minimization of skill requirements and job-learning time 5. the reduction of material handling to a minimum

The centrepiece of scientific management was the separation of tasks into their simplest constituent elements (first principle). Most manual workers were sinful and stupid, and therefore all decision-making functions had to be removed from their hands (second

principle). All preparation and servicing tasks should be taken away from the skilled worker, and performed by unskilled and cheaper labour (third principle). According to Littler this is the Taylorist equivalent of the Babbage Principle and is an essential element of more work intensification (1982, p. 51). Minimizing skill requirements to perform a task reduces

labour's control over the labour process (fourth principle). Management should ensure that the configuration of machines minimizes the movement of people and materials to save time (fifth principle). Taylor's approach to job design, argues Littler, embodies 'a dynamic of deskilling' and offers to organizations 'new structures of control' (1982, p. 52).

Some writers argue that Taylorism was a relatively short-lived phenomenon that died in the economic depression in the 1930s. Rose argues that scientific management did not appeal

to most employers: 'Some Taylorians invested a great effort to gain its acceptance among American employers but largely failed' (1988, p. 56). This view underestimates the diffusion and influence of Taylor's principles on job designers. In contrast to Rose, Braverman argues that: 'the popular notion that Taylorism has been "superseded" by later schools of "human relations", that it "failed"... represents a woeful misreading of the actual dynamics of the development of management' (1974, pp. 86–7). Similarly, Littler and Salaman have argued that 'In general the direct and indirect influence of Taylorism on factory jobs has been extensive, so that in Britain job design and technology design have become imbued with neo-Taylorism' (1984, p. 73).

Fordism

Henry Ford applied the major principles of Taylorism but also installed specialized machines and perfected the flow-line principle of assembly work. This kind of job design has come to be called, not surprisingly, Fordism. The classical assembly line principle should be

examined as a technology of control of employees, and as a job design to increase labour productivity, both job fragmentation and short task-cycle times are accelerated. Fordism is also characterized by two other essential features, the introduction of an interlinking system of conveyor lines that feed components to different work stations to be worked on, and second, the standardization of commodities to gain economies of scale. Fordism established the long-term principle of mass production of standardized commodities at a reduced cost (Coriat, 1980).

The speed of work on the assembly line is determined through the technology itself, not through a series of instructions. Management control of the work process was enhanced also by detailed time and motion study inaugurated by Taylor. Work study engineers

attempted to discover the shortest possible task-cycle time. Henry Ford's concept of people management was simple. 'The idea is that man... must have every second necessary but not a single unnecessary second' (Ford, 1922, quoted in Beynon, 1984, p. 33). Recording job times meant that managers could monitor more closely subordinate levels of effort and performance. Task measurement, therefore, acted as the basis of a new structure of control (Littler, 1982, p. 88).

Ford's production system was not without its problems however. Workers found the

repetitive work boring and unchallenging. Job dissatisfaction was expressed in high rates of absenteeism and turnover. For example, in 1913 Ford required about 13 500 workers to operate his factories at any one time, and in that year alone the turnover was more than 50 000 workers (Beynon, 1984, p. 33). The management techniques developed by Ford in response to these human resource problems serve further to differentiate Fordism from Taylorism ((Littler and Salaman, 1984). Ford introduced the Five Dollar Day – double the pay and shorter hours for those who qualified. Benefits depended on a factory worker's lifestyle being deemed satisfactory and this included abstaining from alcohol. Ford's style of paternalism attempted to inculcate new social habits, as well as new labour habits, which would facilitate job performance. Taylorism and Fordism became the predominant approach to job design in vehicle and electrical engineering – the large-batch production industries – in the USA, Canada, and Britain.

As a job design and labour management strategy, scientific management and Fordist principles had limitations even when they were accepted by the workforce. First, work simplification led to boredom and dissatisfaction and tended to encourage an adversarial industrial relations climate. Second, Taylor-style job design techniques carry control and coordination costs. With extended specialization, indirect labour costs increase as the

organization employs increasing numbers of production planners, controllers, supervisors and inspectors. The economies of extended division of labour tend to be offset by the increasing costs of management control structures. Third, there are what might be called cooperation costs. Taylorism increases management's control over the quantity and quality of workers' performance; however, as a result, there is increased frustration and

dissatisfaction leading to a withdrawal of commitment on the part of the worker. Quality control can become a major problem for management. The relationship between controller and controlled can so deteriorate as to result in a further increase in organizational control.

