The nature of decision-makers and how they access science

Key questions that I sought to address in this research were: how do decision-makers engage with science in a communicative sense; what drives or inhibits engagement with science; and what is valuable about engagement processes and how can we evaluate them? As discussed in Chapters 1 and 2, neither the public engagement with science nor science-policy gap discourses explicitly examine decision-makers in a communicative mode – as publics. It is recognised however, that decision-makers can come into contact with science through a variety of mechanisms. They can receive scientific advice through institutionalised mechanisms or proactively seek out science through ad-hoc processes or by commissioning research (Fischer et al., 2014; Jasanoff, 1990; Salter et al., 1988). Alternatively, scientists target decision-makers through ‘science push’ activities such as ‘knowledge transfer’ or more interactive processes of research collaboration and knowledge co-production (Mitton et al., 2007; Roux et al., 2017). My two case studies in the natural resource management (NRM) sector broadly show that decision-makers access and engage with science via these mechanisms with the notable omission of advisory groups (Figure 6) the significance of which I will now explore.

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expert elicitation e.g. expert panel, workshop

seek informal advice e.g. colleague, scientist, bridging agent

3rd party expert commission science collaborate in research*/ product development aim of the 2 cases

advisory group (not mentioned)

access “static” material e.g. journals, internet sources

decision- maker conference/ workshop attendance mass media bridging agent bridging agent

* note some interviewees personally conducted science on some occasions. These instances aren’t considered here as this is engaging in science as an expert rather than with science as a non-expert

Figure 6: The mechanisms by which decision-makers access and engage with science based on current literature and findings from the AdaptNRM and NFEPA case studies.

Like other publics, decision-makers have sometimes been framed in both STS and the SPG in a deficit or linear mode of “receiving” scientific advice, with an explicit institutionalised mechanism being through expert advisory groups (Hutchings & Stenseth, 2016; Jasanoff, 1990). While decision-makers in the two case studies may well have received scientific advice through interpersonal networks (discussed below), it was not happening in an institutionalised sense. While mandated advisory groups are not unknown in NRM contexts—for example committees who provide specific advice on river flow management (e.g. Finlayson, 2001)—they are not the norm. In NRM, organisations often do not have regulatory functions or set easily quantifiable standards and so decision-makers in those contexts are less likely to utilise advisory groups for science input. My findings suggest that as science communication researchers we have perhaps adopted an overly simplistic conceptualisation of decision-makers and their science communication landscape. In focusing on the legitimacy of science and scientific advice (Spruijt et al., 2014) we have overlooked rich communication processes including those in which decision-makers are active participants. NRM may be a particular policy domain where interactive engagement processes are beneficial given it commonly requires decisions involving trade-offs.

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A common observation by decision-makers in the case studies was that they seek out knowledge including science on an interpersonal basis. Such informal pathways may well be a first step in many knowledge-seeking activities undertaken by NRM decision-makers who often have limited time or access to closed access scientific publications (Cullen et al., 2001). The interviewees called upon trusted scientists, non-scientists considered expert from within their organisation, or bridging agents (organisations or individuals such as institutional ‘knowledge brokers’). As indicated in Figure 6, such trusted figures may provide advice or information directly or recommend expert third parties to consult. My research highlights that invited, facilitated engagement efforts such as AdaptNRM and NFEPA do not occur in a communication vacuum. If we seek to understand how or why these activities inform public decision-making we need to be aware of the multiple science communication pathways used by decision-makers and the contexts in which they operate. For example involving internal trusted individuals in an engagement activity may be critical for institutional impact.

In contrast, mass media, such as TV documentaries weren’t commonly mentioned as direct sources of scientific knowledge by interviewees in either case study. However, the conduct of the AdaptNRM project and its ultimate impact were arguably affected by how the climate change debate played out in the media during the project. Climate change was highly politicized during the 2013 Australian federal election which had a number of possible implications for the success of AdaptNRM. An institutionalised attention and response to mass media in public rhetoric and possibly policy making has been observed in other decision contexts (Petersen et al., 2010). With AdaptNRM, negative media coverage of climate change and the politics around it influenced two of the key stakeholder groups for regional NRM organisations: local communities and state government. Communities were described by interviewees as having polarised opinions on climate change including the “non-believers” while some State governments applied pressure on NRM groups to avoid using the phrase “climate change”. One response by decision-makers was to reframe the issue more generically as “developing resilience” rather than “adapting to climate change”. The idea that politics will influence science communication is not new, particularly around controversial issues. It can manifest in what knowledge is accepted, who might be considered legitimate publics (e.g. Mohr & Raman, 2012) or what outcomes from engagement are considered acceptable (Stirling, 2008). My findings highlight that while political factors undoubtedly need to be taken into account in evaluating decision-maker engagement processes, politics

