The second phase of the power-sharing agreement is characterised by the beginning of the civil war and the inability of the state to withhold this agreement. On the eve of its independence
67 Leonard Binder, Politics in Lebanon, (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, 1966), 130.
68 See Sami Ofeish, “Lebanon’s Second Republic: Secular Talk, Sectarian Application,” Arab Studies Quarterly 21, no. 1 (1999): 97-116.
69 Lebanese Republic, promulgated 23 May 1926 Constitution, article 95, Lebanon Presidency office
http://www.presidency.gov.lb/English/LebaneseSystem/Documents/Lebanese%20Constitution.pdf, (accessed June 10th 2014).
70 Zamir, The Formation of Modern Lebanon, 31.
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from the French, Lebanon’s political and social class was comprised of sectarian groups and ethnicities that came together seeking power, privilege and representation. The National Pact of 1943 (Al Mithak Al Watany) was brokered by the British to secure the country’s independence
from France. The sectarian system of representation and access to political office therefore also evolved into a pragmatic political strategy.72 The National Pact was an unwritten agreement
between President Bishara El-Khoury (Maronite) and Prime Minister Riad al-Solh (Sunni). The Pact provided a consensual basis for articulating the character of Lebanon’s polity, the distribution of power in the country and the shape of its political institutions. The Independence and the National Act of 1943 established a unique consociational system, known as “confessionalism” or sectarianism (al nizam al ta’ifi), a power-sharing mechanism based on the guaranteed representation of major religious communities. The National Pact, having included numerically predetermined provisions, would result in future deadlocks that made reform and legislation impossible without consensus and without securing the interests of the sectarian elite.73
The unwritten pact enshrined the principles of (i) segmental proportionality of representation in government that is in proportion to the demographic weight of the sectarian groups, (ii) segmental autonomy to guarantee the rights of sectarian groups to conduct their own religious, educational and cultural affairs.74 Accordingly, the political institutions that emerged after 1943 were primarily aimed at preserving Lebanon’s longstanding tradition of securing the interests of, and resources for, sectarian elites (zu’ama) who served and maintained the loyalty of their constituency. This was seen as the best formula for the ‘coexistence’ of sectarian groups that otherwise would detract from an independent Lebanon and threaten its central government.
The formula exacerbated the patronage system and turned the legislature to “a private club” where national leaders promoted their protégés and used intimidation and vote buying to secure the election of their lists.75 The National Pact granted the Maronite President extensive executive powers and fixed the positions of the House Speaker to a Shi’a and Prime Minister to a Sunni. Powerful political leaders representing the religious communities were considered as guarantors of the nizam ta’ifi, or the confessional consociational order. The zu’ama aligned themselves with
72 Khalaf, Civil and Uncivil Violence in Lebanon, 285.
73 Allison McCulloch, “Consociational Settlements in Deeply Divided Societies: The Liberal-Corporate Distinction,” Democratization 21, no. 3 (2014): 501-518.
74 Zahar, Power-Sharing in Lebanon, 232. 75 Ibid, 234.
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the commercial bourgeoisies’ and worked to ensure a short-lived stability in the realms of politics and the economy between 1943 and 1958. According to Najem, “there was some overlap between these two groups, but for the most part their respective memberships were distinct. Their co- operation was based on their common interest in keeping the Lebanese state weak, and in maintaining the status quo.”76 But even after independence, the efforts of political leaders were
geared not towards the creation of a national civic identity, but towards the fragmentation of identities in order to maintain sectarian loyalties. In tandem, little effort was made to build capable and professional public institutions, but rather efforts were made to keep Ministries and public agencies as tools of political leaders among sectarian elites.77
The rise of Nasser in Egypt and the spread of his pan-Arab ideology in the 1950s deeply divided Lebanese confessional politics, contributing to the crisis of 1958 between Maronites and Sunnis. Tensions with Egypt grew when pro-Western (Maronite) President Camille Chamoun angered local groups by his friendly reaction to the Western powers, primarily Britain and France, after their attack on the Suez Canal.78 Confessional groups mobilised, with Western-backed Christian groups confronting predominantly Muslim factions supported by the Egyptian-Syrian nationalist regimes. This was followed by the US intervening both militarily and politically to convince both sides of the conflict to reach a compromise and to elect a new President, general Fouad Chehab, who had been commander of the Lebanese Armed Forces since 1945. Despite attempts at administrative reforms, most notably those taken during President Fouad Chehab’s term in office (1958-64), public administration was ponderous and generally inefficient. Chehab came to office after civil strife that had killed 3,000 Lebanese during a standoff between pro- Western and pro-Egyptian nationalist groups.79
The tensions were fuelled with the emergence of Palestinian refugees who had set up a base in southern Lebanon and began launching guerrilla attacks on Israel.80 Chehab was seen as a
76 Tom Najem, “The Collapse and Reconstruction of Lebanon,” Durham Middle East Paper 59, (1998): 9. 77 See for instance Robert Rotberg, “The Failure and Collapse of Nation States: Breakdown, Prevention and Repair,” in When States Fail: Causes and Consequences. Edited by Robert Rotberg, (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2004), 9-10.
78 See how various sectarian zu’ama aligned themselves with foreign allies in Alfred Hottinger, “Zu’ama and Parties in the Lebanese Crisis of 1958,” The Middle East Journal 15, no. 2 (1961): 127-140.
79 Michael Hudson, “The Lebanese Crisis: The Limits of Consociational Democracy,” Journal of Palestine Studies 5, no. 3-4 (1976): 109-122.
