Part IV. The Best Institutional Framework — A Dual Commission Model: a Human Rights
2. The Nature of the HKHRC
3.1. The multiple-commission model
646. The multiple-commission model consists of an array of commissions mandated narrowly to deal with specific human rights violations. Usually, each commission monitors a limited number of human rights legislation and seldom cooperates with each other.
647. The NHRIs in Sweden and South Africa are the examples of a multiple-commission model. In Sweden, there are six official ombudsmen.730 They deal with individual complaints within their respective fields of responsibility.731
648. South Africa has established the Public Protector (an office of the ombudsman), the human rights commission, the Commission for the Promotion and Protection of the Rights of Cultural, Religious and Linguistic Communities, the Commission for Gender Equality, Auditor-General, the Electoral Commission, and the Independent Authority to Regulate Broadcasting.732
3.1.1. Intersectionality of multiple discriminations
649. As far as equality rights are concerned, the proliferation of various specialized equality commission is undesirable because of the intersectionality of multiple discriminations. In reality, discrimination cases usually involve multiple grounds. Specialized commissions mandated to deal with discrimination on a particular ground often fail to distinguish and address the particular problems faced by different groups.
730 They are the Office of the Parliamentary ombudsman, Consumer Ombudsman, the Office of the Equal
Opportunities Ombudsman, the Ombudsman against Ethnic Discrimination, the Children’s Ombudsman, the Office of the disability Ombudsman and Ombudsman against Discrimination because of Sexual Orientation.
731 EU Network of Independent Experts on Fundamental Rights, “Opinion of the EU Network of Independent Experts in Fundamental Rights Regarding the Role of Nartional Institutions for the Protection of Human Rights in the Member States of the European Union,”(March 2004) CFR-CDF.Avis1.2004, available at
http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/cfr_cdf/doc/avis/2004_1_en.pdf at 139-42.
732 Constitution of South Afica, Chapter 9, Articles 182-92.
650. On the other hand, a single equality commission is able to deal with multiple grounds of human rights violations, while also being open to the diversity and specific needs of all human rights issues.
651. Mr. Pru Goward, the Australian Federal Sex Discrimination Commissioner, when delivering a speech at the University of Hong Kong, urged the Hong Kong Government to take into account the intersectional nature of discrimination when formulating the Race Discrimination Bill so that the Bill could achieve greater effectiveness and longevity.733 He said that:-
“One of the challenges facing HREOC, the NHRI in Australia, is intersectionality, in particular in the field of race and gender…
“HREOC’s legislation and its structure suggest that discrimination can’t be neatly dealt with by considering separately these aspects of identity. We have created race discrimination legislation, sex discrimination legislation etc. HREOC itself is structured into policy and complaints handling units along these same divisions.
The effect of setting up legislation and human rights structures that deal with these aspects of identity separately is that they are often inadequate for dealing with situations of discrimination or disadvantage that have been brought about as a result of the intersection of different aspects of identity.” [emphasis added]
“In Australia for example, race and gender intersectionality mean that the experiences of women from non-English speaking backgrounds…and Indigenous women are unique, however our human rights system often struggles to work with this overlap…The challenge is to recognise that different groups and persons will have very different experiences of racism, for example, because of other aspects of their identity, such as gender.”734
3.1.2. Cost effectiveness
652. Because of the intersectional nature of discriminations, a number of specialized antidiscrimination commissions would be involved in a single discrimination case under a multiple-commission model. Although the jurisdictions of various specialized commissions do not overlap as such, the antidiscrimination commissions always need to work with each other. Hence, undesirable conflicts and duplications of jurisdictions, which the Handbook expressly warns against, may be generated. 735 Even if the
733 Pru Goward, “HREOC: Its structure, its functions and its challenges,” Speech at Faculty of Law, the University of Hong Kong (11 March 2003), the University of Hong Kong’s website, available at
http://www.hku.hk/ccpl/pub/conferences/11032002.pdf at 26.
734 Id at 23-5.
735 Handbook, paragraph 91, and 94.
commission can cooperate well with each other, the transactional cost of the multiple-commission model is higher than the other two models.
653. Ian Clyde, the Chairman of Consumer Affairs Victoria and Simeon Beckett, the spokesman for Australian Lawyers for Human Rights argued that, due to its structure, its size, power and resources, the Australian HREOC has been able to conduct major systematic human rights inquiries which have not been possible under the pre-2006 structure in the UK.736 On the other hand,:-
“The proliferation of single issue statutory authorities in the United Kingdom is problematic because of the potential inconsistencies between the practice of such organizations, the lesser effectiveness of smaller organizations and the differences between legislative regimes. There seems to be little real basis for maintaining the separation of such organizations apart from anxiety about fusion and natural corporate resistance.”737
654. In Malawi, the existence of both a Malawi Human Rights Commission (MHRC) and an Ombudsman illustrates a clear overlap of jurisdiction. The Constitution provides that the MHRC shall protect and investigate violations of the rights accorded by the “Constitution or any other law”.738 The Ombudsman investigates cases where a person has suffered injustice and where there is no other practicable legal remedy.739 The jurisdiction of the MHRC covers both the public and private sectors whereas the Office of the Ombudsman extends only to members of the public service.
655. To facilitate the cooperation of the MHRC and the Office of Ombudsman, the Ombudsman is an ex officio member of the MHRC. Together with the Law Commissioner, the Ombudsman can effectively control the appointment of human rights commissioners. Thereby, frequent communications as well as a close working relationship are essential to construvtive cooperation.740
656. One can argue that a clear definition of remits of various NHRIs can avoid duplication of jurisdiction. Where jurisdictions overlap, NHRIs can communicate with each other to resolve the disputes. The presence of the Malawian Ombudsman as an ex-officio member of the Malawi Human Rights Commission has been regarded as a useful way to resolve any duplication over jurisdictions.741
657. Frequent communication is required to maintain inter-institutional cooperation in the multiple-commission model. The transactional cost for communication and decision
736 See generally Ian Clyde and Simeon Beckett.
737 Id at 146.
738 Constitution of Malawi, Article 129.
739 Id, Article 123(1).
740 John Hatchard at 36.
741 Id.
making for multiple agencies would usually be greater than a single institution or a double-institution.
658. At the same time, the multiple-commission model “restrict or preclude shared use of services which could well be cost-effective, particularly in outreach and education, but also in legal advice and administrative support.”742