Multi-level governance

Implicit in the above discussion is the idea of ‘multi-level’ or ‘multi-tiered’ governance – the notion that governance ‘happens’ within local, regional, national and international jurisdictions. This term was first coined by Gary Marks (1993) to describe the workings of the European Union (EU) and its member states, before gaining wider currency as other scholars began to emphasise how different tiers of government shape and implement policy, often in collaboration with societal actors (Kohler-Koch and Eising, 1999). Indeed, the emergence of supranational institutions such as the EU, the decentralisation of power within nation-states and structural reforms associated with New Public Management (NPM, see section 2.2.6) have made the term increasingly relevant to Western democracies (Peters and Pierre, 2001). Crucially, not only does it assume that governance is an important horizontal

factoracross each of these levels, but it also takes account of vertical arrangements that result in policy priorities being shaped and delivered both ‘downwards’ (e.g.,

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from central to local government) and ‘upwards’ (in the opposite direction). In other words, multi-level governance arrangements reject traditional ‘top-down’ hierarchies by recognising that policy-making processes are complex and involve a range of different stakeholders.

Due to the numerous state and non-state actors involved in environmental policy, and the ‘wicked’ nature of the issue, many scholars have sought to use multi-level

governance perspectives to understand this sector (see for example Lenschow, 1999, Auer, 2000, Bulkeley, 2005, Bulkeley and Betsill, 2005, Schreurs, 2008). Indeed, the multi-level perspective can help to provide a more holistic analysis of policy

processes and implementation strategies in a variety of scenarios. For example, the EU (through the regional development funds), or central or state/Land governments might impose specific targets on municipalities, or attach strings to funding grants to try and ensure that policy objectives are achieved. Alternatively, they may provide additional capacity and resources to help local authorities to achieve their objectives fairly autonomously of other horizontal actors. For their part, private actors could exercise significant influence over decision-making, with the result that policies do not reflect the ambitions of public officials.

Together with Lisbet Hooghe, Marks developed the initial idea further by

characterising two different types of multi-level governance: Type I, which consists of relatively static, multi-purpose jurisdictions where a single public body has direct responsibility for a range of services; and Type II, where more ad hoc, specific governance arrangements are more common (Hooghe and Marks, 2003). Table 2.1 summarises these differences.

Hooghe and Marks (2003) acknowledge that the two theoretical types are ideal models and normally overlap in the real world, and that neither is demonstrably more effective than the other. Moreover, they stress that most (if not all) countries are positioned somewhere along a spectrum between the two models and do not conform to either ‘ideal’ type. Nonetheless, they provide a useful distinction for the purposes of comparative politics. In particular, Germany is a federal country that allocates specific responsibilities to the multi-functional Länder (states) and local authorities. Since these institutions are also anchored into a rigid constitutional framework, it

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resembles a Type I environment. In contrast, England (though not necessarily the other constituent parts of the United Kingdom following devolution to Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland) has much more of a Type II unitary structure, because institutional arrangements are flexible and dynamic, and sub-national government is much weaker than the centre. In addition, the state is fragmented because a range of other functional agencies, such as quasi-autonomous non-government organisations (quangos), play important roles in various policy sectors (Alexander, 1991,

Goldsmith, 2012). This contrast has led Herrschel and Newman (2002) to characterise Britain and Germany as representing two extremes in terms of state structures – and this has been the case especially since the 1980s, when local government in England underwent significant horizontal fragmentation (Miller et al., 2000).

Table 2.1: Type I and Type II multi-level governance (source: Hooghe and Marks (2003)

Building on the ideas of Hooghe and Marks, this thesis is particularly interested in the contrasts between Type I and Type II multi-level governance in terms of vertical and horizontal relationships with other policy-making actors. However, the empirical research found three ways in which this typology needed to be refined. Firstly, it revealed a key contradiction in table 2.1 – between row 2 on the one hand, and rows 3 and 4 on the other. Crucially, it found that the greater the degree of vertical interaction between tiers of governance, the more structured and fixed these structures became. Indeed, as chapters 4, 5 and 6 will demonstrate, the mutually-supportive nature of interdependent vertical relationships in Germany actually reinforced the system-wide architecture, since all tiers of government recognised that collaboration could increase their capacity to achieve policy objectives. In other words, Gelsenkirchen is involved in intersecting vertical relationships (a Type II characteristic), yet these strengthened

Row Type I Type II

1 general-purpose jurisdictions task-specific jurisdictions

2 non-intersecting memberships Intersecting memberships

3 jurisdictions organized in a

limited number of levels

no limit to the number of jurisdictional levels

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the existing structures and fixed number of jurisdictions within which the council operates (attributes that would normally be associated with Type I multi-level governance).

Figure 2.1: Vertical and horizontal dimensions of Types I and II multi-level governance arrangements (adapted from Hooghe and Marks, 2003)

To address this issue, the thesis condensed the Type I and Type II characterisations into two sub-dimensions: the extent to which municipalities exist within a structured vertical framework; and the degree to which the local state has been fragmented and other horizontal actors undertake public functions. Figure 2.1 provides an overview of these sub-dimensions of multi-level governance, whilst emphasising the fact that they exist on a spectrum and jurisdictions may exhibit characteristics associated with one type horizontally but the other along the vertical sub-dimension. This diagram will act as a template for illustrating the different structural arrangements that operate in Gelsenkirchen and Newcastle (see chapters 4, 5 and 6). As it suggests, a

municipality in a characteristically Type I jurisdiction would be located in the bottom left quadrant. This is because it operates within highly-structured vertical

arrangements and responsibility for a wide range of local functions is concentrated within the council, in what Hooghe and Marks call a ‘multi-purpose’ authority. In contrast, Type II arrangements in the top-right quadrant are loose and flexible along the vertical sub-dimension, and the local state is fragmented horizontally. As section

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2.3 will explain, these two contrasts form a key part of the central hypothesis in this thesis.

A second problem with Hooghe and Marks’ typology relates to their descriptions of governance actors. Although the very term ‘governance’ implies that private firms and voluntary bodies have a role to play in decision-making, Hooghe and Marks suggest that their typology only extends to those organisations that help to provide public services within the jurisdiction under investigation. For example, their description of a Type II arrangement, in which the local state is fragmented into various task-specific organisations, only appears to cover those bodies that have responsibility for delivering or deciding on public services. Such a characterisation ignores the crucial role that private actors need to play in climate change mitigation and illustrates how the typology has limited applicability in wicked policy sectors, particularly along the horizontal dimension. Indeed, since any jurisdiction’s governance approach to climate change could theoretically encompass every

organisation and private citizen within its boundaries, it might be argued that Type II arrangements must apply because the actors involved in addressing it must by

definition be fragmented. To overcome this second problem, the thesis only

considered those actors that the municipalities in Newcastle and Gelsenkirchen have actively sought to involve in their governing arrangements. Although this may

simplify the analysis to a certain extent, it ensures that the investigation is manageable from a practical perspective.

Thirdly, and most importantly, although the typology might help to illustrate how different jurisdictions have adopted contrasting governance arrangements, it does not

explain the reasons for these differences or provide theoretical tools that could predict the ways in which they may change. Indeed, the overall idea of ‘(multi-level)

governance’ is more descriptive than analytical: it highlights the fact that numerous stakeholders are involved in making and implementing policy, but does not act as a tool to help understand why things turned out the way they did (see Smith, 2003, Zito, 2013 for more comprehensive critiques). As such, it is a useful reference point when discussing the fact that different actors are involved in decision-making, but it is not an explanatory tool, and certainly not a comprehensive theoretical framework.

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between tiers of government, and therefore it cannot help to identify which actors are most influential in governance arrangements. As a result, this thesis also draws on Rod Rhodes’ theory of power dependency (Rhodes, 1981) in order to provide the necessary theoretical support to explain how climate change policy is made and implemented in Gelsenkirchen and Newcastle. Section 2.4 will show how this theory is applicable to the case study cities, and also expand on Rhodes’ original model to provide even greater insight into policy-making processes.