The principles of Taylorism and Fordism reveal a

basic paradox 'that the tighter the control of labour power, the more control is

needed' (Littler and Salaman, 1984, pp. 36–7; see also Huczynski and Buchanan, 1991, p.

307). The adverse reactions to extreme division of labour led to the development of new approaches to job design that attempted to address these problems. The human relations movement began to shift managers' attention to the perceived needs of workers.

Image Human relations movement

The human relations movement emphasized the fact that job design had to consider the psychological and social aspects of work. The movement grew out of the Hawthorn

experiments conducted by Elto Mayo in the 1920s. Mayo set up an experiment in the relay assembly room at the Hawthorn Works in Chicago, which was designed to test the effects on productivity of variations in working conditions (lighting, temperature, ventilation).

The Hawthorn research team found no clear relationship between any of these factors and productivity. The researchers then developed, ex post facto, concepts that might explain the factors affecting worker motivation. They concluded that workers are motivated by more than just economic incentives and the work environment; recognition and social cohesion are important too. The message for management was also quite clear. Rather than depending on management controls and financial incentives, it needed to influence the work group by cultivating a climate that met the social needs of workers. The human

relations movement advocated various techniques, such as worker participation and non-authoritarian first-line supervisors, which, it was thought, would promote a climate of good human relations in which the quantity and quality needs of management could be met.

Criticisms of the human relations approach to job design were made by numerous writers.

They charged managerial bias and that the human relations movement tended to play down the basic economic conflict of interest between the employer and employee. Critics also pointed out that when the techniques were tested, it became apparent that workers did not inevitably respond as predicted. Finally, the human relations approach is criticized because it neglects wider socio-economic factors (Thompson, 1989). Despite the criticisms, the human relations approach to job design began to have some impact on management practices in the post-Second World War environment of full employment. Running parallel with the human relations school of thought came newer ideas about work which led to the emergence of a job redesign movement.

Image Job redesign movement

During the 1960s and early 1970s, job design was guided by what Rose (1985, p. 200) refers to as the neo-human relations school (Maslow, 1954; McGregor, 1960; Herzberg, 1966) and the wider-based quality of working life (QWL) movement. The neo-human

relations approach to job design emphasized the fulfilment of social needs by recomposing fragmented jobs. The quality of working life movement can be traced back to the

publication of two reports, the Work in America report (1973) and the British report On the Quality of Working life (Wilson, 1973).

Littler and Salaman (1984) put forward five principles of 'good' job design which

and the supplier. Another dimension to our model is a managerial ideology which also acts as a moderator. Analyses of large Japanese companies have often conceptualized the corporation as a 'community', and theorists have focused on how workers are socialized into complying with the rules and norms of the 'corporate community'. Dore (1973) identified a multiplicity of ways that the employment relationship entailed obligations beyond the exchange of labour and cash both in the British and the Japanese factories he studied. Japanese workers in large corporations are constantly reminded by management of the 'competition' in the product market. The notion of corporate 'competitiveness' is an ideology that acts to regulate corporate members' behaviour independently from the actual market conditions outside the company. The Japanese approach to job design is

characterized by cooperativeness, group problem solving, and attitude control (what may be described as the social organization of work), and the system is characterized by sophisticated production planning. But the social organization of work constitutes a sophisticated control system of employee behaviour. For example, Burawoy (1979) has given an account of how workers in self-organized teams created a work culture that reproduced the conditions of workers' own subordination.

A study of engineering companies in the north of England found evidence of the 'coercive culture system'. Operators working in the cells perceived a moral obligation to work hard, to 'put a full day in', because of peer-group pressure or clan control. The cell members had increased autonomy but the management had increased control through a computerized production system. Management control can therefore be conceptualized by the term 'computer-controlled-autonomy' (Bratton, 1991).

