Another helpful way of thinking about the identity-image rela-tionship has been developed by John Balmer and Stephen Geyser (2003). They seek to apply the concepts of identity to the whole field of corporate-level studies, which they argue can cohere around the management of these multiple identities of a corporation (though this is a different usage of multiple identities to our own). As a result, they have proposed a multi-disciplinary approach – now called the AC3ID framework – to the manage-ment of image and identity. According to them, identity has five meanings which incorporate not only the previously discussed organizational identity and image but also other corporate-level concepts such as corporate identity, strategic vision and corpor-ate strcorpor-ategy (see Figure 3.4).
A Actual or (organizational
identity)
C Conceived or
(corporate image)
I Ideal or (corporate
strategy) C Communicated
or (corporate identity)
D Desired or (corporate vision) C
Covenanted identity (brand
promise)
Figure 3.4
The AC3ID framework (adapted from Balmer and Geyser, 2003, p. 17; Balmer and Stuart, 2005).
■ The actual identity is defined as the current attributes of the corporation, including the management values, leadership styles, organizational structure, business activities and markets, and the range of products and services.
■ The conceived identity refers to the past, present and future perceptions of internal and external stakehold-ers, close to Hatch and Schultz’s image and identity relationship, and to reputation.
■ The ideal identity, which is the optimum positioning of the corporation in its given markets at a point in time, based on an analysis of external environmen-tal–internal resources fit. This identity is associated with the work of strategic planners and is close to the notion of corporate strategy and strategic positioning.
■ The desired identity is synonymous with the vision of the organization held by its leadership. It is not the same thing as ideal identity, which is mostly the result of serious analysis. The desired identity is very often a personal and egotistical statement made by senior lead-ers, but which is no less important in its consequences than ideal identities.
■ The communicated identity is the ‘official’ identity put into the public domain through the corporate commu-nications function – the official rhetoric of the organiza-tion that communicates what the organizaorganiza-tion wishes to be. It is also, however, communicated by less contro-llable media, such as ‘word of mouth’ and the financial press, which requires a great deal of management time spent on internal communications and public relations.
■ The covenanted identity, which is the ‘promise’ made by the brand to persuade us to place our trust and confidence in it and to continue to support it through repeat ‘purchases’ and recommendations.
The main practical value of this framework is the proposition that all five identities need to be broadly aligned over time.
Balmer and Geyser maintain that if any two of these are out of alignment at a particular point, this will be manifested as a
‘moment of truth’ from which a corporation’s reputation is in
danger of suffering serious damage. So, for example, the dan-gers of communicated identity (or corporate identity) running ahead of the actual identity (or organizational identity) can, as we discuss in later chapters, lead to persistent cynicism among employees and also lead to distrust among customers if this cynicism is communicated by disaffected employees. Another example is redundancies or retrenchments that lead to mass disaffection among employees (negative organizational iden-tity) who are simultaneously being exhorted to ‘live the brand’
image that ‘puts people first’ (the conceived identity). So, Jeff Pfeffer (2005) has argued that as ‘employees are increasingly disengaged and distrustful of their employers, organizations have moved to become less like communities and adopt more arm’s-length and distant relationships with their people. Organ-izations that are more communal have arrangements for help-ing employees in need … are better at resolvhelp-ing work–family issues, and foster long-term employment relations’ (p. 1).
The Balmer and Geyser model has been applied to the analysis of British Airways progress over the past few decades (see Box 3.2).
Box 3.2 The changing identities of British Airways (BA) BA can be traced to 1924 when four small airlines merged to form Imperial Airways, encouraged by the British government. It operated as a virtual monopoly until 1935, when British Airways was established to further the UK’s aviation interests in South America and Europe. The brand name temporarily disappeared but was re-established in 1974 fol-lowing the merger of British Overseas Airways Corporation (BOAC) and British European Airways (BEA). Balmer and Stuart trace six periods during which there has been a mismatch in BA’s changing identities.
■ ‘Appalling’ identity (1974–1980). Following the merger of BOAC and BEA, there were tensions between the two groups of staff, with the former seeing themselves as superior to the latter. This mani-fested itself in poor service which was exacerbated by the attitudes of BA pilots, many of whom had joined from the Royal Air Force and saw passengers as cargo to be transported, and as a near-unnecessary evil. This became a major problem for customers since
the airline held a virtual monopoly of many routes in and out of Heathrow. BA came to stand for ‘Bloody Awful’.
■ ‘Adjusting identity’ (1981–1983). Margaret Thatcher gave Sir John King the chairmanship to turn it around from a loss-making nation-alized carrier to a profitable private sector organization. Inheriting a huge overdraft, King and his new board embarked on a series of initiatives to improve employee morale and self-image, which was seen to be a major problem. This included an expensive advertise-ment, called the Manhattan ad, that was designed to change the identity and self-respect of employees as much as convince custo-mers that the airline was changing.
■ ‘Appealing identity’ (1984–1987). King and his new CEO, Sir Colin Marshall, who had a service industry background, were experienced communicators, who recognized the need to change the image and self-image of the company to improve customer service. This began with a major culture change programme called ‘Putting People First’, in which Marshall led from the front. It was also a period during which BA introduced a new livery that emphasized its ‘Britishness’, incorporating the Union Jack flag and a coat of arms. There is evi-dence, however, that this culture change programme had only a limited impact, especially among lower levels of employees.
■ ‘Adoring identity’ (1988–1995). BA adopted the claim that it was ‘the world’s favourite airline’, which was supported by customer satisfac-tion surveys. King and Marshall were insistent that this brand pro-mise was supported by employee behaviour and HR became a major player in delivering the brand warrant.
■ ‘Ailing identity’ (1996–2000). Robert Ayling became CEO in 1996 in its lead up to privatization in 1997. Ayling and his team determined that BA had to change its image from being Britain’s national flag carrier to an international business, since more than 60% of its customers were non-UK citizens. It was during this period that BA changed its communicated identity by, among other design efforts, introducing a series of international images on the tailfins. This soon became seen a major mistake when Margaret Thatcher descri-bed them as ‘appalling’. Employees resented the changes, especially since they cost £60 million, and Richard Branson of Virgin exploited the criticism of many US customers that they wanted BA to look more British, by changing the livery of Virgin airlines to carry the Union Jack. The ethnic tailfins were replaced after two years and
Ayling accepted the position of BA as a British-based global airline.
The period was financially disastrous with £4.2 billion being wiped off BA’s balance sheet. Needless to say, Ayling stepped down in 2000, following his failed attempt to change the image of BA through graphic design.
■ ‘Affirming identity’ (2000–2005). A new CEO, Rod Eddington, was appointed, whose job has been to deal with the problems posed by low cost air carriers on short-haul journeys. The British airline indus-try has become one of the most competitive in the world, with a large number of ‘no-frills’ airlines offering extremely cheap fares all over the UK and Europe. BA has attempted to affirm its trad-itional identity by affirming its ‘Britishness’ and by re-positioning itself ever more as a carrier that deals with premium service and business class passengers. It has done so quite successfully, posting huge profits in 2005, but has run into employee relations problems with its full-time staff and contractors causing it to lose reputation for customer service.
Balmer and Stuart analyse each of these periods in terms of either a mismatch between the multiple identities or of bringing them into alignment. For example, the first period, the appalling identity, was seen as a misalignment between actual and ideal identities, while the adjusting identity period was seen as bringing the covenanted identity and actual identity into alignment. You may wish to reflect on how they analyse the other periods.
Source: Adapted from Balmer and Stuart, 2005