THE MODEL

Having laid out propositions that are likely to shape behavior during middle power nuclear crises, we now turn to formalizing the model that forms the core of this research. Foremost, it is premised on the belief that crisis dynamics between middle power nuclear states without formal extended deterrence guarantees are likely to play out in a manner much different than that predicted by classic Cold War models. Situated in the rationalist framework, the propositions posited above lead to a model of trilateral engagement where the recursive interaction between the principal antagonists and a hegemonic third party (singular or plural) – each entering the crisis with non-identical goals – ultimately determines crisis behavior, with its attendant implications for crisis trajectory and outcome.

We are now in a position to define brokered bargaining more fully: a bargaining framework where two parallel but intrinsically wedded set of interactions are operative: the principal antagonists are aiming actions and signals at each other, either to compel the opponent to respond in a certain way in line with their respective crisis objectives or deter it from taking an action (as classic theories of nuclear crisis behavior would predict); at the same time, they are also trying to lure the third party to act in certain ways towards

bargain not to exceed certain restraints…….it takes two to keep a limited war limited…..” Henry A. Kissinger, The Necessity of Choice: Prospects of American Foreign Policy (New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1960), 60.

them and their adversary. The third party is simultaneously attempting to find space to mediate between the two principal actors to ensure swift de-escalation. In the process of engagement in this ‘three-cornered’ bargaining exercise, all three parties effect each other’s expectations, incentives, strategies, and overall behavior and in turn, the outcome of a crisis.

Brokered bargaining plays out in a context that imposes significant constraints on the freedom of action of each of the three parties. The principal antagonists have to deal with two competing sets of demands. They could potentially be forced to pursue

aggressive behavior to establish credibility of the force functions they are employing during a crisis and to play on the third party’s fear of war. The competing need to show prudence will be driven both by the dangers in excessive risk-taking in a nuclear environment and by their sensitivity to third party preferences born out of the factors highlighted in our propositions. The conflicting parties would thus be faced with a “resolve-prudence trade-off” with a dual characteristic: vis-à-vis the principal opponent and vis-à-vis the third party. The trade-off implies that they would have to concede some of their decision making autonomy that otherwise underpins efforts to manipulate the risk of war.

During any crisis, the conflicting parties would have an interest to portray their ability and desire to retain a high degree of autonomy. This would be needed to make their intent more credible for the adversary and the third party. The third party would seek to chip away at their autonomy and thereby alter their cost-benefit calculus by utilizing its “reward-punishment leverage.” At the same time, the third party will seek to

minimize the reverse influence the antagonists can exert on it. This complex and recursive interaction will lead all three actors to manifest behavior along the lines predicted by the brokered bargaining model.

Successful escalation management would be a function of the third party’s ability to subjugate the autonomy of the principal actors each time their actions threaten to push tensions beyond the brink. It would entail the third party reorienting the antagonists’ cost- benefit analysis, making swift crisis termination the most attractive option – ahead of their ideal crisis outcomes and possibly while incurring political and reputational losses that may come with settling short of the original crisis objectives. In effect, the principal antagonists would have prioritized their sensitivity to third party preferences above their desire to take autonomous offensive decisions that could cause an outbreak of hostilities.

The conflicting parties’ sensitivity to third party preferences could best be

described as a desire for “positive evaluation” on their part. The formulation is borrowed from sociological literature and specifically from Rubin and Brown’s (1975) concept of “evaluation” in bargaining frameworks.59 It is predicated on the belief that bargaining situations can have ‘audiences’ that act not only as observers but also as evaluators of their performance. Third parties would behave as audiences and in that stead provide performance “feedback” to the principal bargainers.60 Rubin and Brown argue that “the mere presence of an audience (including psychological presence) motivates bargainers to seek positive, and avoid negative, evaluation – especially when the audience is salient to

59 _{Rubin and Brown, Social Psychology, 44-48.} 60 _{Ibid., 44.}

the bargainers.”61 This is driven by the audiences’ “apparent readiness to make demands or impose sanctions upon him [the bargainers] if their preferences are not pursued to their satisfaction.”62 The need for positive evaluation “puts the bargainer on notice that his behavior is being, or will be, scrutinized, and that the esteem in which he is held is contingent upon the appropriateness of his performance, as this is defined by the particular audience.”63 It develops a sort of accountability towards the audience; accountability in turn provides audiences the requisite leverage to affect behavior.64 A ‘dependent’ audience which depends on a bargaining exercise’s outcome for achievement of its crisis objectives is most likely to hold the bargainers accountable.65 In our case, the third party’s dependence on the antagonists to achieve de-escalation puts it squarely in this camp.

