microDIRSIG Validation

Apart from reports on the conduct o f the police for which newspapers accounts were significantly useful, the newspapers also carried reports that were useful in resp ect o f the adm inistration o f the forces. I shall cite the cases o f the appointment o f Chiefs o f Police in the Kano and Adamawa emirates in the North in 1957 and 1958.

The appointment o f these Chiefs o f Police hark back to the princely-liaison officer scheme inaugurated in 1928 to boost the transformation from the dogarai to the yan doka phase o f policing.7 Under the scheme children o f the royalty were encouraged to hold leadership positions in the N.A.

police forces in their domains. The cases confirm that the hopes on the scheme, which included the enhancement o f the prestige o f the Emir, the upholding o f his authority and the exciting o f the interest o f more respectable citizens in police w ork, had been realised. T h e appointees were not just beneficiaries o f the patronage system that was associated with the governmental system in the emirates. They were also members o f the royally, just like their predecessors in office.

Indeed, one o f them became the Emir o f Kano five years later.

None o f them had, however, been in the force before their appointment.

O n 28 February 1956, the Kano Chief o f Police, Alhaji Kabiru, w as suspended for som e w rongdoing and was eventually relieved o f his p o st/ He was Emir Sanusi’s brother.

He la te r bag g ed th e p ost o f D istric t H ead, a ch o ice appointment by contemporary emirate standards. The post o f Chief o f Police was then offered to Kabiru's immediate junior brother. Ado Bayero, who at the time was an elected NPC member o f the regional House o f Assembly. He did not immediately accept it.

Ado Bayero had won his seat in a bye-election in the general elections o f 1956, having defeated Mallam Baba Dan'agundi o f the Northern Elements Progressive Union (NEPU) - the major opposition party in Northern Nigeria in the era o f party politics which was led by Aminu Kano and with its headquarters in Kano - and his own friend. Mallam Ali Abdullahi who stood as an independent candidate.0 He had m ade a n am e fo r h im s e lf in th e H o u se by his outspokenness. He must have been among the most educated m em b ers, hav in g ju s t passed ou t o f th e In stitu te o f Administration. Zaria and he w as probably the youngest at 26. His initial demur therefore might not be unconnected with the allure o f parliamentary life in the circumstances.

He, however, yielded to pressure and consented to sacrifice his active political career saying that 'it is good to make sacrifices some time, and this is the first time in my life that I have made [a] sacrifice”.10 But he did not vacate his scat until after his installation which was on 12 April, 1957 at an impressive ceremony witnessed by a large concourse of people who came from all over Kano." He emphaissed the importance o f his new office - which was common knowledge - in a later letter o f resignation to the President o f the House o f Assembly.11 It was one that carried heavy responsibility but he neglected to add that it also earned enormous powers

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and inestimable perquisites!

H is appointm ent w as qu ite popular, even w ith the opposition NEPU. It was reported that Aminu Kano described it as “a good gesture and a good omen for the future of Kano”. 13 He hoped that his youthfulness, firm ness and broadmindedness would reflect well on the NAPF. He saw his re sig n a tio n fro m th e h o use and p o litic s as “ the manifestation o f his sincerity.”

In what smacked o f compensation for his lost seat in the le g isla tu re , B ay cro w as la te r rew ard ed w ith a board appointment.14 The official reason for putting him on the board o f the Northern Regional Broadcasting Corporation was that he had "experience and knowledge o f Local Government affairs” ! Ado Bayero was in office until 1961 when he was made Nigeria’s ambassador to Senegal. From there he was later recalled to become the Em ir in 1963 after the deposition o f Sanusi and the death o f his immediate successor.

A year after the appointment o f Ado Bayero in Kano, a sim ilar appointment was made in the Adamawa emirate.

Again, much o f the information about the appointment was carried in the N igerian C itizen, th e N orthern regional government’s newspaper. The royal exclusivity o f the post o f C hief o f Police is also emphasised in this example. Here too, it was not uncommon for holders o f the post to graduate to the Lamidoship (Lamido is the Fulani title for Emir and that is what is used in that emirate). The headquarters o f the emirate was Yola, which also served as the headquarters o f the Yola province

Mai lam Adamu Bawuro was the son o f a late Lamido of Adamawa, Mallam Musdafa15. Bom in 1925, he was educated

at the Yola Elementary School and the Yola Middle School.

He joined the NA service in 1945 as a Central Office scribe (an upw ardly-m obilc post) and later served in various capacities. His last administrative post was Assistant Council Secretary. AH that while, his father was the Lamido and his elder brother, Aliyu Musdafa, was the C hief o f Police with the title o f Walin Adamawa.

