Bergson, according to Moore, is not interested in offering a definition of humour, such as for example: humour is the enjoyment o f incongruity for its own sake. For Moore, such definitions would presumably be regarded as 'formulas'. Instead o f offering a definition (formula), Moore thinks Bergson is giving us the procedures for making something funny. (Moore, p. 67) Moore, gives a description o f how an approach in terms of necessary conditions might work in the case o f humour, and then opposes this to the notion of fabrication which he finds in Bergson's account.
Something is seen, on the necessary condition model, to be amusing because individuals possess certain criteria (which the particular model has defined as the relevant criteria) for judging something to be amusing, and when the thing in question satisfies these criteria it is judged to be amusing. (Moore, p. 68) Instead o f the necessary condition model he has described, Moore thinks that Bergson's is interested in describing how a joke is produced. (Moore, p. 69) Moore describes this in terms of
outlining recipes for the production o f humour which are to act as general guides. (Moore, p. 69) Taking his own account o f recipes literally, Moore describes how two cooks might be given the same recipe but produce a different result. Moore claims that these different results do not show that the recipe lacks precision as it is the very nature o f the recipe to be imprecise. (Moore, p. 69) The instructions for recipes capture the
essentials o f the fabrication procedures, whilst there are multiple ways that these instructions can be implemented. This kind o f productive knowledge grasps the procedures by which an effect is produced, but does not thereby mean those with this knowledge will be able to correctly
implement it. Thus productive knowledge is not the same as learning how to write jokes, or a comedy. (Moore, p. 70)
After giving the above outline o f what he considers to be Bergson's position, Moore puts forward a potential objection: there appear to be examples o f humour which are not "... deliberately fabricated to be
funny", (Moore, p. 70) falling over in the street to use Bergson's example. Fabrication, to extrapolate from Moore's position, appears to entail that humour is produced deliberately,45 i.e. thought out in advance, and with a definite aim or purpose to amuse and a consciousness o f this aim. On the other hand fabrication would not necessitate that the joker, say, was conscious o f all the productive processes they were using to create amusement, but that amusement was the intended result.
Instead o f trying to argue that this apparent counter-example is not in fact a counter-example, Moore argues that there can be a multitude of apparent counter-examples to Bergson's account o f productive knowledge, all o f which are however irrelevant, as Bergson is simply not giving necessary and sufficient conditions. (Moore, p. 71) This is an odd response, for two reasons. Firstly, many o f Bergson's examples do not appear to assume that there is any deliberate production o f humour, so it seems odd that Moore should attempt an exegesis which portrays Bergson primary argument as based on these tenets. Secondly, as Moore himself points out, productive knowledge is not about how to write, say.
45 J. L. Austin, " Three Ways o f Spilling Ink,” Philosophical Papers, ed. J. O. I Imison & (i. J. Wamock, 3rd ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979) pp. 272-87.
a tragedy, but about the recipes which would be required to do so; this means there can be non-fabricated situations which can be treated as if
they had been fabricated.
At times Moore seems to trivialise Bergson's account by making it sound like general advice to the aspiring comic, (Moore, p. 75) and hardly philosophical at all. If this stance is assumed with regard to Laughter. then Bergson's account is indeed impregnable to assault by counter examples, as it fails to give a positive account o f humour in the first instance to criticise.
In addition to the 'trivialising' move, Moore extends the model of 'recipes' in line with Bergson's account o f central and peripheral cases. On the central / peripheral case model a central recipe is examined which can produce most cases o f a certain type, then from this other peripheral cases which have "... similar or related modes o f production ... " (Moore, p. 72) are traced. So, to take the analogy to recipes seriously, a central case might claim that in order to make an omelette, eggs are required. Such a claim would not then be refuted by the existence o f vegan omelettes made without eggs. Vegan omelettes are so called by virtue of the resemblance they bear to non-vegan omelettes. (Moore, p. 72) As Lacey puts it "... we laugh at cases which bear a superficial resemblance or accidental relation to the central case or to cases themselves so related to it." (Lacey, p. 195)
Further textual support for the central case-with-peripheral-effects-model can be found in Laughter, when Bergson claims that several "...
witticisms are constructed on the same model. We might make up any number of them, when once we are in possession o f the recipe." (Laughter, p. 64) From this quote it might seem reasonable to suppose that Bergson is indeed producing recipes, accounts giving productive knowledge. Bergson additionally says that there is something beyond mere 'mechanism' in the creation o f a joke, that although there may be a model to be copied, there also has to be something which allows the joke to be acceptable and it is the making acceptable which constitutes the art o f the comic.46 Acceptable in this context has two basic meanings. Firstly to take something which is potentially funny, say a ceremony, and make it actually amusing. Secondly to make a false logic seem as if it could almost be true. We follow such logic, for a moment, before withdrawing into laughter. (Laughter, pp. 196-7) More will be said about the notion of acceptability in the next chapter. Bergson's description as it has been outlined so far seems perfectly in keeping with Moore's exegesis o f his position in terms o f productive knowledge. One might know all the productive processes involved in writing a comedy, but still not be able to write one. The problem with Moore's account is that he then proceeds to outline various central cases and there attendant peripheral cases without outlining what links these central cases.