80 Jaber Suleiman, “The Current Political, Organizational and Security Situation in the Palestinian Refugee Camps of Lebanon,” Journal of Palestinian Studies 29, no. 1, (1999): 66-80.
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‘compromise’ candidate who did not represent either faction.81 He initiated an aggressive policy
towards the Palestinian camps and limited their armed activities. Chehab’s short time in office did show that political will coupled with substantial executive powers can drive institutional reform, as he led an effort to establish most of the public agencies still active today including: Civil Service Board, Central Bank, the Court of Audits, Water and Electricity Providers, and Central Inspection Board.82
During the 1960s, and more so after the 1967 Arab war with Israel, the internal situation in Lebanon was destabilised. The 1967 war resulted in the influx of hundreds of thousands of Palestinian refugees, who represented a greater shock than the Lebanese system could peacefully accommodate.83 The country became split between two different political factions, one that was mainly Muslim and pro-Palestinian, and one that was mainly Christian and anti-Palestinian. At the end of Chehab’s term in 1969, uprisings in the Palestinian camps and pressure from Egypt and other foreign players ended with the November 1969 Cairo Accords between the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) and the Lebanese state, which authorised Palestinian guerrilla activity in Lebanon.84
The Cairo Agreement fuelled the first phase of the Lebanese Civil War, causing polarisation and the armament of militia groups across the country.85 Krayem notes that the political system “could not withstand the pressure, and internal compromise became harder to achieve.”86 It is generally agreed that 13 April 1975 marks the beginning of the Civil War.
Irrespective of the particular circumstances that led to this clash, it was already preceded by widespread armed conflict between Christian political parties and Palestinian organisations for
81 The act of parliament electing a president who was with neither of the political factions is another facet of the historical institutionalism features in Lebanon that would be repeated again in two critical juncture. The election of Emile Lahoud under Syrian tutelage and yet again that of Michel Suleiman in 2008 after Syria’s withdrawal. See Ersun Kurtulus, “The Cedar Revolution: Lebanese Independence and the Question of Collective Self-Determination,” British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies 36, no. 2 (2009): 195-214. 82 Activists in Lebanon have recently posted pictures of the late President nominating him for another term though he has passed away for over 30 years, see As Safir Newspaper cover page on 26 April 2014
http://www.assafir.com/Article/1/348118 (accessed 9 May 2014).
83 See for example Farid Khazen, “Permanent Settlement of Palestinians in Lebanon: A Recipe for Conflict,” Journal of Refugee Studies 10, no. 3 (1997): 275-293.
84 Suleiman, “The Current Political, Organisational and Security Situation in the Palestinian Refugee Camps,” 66-80.
85 Khazen, “Permanent Settlement of Palestinians in Lebanon,” 275.
86 Hassan Krayem, “The Lebanese Civil War and the Ta’if Agreement,” in Conflict Resolution in the Arab World: Selected Essays, Edited by Paul Salem, (Beirut: American University of Beirut Press, 1997), 416.
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some years, especially after the expulsion of the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) from Jordan in 1970.87 The PLO’s presence in Lebanon was a trigger for the sectarian leaders to divide and reposition themselves as either supportive of the armed resistance or fighting against it. The PLO was an alibi for the West to arm Christian militia groups and the Arab states to arm Muslim groups in preparation for a protracted armed conflict on Lebanese soil.88
The reasons for the outbreak of the Civil War vary depending on the angle taken. What is certain is that the power-sharing agreement could not produce institutions that can mitigate conflicts and function in a polarised political climate. Some argue that the war was a class struggle.89 At the outbreak of the war, the wealthiest four per cent of the population received 32 per cent of the total gross national product, and 82 per cent of the population received only 40 per cent.90 Others suggest that a major cause of the civil war was increasing calls for the redistribution of political power by Muslim groups that perceived themselves as under-represented in the context of the National Pact.91 The Shi’a in particular began to lay claim to their share of political power. Similarly, according to Johnson, the Sunni zu‘ama were unable to control their own ‘street’, as their clients found alternative patrons, including pan-Arab and armed Palestinian groups.92 Other scholars argue that the war was primarily caused by the pressures originating from external factors, such as the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, which destabilised the country.93
In this thesis I recognise a combination of these interpretations. Lebanon had significant internal challenges, including class struggle and sectarian tensions. These were only heightened by the inability of the state to provide security, protection and services without the support of sectarian leaders. As soon as sectarian leaders found it opportune to ally themselves with external actors to increase their local power bases, they replaced their collusion with confrontation and began sponsoring different armed groups. At the same time, Lebanon’s regional environment
87 Samir Makdisi, The Lessons of Lebanon: The Economics of War and Development (London: IB Tauris, 2004), 129.
88 Krayem, “The Lebanese Civil War and the Ta’if Agreement,” 416.
89 See for instance Latif Abul-Husn, The Lebanese Conflict: Looking Inward, (Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998).
90 Halim Barakat, “The Social Context of Lebanon in Crisis,” in Lebanon in Crisis, Edward Haley and Lewis Snider eds., (New York: Syracuse University Press, 1979), 3-20.
91 See for instance Abul-Husn, The Lebanese Conflict: Looking Inward.
92 Michael Johnson, Class and Client in Beirut: The Sunni Muslim Community and the Lebanese State 1840 – 1985, (London: Ithaca Press, 1986).
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invited its national leaders to side with, and invite support from, conflicting foreign countries. These countries began acting as patrons by providing political and military support to local groups.