mind the gap

So what could be done to close the gap between this vision and the present-day reality? To address this it is first helpful to consider why the transformation has not taken place.

At its root, Lubchenco’s New Social Contract requires a substantial reform of climate scientists’ roles and behaviours. Susan Michie and her co-authors²⁴⁶ have developed a generalized framework to analyze,

characterize and address behavioural change challenges. The Behavioural Change Wheel identifies three factors that are necessary and sufficient prerequisites for the performance of a specified volitional behaviour. These are motivation (the brain processes that energise and direct behaviour), capability (these may be physical or psychological, the latter being the knowledge and skills necessary for the behaviour) and opportunity (the physical and social context that enables or promotes the behaviour).

Motivations may be ‘reflective’, in the sense that they involve analyzing the cost and benefits of a given course of action (e.g. belief that an activity is

‘wrong’ or ‘harmful’), or ‘automatic’, in the sense that they involve drives, emotional processing and habits. Any given behaviour in its context can be analyzed within this framework, revealing the location and nature of the issues that are blocking progress and the alterations that are required for the behaviour to change.

In the case of transforming the norms, values and practices of climate science, motivation presents a significant obstacle. We have noted that the prime motivational driver for most researchers is carrying out their science (Section 1.3). As the climate science enterprise has expanded, ever-larger numbers of researchers have found themselves “privileged to be able to indulge their passion”. As a result, there has been little incentive for already busy individuals to take on additional demanding commitments in areas of climate science communication the science–policy interface for which they have little training or experience. Factors reinforcing the situation are the academic rewards system, which continues to place priority on publishing original research, and a pervasive prejudice amongst scientists that

120 Rising to the Challenge

‘outreach’ activities are lower status than, and a distraction from, the main objective (i.e. understanding and predicting the climate system)⁴⁰.

Those individuals who have engaged in such activities, with notable

exceptions, have tended to be drawn from the more established members of the community. These figures are arguably better able to take the time and the risk (as well as being seen as more ‘expert’), having more freedom of control over their schedules and being more secure in their posts.

Although they have been rewarded through increased status, influence and access to power, many have found the consequences double-edged, having become the target of attack within the blogosphere and the media.

At the institutional level, the experience has been similar.

Even assuming it were possible to generate a ‘strong intention’, a second issue blocking progress concerns capability. Typically, once objectives have been agreed the execution of transformational change requires a combination of know-how, and strong leadership. We have noted the general lack of familiarity of climate scientists with the insights of the political and behavioural sciences (representing highly relevant know-how), and this is undoubtedly an obstacle.

More fundamentally, the science community is ‘self-organising’ and not amenable to authoritative direction (see also Section 1.4). This is a cherished principle, enshrined within the UK by the Haldane Principle²⁴⁷, which ensures that the focus of research is under the control of scientists, free from political and administrative pressures. Similar arrangements apply in most nations worldwide. The unwitting consequence is the lack of an instrument or means by which collective reform can be addressed. In addition to protecting science against political manipulation, the situation is analogous to that of the free market in which it is assumed that the ‘invisible hand’, corresponding to the aggregate consequences of countless individual decisions, drives progress more effectively than centralized control. As is the case for the financial

markets, the scientific enterprise is vulnerable to its insensitivity to externalities that by definition have no influence on individual decisions. In the case of climate science, the need to better serve society is one such externality. The need to overcome cross-disciplinary barriers is arguably another.

Time for Change? 121

For free markets, the curative mechanism is regulation. But this is only possible through the intervention of a higher authority, typically government regulation through law. As we have seen, the science enterprise has

been established in a manner designed specifically to prohibit such intervention. The challenge then is to find a means by which change can be effected voluntarily, retaining the integrity of the Haldane Principle, yet achieving the psychological capability (engaging in the necessary thought processes of comprehension and reasoning) and the physical capability (developing an instrument and mechanisms) to make progress. To foster cross-disciplinarity (and international coordination) the solution adopted was to establish the Global Change programmes that derive their legitimacy from their sponsorship by the international science bodies (World Meteorological Organization, International Council of Science, International Social Science Council). We build on this approach in the next Section.

Regarding opportunity, the situation is mixed. Concerning communication, despite a view within some parts of the media that climate science is ‘toxic’

and hence a risky subject in which to invest effort, there is evidence that the lay public are interested to learn more in order to be able to ‘make up their own minds’. This is illustrated by the popularity of public lectures, articles and books on the subject, and, for example, by the experience of the ‘atmosphere’ gallery at London’s Science Museum¹⁹⁷ (two million visitors in just over two years), and by the success of the museum’s Dana Centre dialogue events.

Concerning the science–policy interface we have noted the inappropriateness of the ‘technocratic model’, the danger of the ‘Iron Triangle’ (Section 1.5), and the need to shift responsibility and accountability for society’s decisions on the results of climate science back to the democratically-elected

politicians and decision-makers. Although examples of scientist involvement in co-production-like activities exist (see Section 1.5), and although

references to its desirability can be found, these are the exception rather than the rule. For example the Research Councils UK Strategic Vision²⁴⁸ and Pathways to Impact²⁴⁹ betray their origins in the ‘technocratic’ mindset and are far from conforming to the concept outlined by Mike Hulme (Section

122 Rising to the Challenge

1.2) and illustrated in Figure 6b. In practice this may prove the most difficult obstacle to overcome, since it confronts the difficulty of changing established practices in policy formulation and decision-making that lie outside the influence of climate scientists.