46 Bergson is n o t here referring to what Walton refers to as "... c a u s e s but not
o b j e c t s o f my amusement ..." examples o f causes being comic timing, canned laughter
and so forth which act to promote or heighten laughter. (Kendall Walton. "Understanding Humour and Music," The Interpretation o f Music: Philosophical lissavs. cd. Michael Kraus/. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993) p. 261 This point will become clearer when acceptability is dealt with in the next chapter. It is more a case o f the joke appearing 'natural.' (Laughter, p. 64)
In contrast to Moore, it shall be maintained that it is not merely a case of finding the recipe behind each central case o f humour, as Moore seems to think, and then finding how these relate to peripheral examples, but instead o f starting with central cases o f humour which are produced from the basic tendency behind humour - inattention - and then tracing resemblances to peripheral cases from the central cases so produced. From these central cases peripheral cases can then be traced which resemble some central case.
So, to be clear: according to Moore, there are recipes behind each central type o f humour and around these are peripheral cases which are funny due to their resemblance to the central case. This thesis differs from Moore's exegesis in two ways. Firstly in maintaining that Bergson thinks there is a basic tendency from which central examples are produced. This is because in each type o f comedy there is a variation on the theme o f the particular central example, and also the general theme. (Appendix, p. 156) Secondly in maintaining that counter-examples are not theoretically irrelevant to Bergson's account, though they might turn out to be in practice if his account is 'correct'. Bergson argues against giving necessary and sufficient conditions because such conditions trace a circle which is too wide, (Appendix, p. 156) so general as to be o f no real value. He does not want to enclose laughter in a formula which is very large and very simple,47 as this would annul "... the degrees o f whose highs touch on the finest cultural works, all o f which must keep a social
function - the correction o f "moeurs" [morals, customs, habits, manners]" (Worms, p. 179) Bergson instead claims that although his definition might be considered too narrow, the importance o f peripheral examples should not be underestimated. (Appendix, p. 156) As peripheral examples bear an outward resemblance to central cases they can still be amusing, whilst not conforming to the narrow 'definition' given. A counter-example would, given the above, be a humorous example which was neither a central case o f humour on the one hand, nor a peripheral case related to a central example on the other. Ultimately, an example will be explicable in Bergsonian terms if it can be traced back to humour’s original productive tendency. Either directly in the case o f central examples, or indirectly in the case o f peripheral examples.
In order to examine how faithful to Bergson this interpretation is, the following passage will be considered:
It would be chimerical to try to derive all humour from a single simple formula. In a certain sense, there is a formula; but it does not unfold uniformly. In other words, we must stop at occasional dominant effects here and there which are derived from it. These act as models, each surrounded by a circle o f new effects resembling the model. The new effects are not derived from the formula, but are funny by virtue of their relation to the models which are derived from it.48 (Moore, p. 72)
Bergson's position can be summarised as follows. There is a formula, but this formula cannot be simply understood, instead there can only be
48 This is quoted from l.e Rirc. p. 28, by Moore although 1 have modified Moore's translation o f the french slightly.
dominant effects derived from it, that is, central cases which are then 'surrounded' by other cases which resemble these. The circle o f effects which resemble the central cases, their model, are not directly related to the initial formula, but are instead funny by virtue o f their resemblance to those central cases which are related to the initial formula.
Two types o f connection can now be distinguished:
(i) That between the central formula and the various central cases of humour which are produced from it.
(ii) The outward resemblances which link peripheral and central cases of humour.
(i) It is possible to trace back a tendency, to find an image which is the interpenetration o f several ideas or theses. Bergson demonstrates this process with regard to Berkeley's philosophy identifying four theses49 which he then proceeds to show are interdependent. Bergson then progresses a stage further showing how it is not merely a case o f interdependence but instead o f a mutual source for these theses, an image which allows it self to be seen, being almost matter, yet cannot be touched, being almost mind. In the case o f Laughter the image is of something encrusted on the living. This image is the nearest it is possible to get to an intuition in expression as the only other mode o f expression, the concept, is a spreading out o f the image - a developing into a system.
