Modernisation is widely linked to development in its materialistic manifestations, while Westernisation is associated with the influence of the Western value system on the cultu ral, family and commun ity values of developing (non-Western) countries. Pfaff (2002, p. 1 ) high lig hted the contradictory views of Western isation: "Western isation , to Westerners, means liberation . . . for people in other societies, Western isation frequently means destruction , social and moral crises, with individuals cast ad rift in a restructured and literally demoralised world". Modernisation theorists define 'modernity' strictly using Western criteria. In addition, the underlying frame of reference for the modern isation theories is the 'Western model' of development as the only model for developing countries to follow. Reflecting on this common understanding imbedded in the Western mentality, Holmstrom (2002) passes on the general Western , but not his own , perception comprising the notation of 'development':
. . . to develop means to become more like us, meaning those of us who live in rich countries. The way for the poor countries to get rich is to copy our institutions, like the free market; absorb our culture, our work ethics, management etc. (Holmstrom, 2002, p. 36-3 7).
Wh ile Holmstrom (2002) described the common Western view of d evelopment, Shrestha (2000) reflected on his "own developmental experience and journey". He realised that his "mind had been colonised" by Western values and developmental thinking throughout his youthfu l years:
In recent years though, I have come full circle. I am not the passionate subscriber to Western development that I once was. The more I observe what is happening in countries like Nepal, especially the social, political, and economic outcomes of their booming enterprise of development rooted in western materialism, the more I question its value (Shrestha, 2000, pp. 1 1 1-1 1 2).
There are no ind ications that the debate on the nature of the relationsh ip between Islam and modern ity and the su bsequent impact of such a relationship on the course of development is losing its momentum or coming to a near closure. Two opposing schools of thought have attempted to explain the relationship betwee n Islam and modernisation. The first school claims that Islam is a static religion that stands in the way of economic prosperity and innovation and views Muslims' religious values as being barriers to carrying out reforms necessary for the emergence of entrepreneurship (Coulson , 1 964; Labohm, 2003; Perkins, 2003; Pipes, 1 983).
The su bscribers to this school of thought believe that non-Western cultu res are incompatible with modernisation and for such societies to develop, they must modernise, and to modernise they must break ties with their trad itions and endure a cu ltural transformation process towards Western modernity. Thus, they equate modernisation with Westernisation, and operate under the assumption that the cultural and moral values and religious beliefs of non-Western societies are on a collision course with those of the West. They fu rther explained that due to the superiority of the Western culture, to that of non-Western , evidenced by its scientific and economic advancement, there is no way for the traditional societies to develop but to go Western .
The problem therefore is not in modernisation itself and whether to modernise or not; it is rather rooted in the insistence by some that Westernisation i s a must for modernisation. While Berger ( 1 99 1 ) and Lee and Peterson (2000) advocated cultural transformation , Pipes ( 1 983) could not have been more explicit, direct and confrontational when he revealed his views on modernity with reference to Islam. " Islam does not offer an alternative way to modernise . . . only when Muslims explicitly accept the Western model will they be in a position to tech nicalise and then to develop" (Pipes, 1 983, pp. 1 97-1 98)9. In his appraisal of the Arab Human Development Report 2000-2003, Labohm (2003) noted that the report "evades the delicate question of the impact of Islam on the sustained absence of an economic take-off'. This attitude
9 Unsurprisingly, The Islamic Human Rights Commission made Daniel Pipes a nominee for their 2004 and 2005 "Islamophobe of the year" awards. Pipes is in the process of creating two organizations with an anti-Islamist attitude: the Anti-Islamist I nstitute (Al l) and the Centre for I slamic Pluralism (Lobe, 2005).
conforms to the general Western perception that Islam and development enjoy a paradoxical relationship.
Among the early advocates for cultural transformation and equating modernisation with Western isation is Lerner ( 1 958). In his publicised study of the modernisation of the small Turkish village of Balgat, Lerner failed to distingu ish between modernisation and Westernisation . He portrayed the tension between the gloom of the past and the hope of the future: on the one hand were the past, the backward ness and status q uo, represented in the personality of 'The Chief'. On the other hand , there were his sons who represented the dynamism, the promising futu re and the d ream of a better tomorrow. The Ch ief's sons have recognised , seized the opportunity, and abandoned long time traditions. They are now the new shopkeepers . . . they are the entrepreneurs. It is the contrast between tradition and modernity (Schech & Haggis, 2002), in which modernity has prevailed. Once the modernisation process has started , rad ical rather than gradual cultural transformation of the traditional society has occurred.
The impact of cultural transformation on the social fabric of 'Balgat' , on the villagers' values and on their sense of belonging was not the issue ; hence, it was deemed immaterial a nd of no relevance to Lerner's investigation . Modern isation was at work in Balgat, declared Lerner, hence the research was com plete and what follows is to be accepted as part of the process. Therefore, what Lerner is trying to say is that cultures will converge and the convergence will eventually be towards modern Western values. That is because, according to this line of reasoning, one cannot separate Western modern isation (the form) from the value system (the content) that prod uced Western material modernity
Pfaff (2002) questioned what makes the West believe that they are in a position to decide not only what su its the West, but also to establish that Islamic values are "unsuitable for the Muslims themselves". He concluded , "in short, they are to become us". However, are Muslims willing to "give up their moral identity"? Thus, the real issue becomes whether Muslims do really want to become "us".
