IDEF0 Model for RFID-Enhanced Operations

As we have done in the case of non-RFID-enhanced operations, let us state some further assumptions about the process we are now going to model:

u yard capacity, i.e. configuration: RTG;

u information about container: regular FCL;

u type of operation: import;

u regulatory framework: security level 1 (theoretical, i.e. level 2 is granted by RFID); and

u ICT systems: RFID adopted.

We will show how the impact of RFID can change some of the constraints we put in the model. Some activities, however, are not going to be affected by the use of RFID technology and therefore they are going to be modelled in the same way as before. Given the high degree of flexibility of this technology, we are going to specify case-by-case in the mechanism arrows which capability of RFID is foreseen. The specification of activity A1 ‘‘move container quayside yard’’ is detailed in Figure 7.

It is possible to note that the mechanism ‘‘RFID’’ has been introduced for the sub-activity ‘‘move container on internal truck’’ and that the control

‘‘Customs’’ has been cancelled. Although the security level does not change, in fact, RFID avoids Customs inspection because all information necessary for Customs is already written on the smart tag and is readable at any point in the yard. This is the aim of many security initiatives like Smart and Secure Trade-lanes, Container Security Initiative and Customs Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT). Information about the cargo such as origin, destination, contents and status are stored in the active RFID tag and are not likely to be altered due to different levels of cryptography. This feature can generate savings in terms of time spent for customs clearance and therefore can increase the efficiency of the operations, reducing the processing time and giving access to more secure information.

Figure 7: ‘‘Move Container Quayside Yard’’ View

Another feature of active RFID tags is that it possible to use them for tracking the containers (and therefore the trucks) during their movements within the yard. Through the utilization of localization algorithms (like trian-gulation) it is possible to know, in a discrete way, the position of the container with a precision of almost one metre. At the same time, an active RFID tag linked to the so-called Smart Box with sensors can give real-time information about the general condition of the container and the cargo stored inside (temperature, tries of forced openings, change in weight, etc.). It is worth noting that the presence of RFID do not exclude integration with other technologies. Differential GPS for instance, is a more accurate means of localization than RFID, although the accuracy less than one metre does not affect the actual scope of localization too much. For the same reason, and to respect the regulation about security in the yard, the use of CCTV is com-plementary to RFID and cannot be replaced. Moreover, given that the range of transmission of RFID is around 100 metres, it is necessary to link the readers with the intranet in order have the information actually available. This is possible by linking, as nowadays featured by almost every producer although with some incompatibility of frequency, the RFID readers with a wireless LAN spot, maybe sharing the infrastructure with wireless CCTV, which has become more and more utilized in open spaces like ports.

^ ^ S a f e t y level 1

-j'D ocum ent and paym ent clearance

m ove container

tru ck in position for delivery;

■Drivers

4 C O N C L U S I O N S

The aim of this work was to show whether RFID technologies, which are widely used for security purposes, could enhance the efficiency of yard opera-tions. The results were not conclusive in the absence of an appropriate cost-benefit analysis and of a sufficient number of case studies, although some significant results emerged:

u first, it has been shown that the automated compliance to security regulations allowed by RFID can avoid some operations (e.g. Customs inspections), thereby reducing the processing time and increasing the efficiency of the port;

u secondly, ‘‘automatic’’ compliance to level 2 of ISPS code (heightened security) is ensured by the adoption of RFID, avoiding in this way the extra cost of passing occasionally, but repeatedly, from level 1 to level 2; and

u finally, it has been shown that RFID can provide a cheaper alternative to other technologies for identification and localization purposes.

As a reflection of the limitations constraining the model, a further develop-ment of this work could be the extension of the modelling to other configura-tions and other environments. The analysis of the impact of RFID technologies in different yard configurations would give room to different conclusions, either in a more or less encouraging way. For instance, the application of RFID in a tractor chassis yard system seems likely to fit well with RFID characteristics. In a similar way, it would be interesting to analyse what might happen to RFID-enhanced containers during the handling process (LCL containers).