Their father died in 1958 and Aliyu had to ascend the throne. To fill the vacant position o f C hief o f Police. Adamu was selected and sent to the Northern Police College, Kaduna fo ra six-month course. He was subsequently appointed, with the title o f Makaman Doka.

His installation had every touch o f a royal coronation. It was reported that “the Lamido o f Adamawa. Mallam Aliyu Musdafa, has conferred the title o f Makaman Doka on Mallam Adamu Bawuro Musdafa” 16 (Emphasis added). So it was like a chieftaincy title which was the privilege o f the king to bestow on any worthy subject o f his! And the scene was described thus:

The turbanning ceremony was watched by many people. He was escorted home by a large crowd o f p eople in cars, on horses and on f o o t.17 (Emphasis added)

T h e sam e n e w sp a p e r a lso p ro v id ed very u sefu l information on the loss o f office in Zaria by a beneficiary of this royal preferment in 1957. Mallam Mamman Sule had been appointed C hief o f Zaria NA police force in 1955.

Between 1955 and 1957 when he lost office, Sule was a thorn in the flesh o f all the NPF advisers (four o f them) who worked with the Zaria NAPF. He was incom petent, corrupt and

unamenable to correction, not to talk o f discipline. But all the complaints by the N PF advisers were ignored by the Native Authority because o f Sule's royal connections.18 When his men were on the verge o f a mutiny in early 1957, Sule was suspended from office.19 At the inquiry set up by the NA, the following charges were preferred against him:

(i) th at he receiv ed £ 4 2 .1 7 s.6 d from L ance- Corporal Tanko Dangata in order to promote him to the rank o f Corporal;

(ii) that he was given £8 by Alhaji Dangora from Lance-Corporal Tanko;

(iii) that he received 7s. from ex-Constable Sarkin Zagin Galadima; and

(iv) that he received a sum o f money from Corporal Danladi Bimin Gwari.20

Not unexpectedly, he denied the allegations after he had sworn on the Holy Qur'an ‘four times'. He was. however, found guilty and consequently dismissed from office in July.21

His successor, M alam Nuhu Yahaya, had served in various NA departments since 1938. He was in the police force where he rose to the rank o f Sergeant in 1950. At the time o f his appointment, he was a cashier in the NA service.

But he was also the Treasurer o f the NPC, Z an a branch.22 The case o f Mallam Sule's relationship with NPF advisers to NAPF is symptomatic o f the general trend in the North;

that is, whereas the NPF officers had enormous responsibilities to the NAPFs in terms o f training and management, they lacked the authority to discipline erring NA police officers and men. The contrary was the case in the West. There, from the mid-1930s. the NAPFs had in every significant respect

been subordinated to the officers o f the NPF who were detailed to work with them. Indeed, their nomenclature, ‘Officer-in- C h a rg c ’, a tte s te d to th e s u p e ro rd in a te /s u b o rd in a te relationship.2'B u t as it will be shown presently, the Action Group government o f Western Nigeria decided early in the immediate post-independence years to change the order and brin g it at p ar w ith what o b tain ed in the N o rth . The government’s action generated a lot o f furore by the opposition in the regional and federal legislative houses. Again, the significant point here is that much o f the information on the row w as o b ta in e d from n e w sp a p e r re p o rts w hich I corroborated with records o f parliamentary debates and oral interviews.

DEBATING NAPF-NPF RELATIONSHIP IN THE WEST

While the Northern regional government w'as endeavouring to in c re a se its c o n tro l o v e r th e N A P F s in the post- independence years, the Western regional government was struggling to assert its control over the forces. The process got the government entangled with the NPF and other vested interests. The crisis centred round the leadership o f the LGPFs and the degree o f influence that could be exercised by the NPF vis-a-vis that o f the regional government. For a better understanding o f the issues it is necessary to go back, in time, to the provincialisation scheme o f 1938 (in Oyo province)24 and 1955 (in the w ider region)2-' even if briefly.

The 1938 scheme in Oyo province set the pattern in the subordination o f the NAPFs in Western Nigeria to the NPF.

The 1955 Local Government Police Law not only widened

the scope o f provincialisation. it also reiterated the fact o f the subordination. The law provided for the appointm ent o f superior NPF officers as Chief Officers at the provincial level and as Superintendent-General at the regional level. All this was evidence o f good liaison between the two forces. But in the changed, and constantly changing, political circumstances o f the region from late 1959 the continued subordination of one to the other was clearly unacceptable. The Akintola government harboured the fear o f sabotage by these NPF officers, especially the Superintendent-General. They had a double loyalty: one to the regional government and the other to the NPF whose political head was the Prime Minister. At that time Akintola's AG party was the major opposition party to the NPC/NCNC coalition federal government. To free itself from the encumbrance that the arrangement constituted, the Akintola government effected a change in the position of Superintendent-General in 1961. Not unexpectedly, it met with considerable opposition.

Apparently the plan to whittle down the influence o f the NPF had begun in 1960. In that year, the government promoted some LGP officers to the rank o f Assistant Chief Officer.26 These officers were expected to understudy the NPF officers serving as Chief Officers with the hope to take over later. The change o f personnel in the Superintendent-General's post can therefore be regarded as advancement in the government's plan. By that year, three NPF officers - Pallet, Swain and M arsdcn - had occu p ied th at p o sitio n .27 With th e full knowledge and consent o f the NPF regional authorities and even of the Prime M inister's office, the government appointed one Chief E.A. Oluwolc who had retired from the NPF as

Senior Superintendent o f Police in January 1961 to the post, on contract with effect from 13 February 1961.28 If the Akintola government felt more comfortable having somebody w ho h ad no e x tra -re g io n a l lo y a ltie s in th e p ost o f Superintendent-General, the NCNC opposition in the West, the NPC-NCNC coalition federal government and even the NPF felt bad. They expressed their disquiet not only in parliament but also in the law court.

The constitutionality o f O luw olc's appointment was queried on the floor o f the House o f Representatives in a motion by the Prime Minister on 29 August. 1961.20 It was part o f his reaction to the strident cry by the NCNC. for some time then, that law and order had broken down in the West.*0 The comments o f those who supported the motion can be summarised. O ne, the appointment was in violation o f section 98. subsections 4. 7 and 8 o f the 1960 Constitution which related to the establishment and territorial jurisdiction o f police forces in Nigeria. Two. by appointing an officer with region-wide powers the government had created a Regional Police Force and this was considered a backdoor approach to achieving a goal it had sought unsuccessfully during the pre- independence constitutional conferences. Three, the appointee was a crony o f Akintola’s who could not be expected to do justice to all manner of men without affection or ill-will. Four, since his appointment, it had been impossible for the NPF to cooperate with the LGPFs. Five, the LGP Law o f 1955 under which the government purported to have acted was ultra vires the 1960 Constitution and should therefore be set aside. Six, the ‘n e w ’ o rd e r in the West w as no t in line w ith the management procedure o f NAPFs in the North. Seven, the

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governm ent’s action had interfered w ith the executive authority o f the federal government31.

The only speaker against the motion was Anthony Enahoro o f the AG. He was eminently qualified to speak on it because it was during his tenure as the Minister o f Home Affairs in the Western region (he held the post from 1955 to 1959 when he moved to the federal house), that the re­

organisation o f the old NAPFs, which included the change in nomenclature and creation o f the controversial post, took place in 1955. He made eight points. One, the post was not new; it had been in existence for six years and had been held by three superior expatriate NPF officers. Indeed, the first one. Mr.

Pallet, had been the same officer who had arrested him for sedition some years previously but they enjoyed working together. Two, the new officer. Oluwolc, held the same rank, before his retirement from the NPF, as the previous holders o f the post. Three, there was no Regional Police Force but rather there were local Government Police Forces organised on provincial basis within the region. Hence, the title o f the regional coordinator was the ‘Superintendent-General o f Local Government Police Forces’ and not ‘Superintendent-General o f Local Government Police Force’. Four, the operational control of individual Provincial LGPFs was vested in the Chief Officer appointed by the Provincial Joint Committee, itself established by the component local government authorities.

Five, the Superintendent-General was an agent o f government, appointed by the G overnor, to ensure that the regional government’s financial contributions to the recurrent cost of m aintaining the fo rces and fo r training w ere properly expended. Furthermore, he provided expert advice to the

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\ario u s authorities, including the regional executive council, so as to promote efficiency and to achieve some degree of uniformity in all the forces. Six. there was nothing in the management o f the NAPFs in the North that made that style superior to that adopted in the West. After all. there were complaints o f interference by politicians in the management o f the forces there too. Seven, it could not be true that the regional N PF authorities w ho had endorsed O luw ole's appointm ent w ould turn round to com plain o f lack o f cooperation from the man. Eight, the appropriate place to resolve a constitutional question was the Supreme Court, not the floor o f Parliament.32

In the end. supporters o f the motion won. It was resolved that.

this House views with grave concern the appointment by th e G o v ern m en t o f W estern N ig e ria o f a Superintendent-General of Local Government Police since such appointment interferes with the executive authority o f the Federation.33

The Prime Minister must least have expected that Premier Akintola would react the way he did. The latter took his g o v e rn m e n t's c a se to th e p re ss b y p u b lish in g the correspondence that were exchanged between his office and that o f the Prime Minister before Oluwole was appointed.34 One o f the letters was an apology from the Cabinet Office to retract an earlier accusation that the W estern regional government had breached the agreement on when Oluwole should have assumed duty. In his press statement, the Premier disclosed that he would only allow the NPF to resume control o f the LGPFs if the NAPFs in the North were similarly treated.

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He declared that.

Under no circumstances will I accept an inferior status either in degree o f authority or standard of efficiency for the Local Government Police Forces o f Western Nigeria.35

The controversial appointment and the general question o f the maintenance o f law and order in Western Nigeria formed the agenda at a special meeting o f the Police Council held in Kaduna on 16 September 1961.36 It is clear even from the minutes o f that meeting that the grouse o f the Prime Minister (and that o f his political associates) was more over the fact that ‘a non-serving Nigerian Police Officer' was appointed than that the appointment was unconstitutional. The Eastern Nigerian delegation called for the scrapping o f the post. The LGP should cither be brought under the NPF o r be run along the lines o f the North. The Premier o f the Northern Region, Sir Ahmadu Bello, promised to make available to his Western Region counterpart a note on the system o f NAPFs and their relationship with the NPF. Premier Akintola welcomed the m ove and prom ised to am end the relevant law, where necessary, after due consultation with the opposition. The truce was hailed by a section o f the press which adjudged the Northern system the better and called on the Western Nigerian government to borrow a leaf from it.37 But the note prepared by th e N orthern regional governm ent co u ld only have strengthened the Western regional government's resolve to keep the influence o f the NPF at a minimal level. NPF officers in the North were ‘advisers' to NAs on police affairs: they were not ‘controllers.38

Even before the appointment was debated on the floor of

the House o f Representatives, its constitutionality had been challenged in a Grade ‘A’ custom ary court in Ilcsa. The criminal case in which the Superintendent-General was the prosecutor involved an NCNC supporter, Seidu Olajire. The defence counsel was Babatunji Olowofoyeku, an NCNC member o f the House o f Assembly.39 Quoting sections o f the 1960 constitution on the establishment o f police forces, the counsel held the view that the regional police law that created the office was ultra vires the constitution. He applied to the customary court judge to refer the matter to the regional high court for determination.

The question did go before the high court and was decided by Justice O. Somolu in November 1961. The constitutionality o f the appointment was affirmed and the case was remitted back to the customary court for hearing.40 Oluwole eventually lost the office but it w as during th e Emergency (M ay- Dcccmbcr 1962) when Dr. M.A. Majckodunmi served as the Administrator.41 While the Emergency lasted. theLGPFs were put under the operational control o f the NPF but there was nobody appointed to the office o f Supcnntendcnt-Gencral.

The office was restored in 1963 when the second governm ent headed by A kintola under the UPP/NCNC coalition was inaugurated. But Akintola had to bow to the pressures o f his NCNC partners in the coalition to pick a serving NPF officer, Joseph Adcola, at the time an Assistant C o m m issio n er o f P olice.42 T h e ch o ice o f A dcola was influenced by the following considerations. One, it was in deference to the wishes o f the NCNC coalition partners one o f whose members, Adcoyc Adisa. was the Minister o f Home Affairs. The NCNC had always held the view that some

supervision by the NPF was necessary to check the tendency by politicians in power to misuse men o f the LGPFs. Premier A k in to la ag reed to the request because he had y et to consolidate his hold on power. Two, Adcola was a popular choice. He had acquired fame as a keen sportsm an, and politicians on both sides o f the coalition could vouch for his integrity. Although he was from the Mid-West region, he was well known in social circles in Lagos and Ibadan, circles to which many o f the men in power also belonged.43

The birth o f the NNDP in 1964 meant the exit o f some ministers from the government. The Minister o f Home Affairs, Adcoye Adisa, was one o f those who left. The crisis of legitimacy and the concomitant fear o f insecurity confronted by the government did not abate. The fear o f sabotage by the NPF. despite the NNDP’s romance with the Prime M inister’s party, the NPC. also did not abate. Things cam e to a head on 5 July 1964, when the NPF anti-riot squad (the Police Mobile Force) had a violent clash with some men, suspected to be thugs, in the entourage o f the Deputy Premier, R.A. Fani- Kayode at a spot on the Ife-Ibadan road.44 One Latecf Makindc, in the Deputy Prem ier’s entourage, eventually died from injuries sustained during the clash. The regional government set up a coroner’s inquest headed by acting Chief Magistrate A.O. Adeyemi45 The coroner indicted the PMF for behaving discourteously to the Deputy Premier and for ‘rash, furious and unreasonable conduct' because they had w ay-laid a peaceful convoy. He ordered that further investigations be conducted into Makinde s death to identify the killer for possible prosecution.46 The government was prevailed upon by the Prime Minister to stay action on aspects of the coroner’s