The multiplicity of power in practice

There are a number of other suggestions and discussion points until BPBD (BPBD Sleman) joins the debate. The explanation is as follows; The Unit Lak is only open to village leaders and the staff members. They are responsible for what co-ordinating during and after the eruption in terms of evacuation and rebuilding. The Forum PRB is open to members of the Unit and organisations within the village, meaning the participants of the seminars. They are responsible for Pengurangan

(reduction of risk) before the eruption, thus prevention and preparedness. This seemed to clear some of the confusion until a participant pointed out the overlapping nature of the two committees. The theory of the BNPD was that the Unit Lak should only be responsible for the time during and after the eruption. However, because the Unit had been put in place earlier, it was responsible for the time before, during and after the event. This caused confusion as the two committees duties would overlap. Eventually however it was agreed that the original clusters of the Forum would be divided as such: The forum PRB: Clusters, prevention and preparation of actions before an eruption, plans (such as SOP) and recommendations and have a passive role during and after a natural disaster. Where as the Unit Lak would take an active role during and after an eruption.

It is also important to reflect upon who was making the suggestions and joining in with the discussions as Lingkar noted, some people may not want to speak due to issues of hierarchy within the village community. As an outsider this is very hard to reflect upon. However, during the discussions it was clear that the village administrative staff as well as the sub village leaders had most to say about the different discussion points. Although occasionally members of the PKK as well as other organisations within the village did speak up, the bulk of the conversation about clarification came from those who’s position could be affected.

The anecdote above shows the need for the power structure to be in place which means that the discourse provided by the BPBD is largely irrelevant as the village has their own discourse in the administration rather than the development discourse used by Lingkar and BPDB. It also shows how discourse, if not fully understood equally by both parties, can cause miscommunication and misunderstandings. The positioning of the expert throughout the debate was constantly shifting between Lingkar/the BPBD and the participants. The positioning and performance throughout the debate affected the way in which the discussion flowed.

There were a number of elements that became clear throughout the discussions. Firstly, the new system would not interfere with the current power structure of the village. Secondly, the new committee would have to be transparent, especially when handling finances. Although both the BPBD and Lingkar had the same objective in the beginning of the seminar, Lingkar tried to shift the position slightly to accommodate the already existing unit in place. Arguably within the discussion above it is clear that during a part of the seminar Lingkar’s change of position caused some confusion between BPBD and Lingkar which damaged the clear technical structure and caused even more confusion to the participants as the role of the trustee was compromised.

This chapter is to show that the social factors that had been highlighted previously all play a role to some degree and that negotiation between the technically rendered policy and the reality must occur for the solutions to be effective. It also shows that there are multiple positions that can be used and that the different positions create their own method of contribution. Capacity building and raising awareness seems to be the central theme with all of the reports and interviews of the organisers of the Resilient Village Program beyond the contingency plan and the Forum PRB (the preparation committee). The capacity is measured by the ability of the village to organise itself before the event as well as the ability to achieve similar economic and social status after the event. By having a well organised evacuation plan much of the livestock and more importantly people can be saved which allows for quicker recovery. Using the technical discourse of capacity there is quantifiable evidence of success. Using this kind of discourse also allows the BPBD and Lingkar to position themselves as experts as well as individualising responsibility at the same time. By raising awareness it becomes the responsibility of the participants to increase the capacity of the village as they are now officially equipped with the knowledge. Thus turning some of the participants into the trustees of village welfare during a natural disaster. What creates a complication is of course the fact that the participants are experts themselves because they are the representatives of the village community and therefore already responsible for the village even before the time of the Resilient Village Program.

Because they do not use the same discourse as the organisers, we can see that discourse is not the only aspect of social interaction that plays a role in this situation and that existing power relations can be a bridge between two discourses and that positioning perhaps more so than discourse affects interactions.