49 Henri Bergson, The Creative Mind, trans. Mabelle L. Andison (Totowa, New Jersey: Littlefield Adams & Co., 1965) pp. 115-8) (Henceforth CM)
The intuition is itself inexpressible and above the image - a motif which diversifies little by little to form the precise images and concepts - fixed and discontinuous. (Mourélos, p. 218) It is this process o f development which 'connects' the various central examples of humour. In a sense each o f the central examples functions analogously to a 'stopping point' in the indivisible movement o f thought’s development which goes beyond numerical categories, (Delhomme, p. 64) yet even though the central examples are 'stopping points', in one sense, they are never as such still elements which can be rearranged at will, but like parts, lines from a poem, which although not giving the whole meaning, cannot be merely juxtaposed and rearranged at will and which are meaningful in themselves. Moving from the intuition to the image and then to concepts requires an increasing subdivision, like the multiplication o f cells dividing into a complete organism, becoming more and more spread out as it moves through successive planes, creating sentences, to express itself which, although diverse, can each express the same meaning. (CM, p. 121) The structure o f the intuition and the image near to it, is the opposite o f a numerical (quantitative multiplicity) where everything is actual - existing in discrete juxtaposition, it is instead a qualitative multiplicity which cannot be divided without changing in kind. In the case o f a qualitative multiplicity there is a move from the virtual to the actual - the lines o f development and the parts do not pre-exist their creation, i.e. a qualitative multiplicity actualises itself by producing its own lines o f differentiation. (Bergsonism, pp. 42-3) It is not a question, as it would be in a numerical multiplicity o f rearranging a series of juxtaposable pre existing elements, but instead o f creating new ideas. The present does not contain the future in disguise (Delhomme, p. 95, Capek, p. 100, Capek 2,
p. 310) ready to be assembled, it is thus impossible to say what a philosophical theory will be until it is complete. (Jankelevitch, p. 28 & Mullarkey, p. 4) So in this sense truth only appears retrospectively, (Mullarkey, p. 7, In Praise, p. 29) develops not by fitting an external existing frame on to each thought in a reductive manner,50 but instead through the change of thought itself, as well as its matter, there is thus no separation between the idea and its expression. (Delhomme, pp. 63-4)
So on the one hand there is a geometric plan which works by assembling juxtaposed spatialised elements, and on the other there is a model of organic growth which is without arrest and gradually appears in greater and greater clarity - termed a vertical rather than a horizontal movement, (Delhomme, p. 50) a creation. (Mourelos, p. 93) The organic has an internal vertical causality where the structure is always a product of differences internal to the multiplicity, whereas the horizontal has differences which are always external and develops across a plane. In the vertical organic development planes are traversed, not as separate pre existing entities which can be visited, like various simultaneously existing juxtaposed rooms in an homogeneous space, (MM, p. 145) but are instead created in the very act o f traversal. (Mourelos, p. 106) This is what it means to think in time. (Paradis, p. 12) Each change in level changes the whole. As each move is due to an internal actualisation whose lines do not pre-exist their creation, neither the result, nor the scheme for its production is predictable. It is not a case o f spatialised
50 T his includes deduction, a global structure which is supposed to represent thought. (Paradis, p. 16)
cause and effect relationships, but instead o f durational, free and creative becoming, (Delhomme, p. 35 & Mourelos, p. 109) each plane being both a repetition o f other planes, but also different from them, (Mullarkey, p. 136) which is what Merleau-Ponty means when he describes duration as "the continual birth which makes it always new and, precisely in this respect, always the same."51 In this sense Bergson cannot be precise (Mourelos, p. I l l ) as no law can explain the move between planes because o f its very creativity. (Delhomme, p. 52) So there is a formula or a motif, but it does not unfold uniformly, or predictably, it is repeated on each level, but at the same time it is different on each level it is repeated on. This is why there are the various ways in which humour functions in I .«tighter each o f which is unfolded from the basic intuition and which functions differently on each particular plane it is actualised on.
With respect to (ii) the connections are very close to the structure, according to Bergson, o f dreams. Dreams give "... an illustration o f the law with which we are well acquainted: given one form o f the laughable, other forms that are lacking in the same comic essence become laughable from their outward resemblance to the first." (Laughter, p. 187) So what kind o f links are created in dreams which are analogous to those between various jokes? In order to answer this question it will be necessary briefly to look at dreams and the form o f resemblance which Bergson thinks is
51 Making Maurice Merleau-Ponty, "Bergson in the Making". Signs (1960), trans. Richard C. McCleary (Evanston: Northwestern University Press. 1964) p. 184. (Henceforth Making)