It is the incompatibility of values between Islamic society and the modern West .
. The power and material dynamism of the West seem inseparable from a value system that demands that Muslims give up their moral identity (Pfaff, 2002, p. 1). A second school of thought builds its argu ment on a very d ifferent logic and argues that
sees in Islam a modern and a developmental religion that has led global modernisation for many centuries while Europe was in the midst of the Dark Ages. The British social anthropologist, Ernest Gellner, refuted equating modern ity with "Westernity". He fu rther maintained that there is no conflict or ten sion between Islam and modern ity even where modernity is d efined within the Western frame of reference. On the contrary, he arg ued that "Islam of the three Western monotheisms the one closest to modernity" (Gellner, 1 98 1 , p. 7). Meuleman (2002 , p . 4) rejected the widely spread notion that the relationship between Islam and modern ity is on a collision course. He further averred that with some objectivity, one has to acknowledge the fact that the Muslim civilization once was the main source of universal "scientific and intellectual" advances. Hooker (2003) disputed the Western account regarding the inevitability of cultural transformation as a pre-condition for d evelopment and argued, "Cu ltural development can proceed in many directions, not only the one that the Western mind takes to be self-evident" (Hooker, 2003, p. 287). In h is study Modernity and Disenchantment of Life: Muslim-Christian Contrast, Woodward concluded that there is no contradiction between being modern and being a good Muslim. "While in the West modernism and religion appear to be locked in an eternal struggle, in Indonesia a person can be both profoundly modern and profoundly Muslim" (Woodward , 2002, p. 1 1 3).
Tim Beh rend believed that " Islam is becoming an ideology and a force that offers an alternative modernity. It offers alternative world to one dominated by the US, and its economic interests with its mu lti-national corporations". He further explained that " Islam offers a d isciplined, tech nology friendly, proud , non-tribal, and non-local, international identity that stands opposed to the "rape of the world" by mu lti-national corporations and interests that serve them" (Behrend, cited in Ponniah, 2005, p. 1 5).
A major theme that highlighted the work of E isenstadt (1 978; 2003) was the idea of "mu ltiple modernity" and his emphasis that modernisation is not necessarily synonymous with Westernisation or Americanisation. In debatin g the inevitability of 'modernisation', Apter ( 1 965) drew a clear distinction between the "indigenous" and the "Western" types of modernity. He fu rther concluded that all nations would inevitably change either willingly or in response to outside pressure. All nations will become more modern by creating their own form of modern ity (Watts, 1 995), and the nature of their modernity would reflect their own cultural, environ mental and h istorical profiles. Ziauddin Sardar rejected the implications of modernisation theories that trad itional societies a re static and argued that "on the contrary, traditional cultures are dynamic entities, they are constantly renewing themselves and chang ing, but they change
according to their own logic and grammar" (Sardar, 1 997, p. 44). External forces as well, on many occasions, interrupt the natural flow of the modern isation process and in many instances manipulate its outcome. "Modernisation" therefore is inevitable but when strictly defined in Western terms "is not" inevitable, concluded Apter (1 965). This is a view supported by Hu ntington (2002), who strongly believed that Westernisation is not a pre-cond ition for modernisation :
Modernization, in short, does not necessarily mean Westernization. Non-Western societies can modernize and have modernized without abandoning their own cultures and adopting wholesale Western values, institutions and practices (Huntington, 2002, p. 29).
Even Pipes (1 983) did not sense anything in Islam as a faith or a tradition that prevents Muslims from being modern. "Islam and modernisation do not clash . . . modernisation requires no one political ideology or set of institutions" (Pipes, 1 983, cited in H untington, 2003, pp. 77-78). Nonetheless, he reaffirmed h is belief that Westernisation must be achieved in order for modern ity to occur, by claiming the incompatibility between Islam a nd modernity in relation to some economic aspects such as the prohibition of interest and the role of women in the economy. While Pipes considered the Islamic stand on interest as an obstacle to economic development, many other intellectuals have embraced the Islamic financial system and its potential role in promoting entrepreneurship and in d elivering just and equitable economic development (Presley & Sessions, 1 994; Sade q , 1 99 1 : 1 992; Ziauddin, 1 994; Zineld in, 1 990). A more detailed discussion on Islamic banking as an alternative to conventional banking is presented in Chapter 3.
As the conflict between traditionalism and modernism is causing tension betwee n different cultures, i t i s also causing a n intense and sometimes fierce d ebate withi n Islamic societies. Muslims are still searching for ways to cope with modernity and trying to comprehend what it entails to be a Muslim in the global era. The tension is evidenced by the failure of Muslim countries to formulate a common perception of such crucial issues in order to devise a consistent approach to effectively manage their implications. Dr. Mahath ir Mohammed , the former Prime Minister of Malaysia, cynically described th is state of chaos, and commented that whenever a Muslim nation attempts to embark on the path of development, it is usually accused by some Muslim g roups of deviating from Islam (Mahathir, 2002), as if Islam stands in the way of development and prosperity. He further criticized the attitudes of the majority of today's "political
interpreting such knowledge in a way that suits their interests and supports their political agenda.