II. THE PRINCIPLES OF JUSTICE IN WTO AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE
2.2. Trade and Development Linkage
2.2.1. Move toward Development-Based Policies: Doha Round
The public goal which arises from the requirements of the second principle of justice addresses the issue of wealth distribution on a global scale in favor of the disadvantaged members of the international community. The concept of development has been studied as the primary concept which, for the implementation of the second principle of justice in trade strategy, acts as the necessary element. In fact the concept of international global justice in conjunction with the current facts and existing limitations of international relations have resulted in the implementation of the second principle of justice in two different stages. While the public goal of distribution on an individual scale should be implemented in two levels, the first stage of the implementation of principles of justice addresses how the competition of international players to achieve a greater share in global trade reflects the concept known as development.
Development has been considered as the first pillar and prerequisite for the process of wealth-distribution which has been set as the goal of national economies in order to become successful participants in international trade and to benefit to the maximum extent possible from the opportunities which have been provided as a result of competition in international trade.
338 Kyle Bagwell and Robert W. Staiger, "Strategic Trade, Competitive Industries and Agricultural Trade Disputes," Economics and Politics 13(2)(July 2001). p.113
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In fact the prerequisite for distributing any wealth among the marginalized members of society is that those members have a better share of the creation of wealth on an international level and that this process of wealth creation takes place under the concept of development. While the implementation of global justice within the current limitations in international law requires the creation of wealth for the member states in the first instance, the development in its efficiency-based model eventually seeks the integration of the developing countries into the world economy and the elimination of poverty at the national level.339 Therefore the understanding that the free trade approach which dominated in the Uruguay Round has left them worse-off and the benefits they gained as a result of the free trade were not the benefits they had anticipated, resulted in the initiation of the developmental approach to international trade which called for the WTO to shift from a pure free trade forum to an organization shaped and prepared to expedite the process of development in developing countries.340
The inequality created and exacerbated as a result of the implementation of certain provisions and measures of the Uruguay Round left the weaker members of the WTO worse-off and made the developing and least-developed countries skeptical of entering into any new trade deal under the WTO umbrella. This unwillingness was weakened by the assurances which the developing countries received that their problem would be addressed in the Doha Round before the main agenda and it would be supported by developed countries be discussed and negotiated. In fact the Doha Round created a fast track mechanism which by giving some leverage to the developing countries sought the assurance of the developing and least-developed countries in terms of resolving their issues before the completion of the whole negotiation package.341
The trade forum in the Doha Round launched a new approach toward the development-based targets by distancing itself from a pure free trade policy and
339 Bhagwati, "Dependence and Interdependence –Essays in Development Economics." p.3
340Gerhart, "Slow Transformations: The Wto as a Distributive Organization.", p.1051.
341 Ibid., p.1073.
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establishing a new solution under the category of trade-based policies.342 In the Doha Round, certain demands were put on a fast track agenda and were considered as obtaining some leverage and concessions from the developed countries in order to ensure the satisfaction and participation of developing countries in the Negotiation Round. These concessions, although granted in order to make the low-income Members of the WTO comfortable that the results of this Round of Negotiation would finally modify certain decisions and regulations adopted in the past, present a major shift from the traditional international trade theory based on the complete freedom of movement of goods and services and pure comparative advantage theory to a new development-centered approach.
These concessions are not only limited to the new interpretations of past obligations and binding regulations but also include certain new decisions and provisions vested either in the title of interpretation or a new substantive decision the implementation of which will result in the roll-back of prior commitments and legal provisions established in the GATT Rounds of Negotiations especially the Uruguay Round.343
These concessions declared in the Doha Declaration include certain provisions in the current applicable international trade regime which the developing countries viewed as preconditions of entering into any new phase of trade liberalization.
The anti-dumping proceedings were addressed and certain micro clarifications have been made to discipline the use of dumping measures. While the anti-dumping measures were resorted to as a protectionist instrument for the developed countries, the developing countries called for the setting of a more objective framework in which the anti-dumping measures could take place and the Doha Round provided certain concessions on this basis.344 In addition, in relation to export subsidies of the developing countries, the possibility of having extensions on the transitional period changed to a sort of right allowing the developing countries to have the opportunity to seek extension and the Doha
342 Ibid., p.1081.
343 Ibid., p.1073.
344 IMPLEMENTATION DECISIONS, supra note 2, art. 7.1: “Where an investigation of the same product from the same Member resulted in a negative finding within 365 days prior to the filing of the application and that, unless this pre-initiation examination indicates that circumstances have changed, the investigation shall not proceed.”
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Declaration made the criteria upon which the extension should be granted more objective.345 However a significant part of the concessions made by developed and high-income countries in favor of the developing countries in the Doha Round relate to intellectual property rights and the Trade-Related Aspects of the Intellectual Property Agreement (TRIPS).