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can be one of the forces molding how engagement emerges (Chilvers & Kearnes, 2016) rather than one that negates it.

A key characteristic of publics in science communication is that they are non-expert in the particular science being communicated (Hess, 2011). While decision-makers in the case studies were certainly non-expert in at least some instances, the idea of being ‘non-expert’ warrants further examination. Decision-makers in both cases mentioned conducting science to feed into management and decision-making although, only the South African consultants and two of the Australians interviewed had scientific research as part of the professional role. These individuals were not generally expected to publish their work in peer-reviewed publications, unlike university-based scientists. An individual decision-maker may therefore, function as a scientist in one context and as part of a public for science in another. Many of the interviewees had degrees or post-graduate qualifications but the complexity of their responsibilities meant they were inevitably non-expert in some science communication contexts. Both cases illustrated, however, that when decision-makers engage with science as non-experts they may still be contributing expertise in non-scientific matters—as is the case with other publics (Irwin & Michael, 2003). A topic of future research would be how typical this level of education and scientific training is in other policy domains or for decision- makers in the private or community sector.

Publics are also characterised as being unknown entities that form around issues of concern (Jasanoff, 2014; Marres, 2005). Warner (2002, p. 414) describes publics as existing by virtue of being addressed in communication and notes “there could be an infinite number of publics within the social totality”. The case studies illustrated that in some contexts decision-makers are known audiences. Both AdaptNRM and NFEPA included a series of individual events such as workshops and phone link-ups with known concrete audiences. However, in other contexts decision-makers displayed the characteristics of unknown publics. If we view the knowledge co-production processes of the two projects in their totality, the same people did not consistently participate in the multiple engagement events. This was sometimes planned, for example, NFEPA workshops were run across the country to get different regional knowledge inputs. In AdaptNRM it was unplanned with some interviewees engaging sporadically depending on which topic they were interested in or when they had time.

There are other indications from the case studies that decision-makers were unknown publics. The AdaptNRM case in particular demonstrated that even an engagement process

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that targeted a specific type of decision-maker—regional NRM planners—actually engaged people from general managers to technical specialists and consultants. While to some degree this may be an artefact of variability in the organisational structure of regional NRM groups (i.e. not all have a standard ‘planner’ position), there seems to be a deeper pattern of instability in staffing in the regional NRM groups related to limited organizational resources and often remote locations (Nursey-Bray et al., 2014; Robins & Dovers, 2007). Staff often took on multiple roles, consultants were called in to fill gaps, or people were employed short term to perform a specific, funded task and then left the organisation or changed role. Staff churn was also evident in South Africa indicating that, in the NRM sector as least, it is difficult to know which decision-makers will engage in invited activities. It is also impossible to know who will access science-based products that come out of knowledge co-production processes. For example, the municipal planners in South Africa using the NFEPA atlas despite them being an unintended group of end-users. For national engagement projects like AdaptNRM and NFEPA in the NRM domain therefore, the suite of decision-makers involved does not remain consistent and isn’t always known or predictable.

At first glance being unknown or ‘unknowability’ may seem unlikely for institutionally- based decision-makers, given I have seemingly constructed them as collectives by virtue of their institutional affiliation and role. In the case studies however, they were unknowable in the simple sense that the outsourcing of work by government agencies to private consultants evident in both AdaptNRM and NFEPA made it difficult to predict which organisations actually would engage in knowledge co-production. Beyond this observation however, decision-maker engagement in the case studies as described above bears the hallmarks of the co-productionist view of public participation (Chilvers & Kearnes, 2016). In other words, publics are mediated and bought into being by participatory processes and issues rather than existing in a natural state waiting to be discovered and mobilised by participatory techniques and procedures. Institutional affiliation and a decision-making role may therefore be more usefully thought of as a factor for analysing engagement (like gender) rather than a deterministic grouping variable. So, in other words, institutional context might be analysed according to how it determines the relevance of different knowledge sources. Applying these concepts of emergent publics to processes of decision-maker engagement with science like knowledge co-production is also an opportunity to value and evaluate these activities beyond their knowledge outputs which is the logical focus of knowledge co-production (e.g. Hegger et al., 2012; Lemos & Morehouse, 2005). Instead of deliberation being viewed instrumentally

