check their confidentiality and anonymity when the interview proceeded.
3. Korean Internet Users: Cyber Asylum Seekers and Underground Cyber Asylum Seekers
A brief description of online communities
* The Name of Web Site in Korean: Republic of Korea, Netizen Exile (Provisional)
* Notice to close the web site in Korea: ‘Thank you very for your love toward Netizen Exile.’
* Notice: The introduction of Netizen Exile (2008.07.26) Figure 1.2: An Introduction to the Website ExileKorea.net
ExileKorea was set up on the 26th July 2008 and mostly archived the posts that had been blocked from being read, or had the potential to be erased from the Korean Web portals by government intervention (Online Interview, 4 May 2010). Despite the characteristic of archiving postings from the Korean web portals, the disadvantage of this is that there is no real-time discussion section. On the 16th February 2010, Exile Korea was shut down due to personal issues of the administrator. The archive that Exile Korea had filled up was transferred to a personal blog. On the 1st March 2010, a
new Exile Korea with a different administrator was opened. With a new environment, it was necessary to use the ‘Tor (anonymity online) programme’21 to access it.
However, due to access difficulties, the previous administrator of Exile Korea had taken over the archive again. Postings on Exile Korea are now accessible without Tor, but it is not possible to upload new postings or make comments on the existing postings. Now, this was also closed and no data is available.
- No. of members: 5,527
- Korean online café name: Agora Justice Forum
Figure 1.3: An introduction to the online café, World Agora Justices Forum
After Agora was proven to be regulated by Daum.net, the administrator set up the café, World Agora Justice Forum (henceforth Agora Justice Forum), on the 8th March 2009 to prepare for cyber asylum with other Korean netizens. The main characteristic of this online community is a political stance against the current administration and their distrust of the Korean web portals.
Online Interviews
The interviews with the administrators of the websites carried out via email in 2009.
(See Appendix II: Online Interview with the Administrator of Exile Korea).
Cyber Asylum Seeker
As my subject matter is highly political sometimes people were afraid of criticising the Lee administration, which was not only the case when I met officials in the government bodies or internet industry. I have a similar impression from
21 Tor is ‘a free software implementation of second-generation onion routing, a system enabling its users to communicate anonymously on the Internet’ (see http://www.torproject.org/).
interviewees from the Cyber Asylum Seekers’ project. Their voice seemed to be contained, not because they were afraid of the Lee government, but because they were tired of their activism, which conflicted with their daily lives. It is worth stating that Atkinson points out the problematic issue of the ethnographic description of the field research. He states that: ‘Whatever the sincerity with which they were told, ethnographic stories were necessarily selective. Ethnographies were the textual construction of reality’ (Atkinson in Hine, 1990:44).
Similarly, I was worried about the possibility of constructing reality from a biased perspective. For example, I may have tactically picked up a passing remark of the interviewees at web portals such as ‘officially speaking’ as evidence that their voices are contained by the Lee government. I may have used the online community members’ statements regarding their sense of the failure of their cyber asylum seekers’ project as evidence to argue that the cyber asylum seekers’ project turned out to be a failure as a result of its radicalism and consequential break of solidarity.
Similarly, I was worried about the possibility of constructing reality from a biased perspective. For example, I may have tactically picked up a passing remark of the interviewees at web portals such as ‘officially speaking’ as evidence that their voices are contained by the Lee government. I may have used the online community members’ statements regarding their sense of the failure of their cyber asylum seekers’ project as evidence to argue that the cyber asylum seekers’ project turned out to be a failure as a result of its radicalism and consequential break of solidarity.