MRAM SMPSM v. BCDA

G.R. No. 142255

DOCTRINE: Prescription does not apply if the subject land is covered by a Torrens Title, as in the case at bar. Moreover, prescription does not run against the State.

FACTS:

As a background, in 1992, RA 7227 created the BCDA to "accelerate the sound and balanced conversion into alternative productive uses of the Clark and Subic military reservations and their extensions," and "to raise funds by the sale of portions of Metro Manila military camps."

Pursuant to this Act, Pres. Ramos issued EO No. 40, series of 1992, specifying, among others, the portions of Metro Manila military camps to be utilized to generate capital for the BCDA.

Among these Metro Manila military camps is Fort Bonifacio, located in the City of Makati and the Municipality of Taguig. Under EO No. 40, 214 hectares in Fort Bonifacio were earmarked for development and disposition to raise funds for BCDA projects and to use such funds to accelerate the sound and balanced conversion into alternative productive uses of the Clark and Subic military reservations and their extensions.

The members of SMPMI, allegedly comprising over 20,000 families, are residents of Fort Bonifacio occupying a portion of it specifically Lot 4, Lot 3, and Lot 1 with an aggregate area of 97.58 hectares allegedly covered by SWO-00-001265 in the name of BCDA. Petitioner maintains that its members have been occupying peacefully and continuously these lots in Fort

Bonifacio. It alleges that Fort Bonifacio is covered by the TCT in the name of the United States of America, hence the Philippine Government.It further alleges that BCDA, pursuant to RA 7227, the Municipality of Taguig, through its Mayor, sent 30-day notices of eviction to its members. It asserts the illegality of the imminent eviction, for which the present action was filed, as the land which petitioner‘s members are occupying is still owned by the USA and not by the Philippine Government.

It further asserts that Section 8 of RA 7227, which stipulates the area of Fort Bonifacio specifically covering 2,276 hectares, did not provide any technical description on what is indeed covered. Besides, it strongly argues that because of the lack of "tie line" locating the exact position claimed by BCDA, the latter cannot illegally stake its claim on the whole of Fort Bonifacio to the prejudice not only of its members but also of all persons or entities occupying said area. Petitioner also contends that what complicates the controversy is the approval of the BCDA plan by the Bureau of Land without due certification from the Land Registration Authority.

ISSUE:

Who between petitioner SMPMI and BCDA has the right of possession over the particular parcels of land which are subject of this petition.

HELD:

The Court ruled in favor of BCDA for the ff. reasons:

1. The Philippine Government, and now the BCDA, has title and ownership over Fort Bonifacio.

2. BCDA has convincingly shown that the in the name of the USA covering Fort Bonifacio was cancelled by TCT No. 61524 issued in 1958 in the name of the Republic of the Philippines. In 1995, the TCT was transferred in the name of BCDA. Thus, BCDA has valid titles over Fort Bonifacio which have become indefeasible and beyond question. On the other hand, SMPMI has not presented any title or deed to demonstrate ownership or any interest in the subject lots.

3. Third, it is clear from the records that BCDA has been granted a clear mandate by RA 7227, specifically by its Sections 7 and 8, and re-enforced by EO No. 40, series of 1992, to take over and administer Fort Bonifacio for its development and disposition to raise funds for BCDA projects, among others, the conversion of Clark and Subic military reservations and their extensions to alternative productive uses.

4. It is basic that ownership or dominion includes the right of possession. In traditional Roman law, jus possidendi or the right to possess is fundamentally not only an attribute of ownership but also a direct consequence of ownership. Thus, from BCDA‘s ownership of the subject lots originates the rights of possession, use, and disposition

5. Prescription does not apply if the subject land is covered by a Torrens Title, as in the case at bar.

6. Neither prescription nor laches runs against the State. Thus, even granting arguendo that the subject lands had been erroneously issued titles in favor of third parties, which is definitely not the case; neither prescription nor estoppel by laches applies against the State. In a catena of cases, we have consistently reiterated this hornbook doctrine. In Reyes v. Court of Appeals, it was held that:

In so far as the timeliness of the action of the Government is concerned, it is basic that prescription does not run against the State. x x x The case law has also been:

‗When the government is the real party in interest, and is proceeding mainly to assert its own rights and recover its own property, there can be no defense on the ground of laches or limitation.‘ x x x

‗Public land fraudulently included in patents or certificates of title may be recovered or reverted to the State in accordance with Section 101 of the Public Land Act. Prescription does not lie against the State in such cases for the Statute of Limitations does not run against the State. The right of reversion or reconveyance to the State is not barred by prescription.‘

FMM

Heirs of Soriano v. CA 363 SCRA 87

DOCTRINE: Possession and ownership are distinct legal concepts. There is ownership when a thing pertaining to one person is complete does not own it and cannot evict themly subjected to his will in a manner not prohibited by law and consistent with the rights of others. Ownership confers certain rights to the owner, among which are the right to enjoy the thing owned and the right to exclude other persons from possession thereof. On the other hand, possession is defined as the holding of a thing or the enjoyment of a right. Literally, to possess means to actually and physically occupy a thing with or without right. Possession may be had in one of two ways: possession in the concept of an owner and possession of a holder.

FACTS:

On 30 June 1967, the heirs of Adrian Soriano, who died intestate in 1947, leased the property to spouses David de Vera and Consuelo Villasista for a period of fifteen (15) years beginning 1 July 1967.

The contract of lease provided that Roman Soriano (―Soriano‖), one of the children of the late Adriano, will be the caretaker of the property during the period of the lease.

During the effectivity of the lease contract, the heirs of Adriano Soriano entered into an extrajudicial settlement of his estate. The property subject of this case was adjudicated to seven (7) of his rune (9) children pro-indiviso.

On 11 January 1968, the property was divided into two (2) lots, Lot No. 60052 and Lot No. 8459.

The former lot was assigned to Lourdes, Candido and the heirs of Dionisia while the latter lot was assigned to Francisco, Librada, Elcocadio and Soriano. The new owners of Lot No. 60052 sold the portions assigned to them to spouses Braulio and Aquilina Abalos. Likewise, the new owners of Lot 8459, except Soriano, sold their shares to the Spouses Abalos.

On 14 March 1968, On March 14, 1968, the Spouses de Vera ousted Soriano as caretaker and appointed Isidro Versoza and Vidal Versoza as his substitutes. Thereafter, Soriano filed a case for reinstatement and reliquidation against the Spouses de Vera.

On 30 September 1969, the Agrarian Court rendered a decision authorizing the ejectment of Roman. On appeal, the decision was reversed by the Court of Appeals (―CA‖). However, before it was executed, the parties entered into a post-decisional agreement wherein the spouses de Vera allowed Soriano to sub-lease the property until the termination of the original lease on 30 June 1982. This agreement was approved by the court in an order dated 22 December 1972.

On 16 August 1976, the Spouses Abalos filed with the then Court of First Instance (―CFI‖) of Pangasinan at Lingayen an application for registration of title. The application claimed ownership of the entire lot No. 60052 and 3/4 pro-indiviso of Lot No. 8459. The Director of

Lands (―Republic‖) and Soriano filed separate oppositions to the application. The latter‘s opposition alleged that the two (2) lots subject of the application have not yet been subdivided and remained as one parcel; that he is the co-owner pro-indiviso of the combined area of the two (2) lots and not just to one-fourth (1/4) of Lot No. 8459 as alleged in the application; and that the applicant‘s source of ownership is voidable. The Republic subsequently conceded that the land applied for was private and disposable. The RTC, acting as a Land Registration Court, granted the application for Registration.

On 13 April 1983, after the expiration of the original lease and the sub-lease in favor of Soriano, the Spouses Abalos filed a case for unlawful detainer against Soriano. This case, however, was dismissed on motion of the complainants, Spouses Abalos.

For their part, Elcocadio, Librada, Soriano, Francisco, Lourdes, Candido and the heirs of Dionisia, filed a complaint to annul the deeds of sale they executed in favor of the Spouses Abalos or should the deeds be not annulled, to allow Soriano, Elcocadio and Librada to redeem those shares sold by Candido, Lourdes, Francisca and the heirs of Dionisia and to uphold Soriano‘s possession of the fishpond portion of the property as a tenant-caretaker. After the dismissal of the case for unlawful detainer, the Abalos spouses a motion for execution of the post-decisional order embodying the agreement of Soriano and the de Vera spouses allowing the former to sublease the property.

In the mean time, Soriano died on 11 December 1985. Thus, the complaint in the civil case for annulment of document and/or redemption, ownership and damages, was amended to substitute Soriano‘s heirs.

Several decisions by the Supreme Court (―SC‖) were rendered but the issue on possession remains challenged.

ISSUE:

Whether an owner is also entitled to possession. -- NO

HELD:

The Supreme Court held that possession and ownership are distinct legal concepts. There is ownership when a thing pertaining to one person is completely subjected to his will in a manner not prohibited by law and consistent with the rights of others. Ownership confers certain rights to the owner, among which are the right to enjoy the thing owned and the right to exclude other persons from possession thereof. On the other hand, possession is defined as the holding of a thing or the enjoyment of a right. Literally, to possess means to actually and physically occupy a thing with or without right. Possession may be had in one of two ways: possession in the concept of an owner and possession of a holder. A person may be declared owner but he may not be entitled to possession. The possession may be in the hands of another either as a lessee or a tenant. The SC also held that the exercise of their rights of ownership are subject to limitations that may be imposed by law.

RGGM

State Investment House v. CA 254 SCRA 368

DOCTRINE: A mortgagee who has foreclosed property is not considered in good faith when such mortgagee has or is expected to have knowledge of any defect in the title; a prior buyer in good faith, although merely under a contract to sell, is preferred over a mortgagee since if the

original owner delivered title, he would not anymore be able to mortgage the thing.

FACTS:

A contract to sell was executed between spouses Canuto and Oreta, and Solid Homes. The sale involved a parcel of land (511 sq. m.). Upon signing of the contract, Oreta made payment with the agreement that the balance shall be paid in installments. Meanwhile. Solid Homes executed several mortgages in favor of State Investment over its subdivided parcels of land, including the subject of land of the mentioned contract to sell. Such mortgage was foreclosed upon failure of Solid to comply with its obligations. Thereafter, Solid through a MOA, negotiated for the deferment of consolidation of ownership over the foreclosed properties. It further committed itself to redeem the properties.

Spouses Canuto after a few years filed a complaint before the HLURB against Solid and State for failure on the part of Solid to execute the necessary absolute deed of sale as well as to deliver title to property subject of the contract to sell despite full payment. Solid alleged that its obligations under the contract have become so difficult for performance. Solid , in effect, asked to be partially released from its obligations by delivering another parcel of land in substitution to the subject of the sale. State, on the other hand averred that unless Solid pays the redemption price, it has a right to hold on to the foreclosed properties. However, HLURB ordered State to execute a deed of conveyance in favor of complainants and deliver the title to the land. Solid was then ordered to pay State the portion of the loan which corresponds to the value of the lot.

this judgment was sustained by the Board of Commissioners, Office of the President, and Court of Appeals.

ISSUES:

1. W/N spouses Oreta's unregistered rights are superior over State's registered mortgage over the property

2. W/N State has the right to rely on the face of the Torrens title

HELD:

1. State's registered mortgage right over the property is inferior to that of respondents' unregistered right. The unrecorded sale is preferred for the reason that if the original owner (Solid) had parted with the ownership of the thing sold, he would no longer have the free disposal of it and would not be able to mortgage it. Registration of the mortgage is not important since it is understood to be without prejudice to the rights of third persons.

2. As a general rule, where there is nothing in the title to indicate any cloud or vice in the ownership thereof, the purchaser is not required to explore further. An exception to this is when the mortgagee or purchaser has knowledge of a defect or lack of title on the part of the vendor or that he was aware of sufficient facts to induce a reasonably prudent man to inquire further. In this case, petitioner knows full well that Solid is engaged in selling subdivision lots. Therefore, as founded on jurisprudence, it should have taken necessary precautions to ascertain any flaw. Moreover, the uniform practice of financing institutions is to investigate, examine, and assess real property offered as security. State is therefore not a mortgagee in good faith.

MCSS