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purely as a means of co-producing robust knowledge (Armitage et al., 2011) it also has its own value in fostering co-productive capacity (Van Kerkhoff & Lebel, 2015), creating the opportunity for meaning making and building relationships.

Three significant aspects of institutional setting emerged from the case studies. Firstly, the organisation a decision-maker worked for broadly set the boundaries for what issues or decisions required scientific input. In other words institutional mandate dictates to some degree the relevance of science to decision-makers—highlighted in the science-policy gap literature (e.g. Cook et al., 2013; Heink et al., 2015). While a citizen can seek out science based on personal interest or individual needs, a decision-maker’s “interest” is broadly dictated by their institution’s mandate i.e a decision-maker working for a national water department may be interested in astronomy but will be engaging in science related to water resource management as part of their job.

Having said this, the case studies also suggest that within their broad institutional remit, the personal interests of decision-makers play a role in whether they actually do engage with relevant science and how they do this. A number of interviewees in both cases said one of their drivers for engagement was personal interest in the topic or curiosity about what scientists and colleagues had to say. In addition, some interviewees, particularly with the AdaptNRM case, indicated they engaged more with modules of greater interest and interest wasn’t solely a function of their responsibilities. In other words, the relevance of science will be largely determined by a decision-maker’s institution but the act of engagement can be influenced by personal interest. This means that when designing and evaluating engagement exercises involving decision-makers consideration must be given to what knowledge is relevant to them at that time but we also need to recognise that higher levels of engagement may occur where individuals are also driven by personal interest and curiosity. Can we design engagement to foster this?

Institutional context can also determine the salience of science or when it is relevant to decision-makers (Cash et al., 2003). This was particularly evident in the AdaptNRM case where climate adaptation science that was of keen interest during the revision of regional plans had low priority when that process was complete. The shifting priorities of decision- makers in relation to science in part reflects the reality that, unlike scientists in research institutions few—in the NRM sector at least—have the resources to consistently stay abreast of all potentially relevant science. Timing is therefore a critical determinant of the level of decision-maker engagement. This brings us to the third significant feature of institutions

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which is that they, to some degree, determine the capacity of individuals to engage. For example, in both case studies lack of time or funding for travel to meetings were barriers to engagement. Organisations with low capacity may simply not have a person employed in a role that can make use of science. In South Africa, the government institutions targeted by NFEPA are known to have inadequate staff with conservation expertise (Funke & Nienaber, 2012; Roux & Nel, 2013). Organisational capacity is likely a real limiting factor for engagement in the NRM sector that can only be partially overcome through the application of resources from third parties through engagement projects. In evaluation terms, a poor engagement outcome may therefore reflect lack of capacity rather than a poor process, although one can also question whether investing in engagement is the best use of resources in situations of low organisational capacity.

For decision-makers in some organisations however, their institutional situation provides the capacity as well as mandate to access data and science. In my South African case, research organisations were mandated to provide scientific support to decision-makers in federal departments. In Australia, NRM groups contributed to relevant research collaborations with universities and paid contractors to conduct literature reviews. Decision- makers are also targeted by research groups who want them to use their science. The capacity to access science has been equated to social empowerment (Stirling, 2008). For the decision- makers I interviewed, power has limitations. Firstly the power to choose which science they engage with may be limited, particularly in science-push contexts (which will be discussed further in section 5.2 below). Secondly, while they may potentially have access to more science than other publics, a substantial effort is still required to determine: how one approach or school of thought may differ from another; which approach is most applicable to them; is the source credible; etc. So in a practical sense, lack of time and resources can limit the potential power of decision-makers to access science. This is recognised in the SPG where there is evidence that providing decision-makers with a synopsis, or summary of the literature increases accessibility of science (Walsh et al., 2014). