This section maps out how the concepts of development and migration are both intimately intertwined. Both processes are inherently contested and invoke conflicting views. The significance of this relation was highlighted in the 2010 World Migration Report that contains an explicit elaboration about the need to mainstream migration in national development agendas (IOM, 2010). However, the inherently political nature of migration governance made it virtually impossible to achieve international consensus on targets and indicators in relation to international migration and making it a distinctive Millennium Development Goal (MDG)1 at the time (Skeldon, 2008b). Succeeding the MDGs, the international community agreed to adopt the current framework of international development the so-called Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) in 2015, that will guide aid and development policies between 2016 and 2030 (Kindornay & Twigg, 2015). In comparison to the MDGs, the SDGs are not only more complex in scope and ambition, but also link migration and development far more explicitly, effectively integrating migration for the first time ever into a global development framework (UN, 2015). International migration implicates the SDGs in a number of ways. For instance, emigration of skilled health professionals and the resulting absence of health practitioners can have an impact on public health in developing countries (Usher & IOM, 2005). Moreover, for some countries, migration has become a constituent part of their national
1 The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) reflected an international effort to improve human well-
being primarily in ‘developing’ countries (Vandemoortele, 2009). Based on an agreement between 192 countries, the MDGs consisted of eight goals that were to be achieved by 2015 such as eradication of extreme poverty and hunger, achieving universal primary education etc. Each of these goals had a number of specific measurable targets and indicators (United-Nations, 2014). Unlike the MDGs, the SDGs comprise 17 goals, are far more comprehensive and universal in scope in that they recognise fundamental issues such as growing inequality and environmental degradation as global problems that implicate wealthy industrialised aid donor countries as much as aid recipient countries (Sachs, 2012).
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development framework (Mughal, 2013; O' Neil, 2004; N. Phillips, 2009). The current trend and increasing interest of countries to build durable relationships with their diaspora, is underpinned by renewed and often overly positive views as to how migration relates to development. While discussions of this relationship have traditionally swung back and forth between optimism and pessimism, the currently dominating perspective assumes that migration is beneficial for all stakeholders, migrants, developing countries and destination countries (de Haas, 2010; de Haas & Rodríguez, 2010; Gamlen, 2010; Newland, 2010; Skeldon, 2008a; UNDP, 2009).
Brushing the migration - development relations in bright and optimistic colours, often underscores the hope that emigration of the highly skilled population does not necessarily constitute a one and for all loss for developing countries. Instead, traditional concerns of brain drain, the dominant view throughout the 1970s and 1980s came to be reframed around brain circulation that assumes a multi-directional mobility of skilled migrants and knowledge workers (Beine, Docquier, & Rapoport, 2008; Blachford & Zhang, 2014; Boeri, 2012; Gibson & McKenzie, 2014; Portes, 2008; Saxenian, 2005; Solimano, 2008). These proponents of brain circulation suggest that emigration may not be equated with the eternal loss of human capital and skills. The overarching theme of brain circulation suggests that due to improved internet and telecommunication opportunities, as well as up-scaled corporeal mobilities, migrants remain in touch and connected with their country of origin. As such, they can contribute via knowledge and expertise exchange to capacity building in their respective home countries.
The UN’s Transfer of Knowledge Through Expatriate Nationals programme (TOKTEN) was a first institutional response that addressed increased concerns that brain drain has negative ramifications for the development aspirations of less developed countries. The TOKTEN programme was created in 1976/1977 and was geared towards supporting the temporary return of skilled migrants (Logan, 1990; Rao, 2006). TOKTEN’s objective was to offer a framework for mitigating the effects of brain drain by supporting the temporary and voluntary return of skilled migrants to their country of origin for a brief period of time, usually ranging between two weeks and six months. During their temporary stay, highly skilled expatriates are placed in research institutions or universities, to provide their technical expertise, policy advice and research to the public sector, governments and the private sector (Muneer, 2011, p. 91). Those early attempts to utilise expatriates’
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expertise were largely framed along developmentalist ideas through which wider political issues of social well-being in developing countries could be addressed. However, more recently emerged initiatives to institutionalise state-diaspora relations, gained largely traction throughout the late 1990s and 2000s and often invoked notions of individualism that tends to accompany human capital discourses (Larner, 2007, p. 336).
Views that advocated for the beneficial impact migration has on development, also often point to the professional and scientific networks that emerged in the 1990s (Meyer & Brown, 1999; Meyer et al., 1997). At the heart of these networks were often scientists that formed loose groups in order to collaborate in research projects. To a large extent, those early research and science networks were only retrospectively ‘discovered’ by governments and incorporated in national development strategies (Larner, 2007, p. 336). A well-documented case study of a scientific network is the Colombian network Red Caldas that was established in Columbia after policies designed to incentivise the return of Columbian researchers largely failed in the 1980s (Chaparro, Jaramillo, & Quintero, 2006; Granés, Morales, & Meyer, 1996; Meyer, Kaplan, & Charum, 2001). The Red Caldas network was created in 1991 to establish linkages between Columbian researchers residing overseas and in Columbia for the purpose of strengthening the Columbian domestic science and research capacities. After some successes in advancing research partnerships between Columbia and other countries the network was downscaled due to restraints in the national budget and concomitant lack of political support (Chaparro et al., 2006; Meyer et al., 2001). As for embracing diaspora knowledge networks, the enthusiasm that was to surround the effectiveness of these actors, was not initially given. For instance, the authors of a report for the World Bank voiced considerable doubt about the viability of diaspora knowledge networks and cautioned against the celebration and expectations of the people involved in those networks (Lowell & Gerova, 2004, p. 24). However, as discussed in more detail below these concerns did not last, nor did they seem to have had an impact on the World Bank’s decision to launch its Diaspora for Development programme in 2005.
The growing importance of none-state actors in the context of development is testament to the rapidly changing geographies of aid in particular, and development in general (IFAD et al., 2013; Richey & Ponte, 2015). The rise of non-traditional partnerships, networks and alliances in development processes does not necessarily signify the
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emergence of new actors per se, but may rather be seen as a process that opens up new spaces of inquiry and interrogations (Richey & Ponte, 2014). This insight holds true for migrant networks that have been shaping the trajectories of regions and countries well before the introduction of the modern nation-state (Castles, Haas, & Miller, 2014). While traditionally, the main actors in development are state, market and civil society (IDS, 2016), a more inclusive and historical reading of development actors allows for framing networks such as migrant, or diaspora networks as classical actors in development2.
Similarly, development is equally diverse and characterised by elements of ideological argument and a multitude of approaches and dimensions hence, “the concept of development itself is a contested concept” (Naerssen van, Spaan, & Zoomers, 2008, p. 3). Development, or lack thereof, such as deprived livelihood options has been described as causative for migratory movement; push factors such as low income, lack of economic opportunity or politically suppressive environments were seen as the primary reasons for emigration. In addition, the exodus of productive human capital in less developed countries, commonly known as ‘brain drain’ framed much of the debate on migration and development. As the amounts of transferred remittances increased, attention was drawn to their direct influence on national income in source countries and the indirect impact that may occur through investment.