Two modes of thinking: the intuitive vs the analytical

It has been widely reported that individuals generally make task related decisions using two main cognitive modes. Interestingly, a number of authors have described these cognitive modes with different terminologies. For example, Kahneman (2011) called them — slow vs. fast thinking; Dane and Pratt (2007) — intuitive vs. analytical; Bazerman and Moore (2006) — system 1 vs. system 2 thinking; Bargh and Morsella (2008) — conscious vs. unconscious, and Evans (2008) — rational vs. experiential strategies. However, despite reaching an agreement that effective decision making may in some instances involve combined use of intuition and analysis, agreeing on the dominant thinking mode still appears unresolved (Goldstein and Gigerenzer, 2002; Hogarth, 2003; Evans, 2008; Dane and Pratt, 2009; Epstein, 2010; Dörfler and Ackermann, 2012). Little consensus has emerged concerning the preferred sequence by which individuals do, or should, employ the two cognitive modes (See Hammond, Hamm, Grassia and Pearson, 1987; Klein, 2003; Evans, 2008; Dane and Pratt, 2009; Hilbig, Scholl and Pohl, 2010). Some of the lingering questions continue to be: should people take stock of their intuition first and then engage in analysis, or should intuition guide analysis? In other words, it is not entirely clear whether intuitive and deliberative thinking represents two different modes of thinking or whether they are end points of the same dimension.

Scholars have expressed varying opinions regarding the sequence of operation between the intuitive and the analytical modes (Simon, 1987; English, 1993; Lamond and Thompson, 2000; Jungermann, 2001; Lipshitz and Cohen, 2005; Evans and Over, 2010; Kahneman, 2011, p.223). For example, Gary Klein argues that the most effective way of combining these two thinking modes is to allow intuition to guide analysis (Klein, 2003, p.64). He considers that intuition ensures that patterns are recognized faster, making it possible for actors to react quicker to more pressing task demands. In most cases the intuitive (tacit) mode serves as the default system as mental energy is more easily freed up for performing difficult tasks. The deliberative mode is only invoked when the former struggles to solve a problem at hand, or when there is need to make some form of conscious decisions (Wulf and Shea, 2002;

98 Hogarth, 2003; Azuma, Daily and Furmanski, 2006), or when there is need to justify one’s actions (King and Clark, 2002; McCaffrey, 2007).

Interestingly, the way the intuitive and analytical mind operates has been likened to the functions of the eyes (see Broadbent, 1977; Dörfler and Ackermann, 2012). Just like the peripheral vision of the eyes, the intuitive mind helps actors become more aware of their surrounding environment, and having a lower “capacity” than the analytical mode, actors are thus able to subliminally track other activities going on within and around them simultaneously. This function contrasts the analytical mode which is mainly designed to focus on one element at a time — similar to the foveal

vision of the eyes. The analytical mode can only illuminate one element at a time i.e.

the particular thing the decision maker is conscious of. This lack of flexibility hence makes it less viable in the dynamic environments (Polanyi, 1966; Dörfler and Ackermann, 2012; Dane, 2011).

A few sceptics have voiced their lack of trust for intuition, instead preferring the analytical style whenever and wherever possible (Messick and Bazerman, 1996; Lamond and Thompson, 2000; Falzer, 2004). These authors argue that the strength of the analytical/deliberative mode lies in the fact that it is mainly driven by the need to think more explicitly about one’s actions in the past, present or future. It entails the conscious use of one’s prior knowledge, sometimes in familiar ways, sometimes in entirely new ways that require creativity, and sometimes in ways that appear more critical (Lamond and Thompson, 2000). It is strongly believed that understanding the conditions where analysis is likely to be flawed remains a unique feature of expertise. This includes, for example, complex and dynamic environments where multiple cues need to be attended to, under time pressure. In these circumstances, it has been shown that deliberating on multiple choice options at the expense of trusting one’s intuition will often prove detrimental to performance (Dijksterhuis, 2004).

The debates regarding the preferred thinking mode have, amongst other things, point to the inherent difficulty, at least in practice, of separating intuition from analysis. Evidence exists to show that intuition and analysis are complementary rather than competitive (Simon, 1990; Epstein, 1994; Ten Berge and Van Hezewijk,

99 1999; Sinclair an Ashkanasy, 2003; Dane and Pratt, 2009; Sinclair, 2010; Kahneman, 2011). Hence, although intuition operates in the sub-conscious realm, it does not necessarily contradict analysis, neither is it the opposite of analysis (Khatri and Ng, 2000). The words of Simon (1987, p.63) — “intuition is analyses frozen into

habit and into the capacity for rapid response through recognition” — has gained

prominence in understanding the relationship that exists between the two cognitive modes. Simon explained that intuition and analysis are mainly distinguished on the basis of the speed of recognition, implying therefore that intuition is made possible because the skills required for task performance have become ingrained in an actor’s subconscious mode. Polanyi and Prosch (1975, p.144) also referred to this as participation through indwelling

Deliberating on possible options does not always translate into incompetence, what matters is to understand the circumstances that best suit a particular cognitive strategy (Hoffrage et al., 2000; Goldstein and Gigerenzer, 2002; Marewski et al., 2009; Marewski, Gaissmaier and Gigerenzer, 2010; Evans and Over, 2010). Goldstein and Gigerenzer (2002) used the term adaptive toolbox to explain how people adapt their decision-making styles to environmental structures and the degree to which various decision strategies fit into different conditions. The authors defined the adaptive toolbox as a collection of various cognitive strategies and the core capacities they exploit (Goldstein and Gigerenzer, 2002; Gigerenzer, 2004). The adaptive toolbox is based on the assumption that no universal tool can solve all tasks ― simple and complex ones alike (Brighton and Gigerenzer, 2011; Reimer and Hoffrage, 2006). Just like a hammer is ideal for hammering-in nails and useless for tightening nuts, so also are certain decision strategies useful for solving specific problems and useless for others (Broder, 2003; Gigerenzer, Hoffrage and Goldstein, 2008). The adaptive toolbox therefore contains heuristics that allow people to make inferences (e.g. to estimate the intensity of a blazing fire), develop preferences (e.g. whether to deploy an offensive or a defensive strategy) and plan interactions with others (e.g. using an open or closed communication style)

The cognitive continuum theory (Hammond et al., 1987) plays a role in explaining the interplay between various cognitive strategies and how they may possibly combine

100 during task performance. The theory classifies task characteristics into “analysis- inducing” and “intuition-inducing” tasks, and asserts that intuition is only one of the many different modes of thinking available to decision makers (see Figure 2.5). The analysis-inducing class includes decomposable tasks with reliably measured cues, while the intuition-inducing class includes non-decomposable tasks with unreliably measured cues, an ill-structured environment with ill-defined goals. The cognitive continuum theory, similar to other theories (e.g. R/M model Cohen et al., 1996; sense-making theory, Klein et al. 2006), suggests that the amount of information and time available to a decision maker determines the dominant decision making strategy they are likely to employ (Hammond, 1996)

Figure 2.5: The intuitive-analytical decision making framework (Hamm, 1988:33)

In his popular book entitled “Thought and choice in chess”, de Groot (1986) reported how grand masters used their intuition to recognize some promising moves that required close examination and then switched to a more analytical mode afterwards. According to de Groot, the transition from intuitive to analytical mode gave the chess players a little more time to reflect on their potential moves as the game progressed.

101 De Groot reported that the chess players were able to analyse their potential moves through the process of mental simulation where moves that were perceived to be less rewarding were screened out, leaving the grand masters with a single move they considered playable. De Groot’s study, which has been advanced by other scholars (Chase and Simon, 1973; Gobet and Simon, 1996; Gobet 2005; Ericsson, 2006), provides additional evidence to the fact that intuition and analysis can be used interchangeably in practice.

However, to avoid post-decision regret when switching between the intuitive and analytical modes it might be worth revisiting the advice of Hogarth (2003), who emphasized the role of self-awareness and advised decision makers to consistently regulate their natural tendencies to intuit e.g. by imposing “circuit breakers” (self- regulating mechanisms).