Finally, the outcomes or goals of the system are flexibility both in terms of workforce skills and tasks, minimum waste, and minimum quality defects as they arise in production. Some may question our model of Japanese management. Is it a

descrip-Image

Figure 4.6 A model of Japanese production management Source: Bratton, 1992

Page 117

tion of what actually exists even in Japan, or is it a set of manufacturing and employment practices that organizations should implement? Is it a theory or a helpful way to organize a complex social phenomenon, such as 'Japanese management'?

A number of observers have acknowledged that models of Japanese manufacturing and employment practices may be based on myths. According to Whittaker (1990) there are 'multiple' challenges to Japanese-style employment; for example, lifetime employment and the 'nenko' payment system are undergoing reform in Japan. The Japanese government has been prodding companies to reform their employment policies in the light of an ageing population. For example, a Labour Ministry report said that the practice of lifetime

employment should be changed to mirror changing attitudes about work and careers, and applauded the growing trend in which mainly young Japanese opt to change jobs, often frequently, rather than sign up for lifetime employment at a major corporation?6

The fact that Japanese employment practices are changing in Japan should not surprise us.

A mature capitalist society is a highly complex and dynamic arrangement and perhaps the only thing that is constant is change itself. Moreover, in the light of empirical evidence, we should be careful not to dismiss Japanization as insignificant (see, for example, Oliver and Wilkinson, 1988). Although current practice in job design may be still some way behind the theoretical models examined in this chapter, in our view the Japanese model is a

perspective on job design worthy of serious study because it is affecting the way managers approach job design and human resource management in the workplace today.

Jurgens' (1989) study of US, British and German automobile industries and, more recently, case studies of kaizen and TQM techniques by Malloch (1997) and Jones (1997) further serve to illustrate that the Japanese production model is more than a 'passing fad'.

The review of the research reported here testifies that, for avant-garde managers on both sides of the Atlantic, the Japanese model represents the state of the art for job design. In our view, the model (Figure 4.6) is a useful framework for organizing the complexities of Japanese management practices and can be judged by its usefulness in identifying key aspects of management innovations in job design and HRM practices. It is best

conceptualized as an 'ideal type' that can form the basis of experimentation for Western organizations. It does not necessarily follow that all elements of the model must, or can, be applied to every workplace. Indeed, there is evidence that the transfer of Japanese

industrial management into British and North American organizations has been highly selective (Jurgens, 1989), and many British companies that have redesigned jobs do not fully appreciate the high dependency relationships implicit in the Japanese model (Oliver and Wilkinson, 1988); further, Japanese job design practices have been installed alongside traditional adversarial industrial relations systems (Bratton, 1992).

Image Re-engineering movement

engineered company can become adaptable and orientated to continuous change and renewal. According to the re-engineering guru, James Champy (1996), BPR is 'about changing our managerial work, the way we think about, organize, inspire, deploy, enable, measure, and reward the value-adding operational work. It is about changing

Page 118

management itself' (p. 3). Structurally, the typical pyramid-shaped industrial model is stood on its head, management structures are leaner or 'delayered', and decision making pushed down to the 'front line' to meet the contemporary demands of quality, flexibility, low cost, and entrepreneurial autonomy (Hammer and Champy, 1993). Some writers have described these anti-hierarchical characteristics in organizational design as a shift from 'modernist' to 'postmodernist' organizational practices, Clegg outlines the main contrasting postmodern features:

Where the modern organization was rigid, post-modern organization is flexible... Where modern organization was premised on technological determinism, postmodernism is premised on technological choices made possible through dedicated micro-electronic equipment. Where modern organization and jobs were highly differentiated, demarcated and de-skilled, postmodernist organization and jobs are highly differentiated, demarcated and multi-skilled (Clegg, 1990 and quoted by Willmott, 1995, p. 90).

The re-engineered organization allegedly has a number of typical characteristics (see Figure 4.7). Central to these organizational forms, argues Willmott (1995), is the

'reconceptualization of core employees' from being considered a variable cost to being represented as a valuable asset; capable of serving the customer without the need for 'command and control' leadership style. With the ascendancy of 'customer democracy', employees are encouraged to exercise initiative in creating value for customers and thereby profits for the company. According to Hammer (1997):

Obedience and diligence are now irrelevant. Following orders is no guarantee of success.

Working hard at the wrong thing is no virtue. When customers are kings, mere hard work – work without understanding, flexibility, and enthusiasm – leads nowhere. Work must be smart, appropriately targeted, and adapted to the particular circumstances of the process and the customer... Loyalty and hard work are by themselves quaint relics... organizations must now urge employees to put loyalty to the customer over loyalty to the company – because that is the only way the company will survive (pp. 158–9).

Characteristic Traditional model Re-engineered model

Market Domestic Global

Competitive advantage Cost Speed and quality

Resources Capital Information

Quality What is affordable No compromise

Focal point Profit Customer

Structural design Hierarchical Flattened

Control Centralized De-centralized

Labour Homogeneous Culturally diverse Organization of work Specialized and individual Flexible and in teams

Communications Vertical Horizontal

Figure 4.7 The re-engineered organization

Page 119

This passage is most revealing. First, it presents the debate on employee commitment, shared commitment and reciprocity in a different light. We shall return to this in some detail in Chapter 12. Second, in the re-engineered organization, responsibility for the fate of

employees shifts from managers to customers. For as Hammer (1997) opines, 'The company does not close plants or lay off workers – customers do, by their actions or inactions' (p. 157). Unlike earlier movements and tendencies in work design, such as the quality of working life movement (QWL), re-engineering is market driven. It focuses on the relationship between buyer and seller of services or goods, rather than the relationship between employer and employee. Hammer and Champy emphasize that the 'three Cs' – customers, competition, and change – and a shift in national government policy of 'tough love' towards business have created the need for re-engineering business processes. For Champy (1996), using a mixture of language discarded by the political 'old Left' and terminology of the 'new Right', 'a dictatorship of the customariat or... a market democracy... is the cause of a total revolution within the traditional, machine-like corporation' (p. 19).

Re-engineering has been criticized by practitioners and academics. One management consultant criticized the imprecise meaning of BPR and pointed out that senior managers were using the term 'to legitimize other objectives' (quoted in Management Today,

February, 1995). A number of academics are critical of 'postmodern' or 're-engineered' formulations (see Craig and Yetton, 1993; Oliver, 1993; Reed, 1993; Thompson, 1993;

Grint and Willcocks, 1995; Willmott, 1995). Thompson, for example, accuses postmodern organizational theorists of having fallen victim to technological determinism and of

mistaking the surface of work organizations for their substance. Thompson argues that the 'leaner' organization actually gives more power to a few. 'Removing some of the middle layers of organizations is not the same as altering the basic power structure... By cutting out intermediary levels [of management]... the power resources of those at the top can be increased' (1993, p. 192). Grint and Willcocks (1995) offer a scathing review of BPR,

arguing that BPR is not novel and point out that it is 'essentially political in its rhetorical and practical manifestations'. Willmott (1995) is similarly scathing about BPR, emphasizing that re-engineering is 'heavily top-down' and pointing out that the re-engineered organization, using information technology, while creating less hierarchical structures produces 'a fist-full of dynamic processes... notably, the primacy of hierarchical control and the continuing treatment of employees as cogs in the machine' (1995, p. 91). In his case-study analysis of BPR in a hospital, Buchanan (1997) observes that the lack of clarity in BPR terminology and methodology offers 'considerable scope for political maneuvering' by politically motivated actors. A case study of BPR in the public sector found that conflict arose from 'very human needs to justify one's role in the new organization, or individual managers' needs to

maintain their power bases within the organization' (Harrington et al., 1998, p. 50). Blair et al. (1998) also demonstrate, through case studies, the contradictory aspects of BPR. They emphasize that despite its stated departure from 'Taylorism', the outcomes of BPR are the same as many previous job design 'fads'; 'the development of organizational control

systems to secure compliance' (p. 127). Moreover, within the context of the employment

can be interpreted 'as the latest wave in a series of initiatives... to increase the cooperation/

productivity/adaptability of staff' (Willmott, 1995, p. 96).

Page 120

Image Paradox in job design

Paradox is evident in job design. The popular logic, for instance, that technological

development leads to a more highly skilled workforce has been challenged by numerous observers. Much debate has centred upon the ambiguity involving alternative scenarios of

development leads to a more highly skilled workforce has been challenged by numerous observers. Much debate has centred upon the ambiguity involving alternative scenarios of