To be sure, positive evaluation implies more than just a concern about one’s image. It is driven by concerns about the third party’s ability to inflict material losses or potential for tangible concessions and gains. It follows that the higher the sensitivity an actor will show to the third party’s demands and preferences, the more positive its

evaluation – and therefore the likelihood of avoiding or minimizing losses or maximizing gains – would be.66 Both sides then can be expected not to lose sight of their need for

61 _Ibid. 62 _Ibid. 63 _{Ibid., 46.} 64 _{Ibid., 48-50.} 65 _{Ibid., 48.}

66 _{Interestingly, literature on ‘evaluation’ tends to focus disproportionately on domestic audience} whereby actors are often driven to exhibit resoluteness to obtain positive evaluation. Dean G. Pruitt and Douglas F. Johnson, “Mediation as an Aid to Face Saving in Negotiation,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 14, 3 (1970): 239-46; Rubin and Brown, Social Psychology,

positive evaluation even as they strive to pursue their crisis objectives. The third party’s task on the other hand would be to play on the regional rivals’ desire for this positive evaluation to ensure de-escalation.

Principal antagonists’ desire for positive evaluation

Third party’s ability to extract compromises on the principal antagonists’ decision making autonomy

We adopt this formulation over the more traditional coercive lens applied to the preponderant outsider’s behavior in Cold War models and theories such as pivotal

deterrence given the relatively constrained nature of third party involvement – in terms of its primary reliance on non-military punishment and positive inducements – envisioned here. Our formulation allows us to see the crisis as a competition between the antagonists to obtain third party support to achieve crisis objectives rather than one in which they simply react to the fear of direct third party action against them.

The brokered bargaining model then presents a very different conceptualization of nuclear crises than classic bilateral rational deterrence models. The following illustrations depict the difference between the two approaches in terms of how a crisis’s progression is envisioned.

48-54. Applied to foreign third parties in contexts most relevant to our discussion however, the pressures ought to be reversed.

Illustration 1: Conceptual Framework for Crisis Progression Under the Classic Rational Deterrence Model Brinkmanship One side backs down/both  mutually accommodate Both keep upping the ante Successful de‐ escalation  Continued escalation  (potentially to the  nuclear level) Crisis triggering event Initiator employs functions of  force/responder responds Rising tensions

Source: Author’s compilation.

Illustration 2: Conceptual Framework for Crisis Progression Under Brokered Bargaining Third party intervenes Initiator’s and responder’s  desire for positive evaluation > Desire to continue  manipulating risk of war Initiator's and responder’s  desire to continue  manipulating risk of war > Desire for positive evaluation Successful de‐ escalation  Continued escalation  (potentially to the  nuclear level) Crisis triggering event Initiator employs functions of  force/responder responds Rising tensions

Source: Author’s compilation.

These varying conceptualizations of nuclear crises also quite obviously imply different drivers of crisis behavior in the two cases. As table 1 shows, despite

considerable overlap, a number of factors at play under brokered bargaining are irrelevant to the classic understanding of nuclear crisis behavior.

Table 1: Drivers of Crisis Behavior in Classic Versus Brokered Bargaining Contexts Drivers of resolute behavior Drivers of prudent behavior

Applicable to classic nuclear crisis behavior and brokered bargaining

Need to establish credibility of resolve to follow up on threats made in employing functions of force

Need to avoid undermining crisis stability and forcing the adversary to take precipitous action

Strategic autonomy attributed to possession of

nuclear weapons Cost-prohibitive outcome in case of a nuclear war Absence of robust bilateral escalation control

mechanisms Importance of exhibiting responsible behavior as nuclear weapon states Reputational concerns

Applicable to brokered bargaining only

Risk manipulation to play on the third party’s fear of war

Principal antagonists’ sensitivity to the third party’s concern about escalation potential and its interest in preventing it above all prior preferences

Possible belief that the third party has enough leverage to prevent the opponent from causing a breakdown of crisis stability

Third party’s ability to raise the costs of defiance for and reward deference of the principal antagonists State of relations with third party actors (e.g.

pre-crisis international image of the conflicting parties, perception of the third party’s reliance on each antagonist for its broader foreign policy objectives, etc.)

State of relations with third party actors (e.g. pre-crisis international image of the conflicting parties, perception of the third party’s reliance on each antagonist for its broader foreign policy objectives, extent of economic interdependence vis-à-vis third party actors, etc.) Source: Author’s compilation.