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P O RT R E C OV E RY F R O M S E C U R I T Y I N C I D E N T S : A S I M U L AT I O N A P P R OAC H

Ghaith Rabadi and C. Ariel Pinto

Engineering Management and Systems Engineering Department, Old Dominion University, Norfolk, Virginia, USA

Wayne Talley

Economics Department, Old Dominion University, Norfolk, Virginia, USA

Jean-Paul Arnaout

Industrial and Mechanical Engineering Department, Lebanese American University, Byblos, Lebanon

Abstract

The security incident cycle of ports consists of four phases: (1) prevention—creates barriers that deny terrorist plans and events; (2) detection—provides early apprehension of planned terrorists acts using inspection, tracking and monitoring; (3) response—miti-gates the impact of a security incident to the port once it has occurred; and (4) recovery—promotes the port’s return to normal operations following a security incident.

There has been much ex ante investigation in securing (prevention and detection) ports from security incidents, but little ex post investigation into the response and recovery from port security incidents once they have occurred. This chapter investigates port recover-ability from security incidents, i.e., how long it will take for a port to return to normal operations following the occurrence of security incidents or due to elevating port security measures. The investigation is undertaken by first developing a simulation model of the operations of a US container marine port terminal to capture container movements and storage within the terminal as well as the arrival and departure of containers via ships, trucks and rail. Critical recourses such as ship-to-shore cranes, straddle carriers and truck chassis are also modelled in simulating the terminal’s container throughput. The simula-tion model of the terminal’s throughput can then be used to simulate the impact of various security incidents on the terminal’s throughput and operations resulting from, for exam-ple: shifting resources to handle security incidents; reducing the number of terminal gates in use; and delays to conducting the screening of inbound containers. The model will use these impacts, in turn, to investigate the terminal’s recoverability based upon various recoverability strategic decisions of terminal decision makers. An analysis of the latter will provide the decision makers with insights into strategic decisions for improving the recoverability of port operations following security incidents.

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1 I N T R O D U C T I O N

Ocean transportation is the primary transportation mode for world trade particularly in the US where ports handle approximately 2 billion tons of cargo annually and is expected to double within 15 years (Nagle, 2005). It trans-ports 95% of US intercontinental trade. Hence, a security incident at a US port that results in its shut down for a significant length of time will not only have a devastating effect on the local port and community, but also on US intercontinental trade and the economy.

A security incident that reduces the throughput at a port (but not its shutdown) can also be costly to the port in terms of revenue foregone and the loss of future throughput (from ships going elsewhere). In order to forecast the extent of throughput reductions for a given port from various security incident scenarios, a port simulation throughput model may be used. The model may also be used to investigate the effectiveness of various port management scenarios in reducing security incident delays.

In this chapter, we present a discrete-event simulation that models port operations of a US container port on the east coast to study the impact and analyse the risk that certain security incidents or scenarios may have on the port’s operation continuity. In a broader sense, the same model can be used to evaluate business scenarios such as implementing a certain operational policy, increasing/decreasing resources, or deploying a new technology. Various per-formance measures can be evaluated including delays, queue times, resource utilization, throughput and turnaround times. This will help the port’s admin-istrators plan for operational decisions to minimize the disruption of possible security incidents. The longer-term objective is to provide insights into strate-gic decisions for better continuity of port operations in light of continuing changes in security technologies, policies and guidelines

2 B A C K G R O U N D O N T E R M I N A L P R O C E S S E S

The port addressed in this paper is a US container port that handles cargo stored in standardized boxes or containers, generally 20 or 40 feet in length without wheels—i.e. as one TEU (20-ft equivalent unit) or as one FEU (40-ft equivalent unit). This port is considered an intermodal node in the transporta-tion network, where cargo changes modes of transportatransporta-tion (e.g. from a ship to an inland transport mode and vice versa) (Talley (2006).

The modelling of this port was designed at a granularity level of containers, trucks, cranes, straddle carriers, trains and ships. Other resources and compo-nents that are at a lower granularity were considered embedded in the ones listed above, and other resources (e.g. personnel) were considered readily available whenever needed. The flow of operations at most container ports including the one described here can be categorized as follows: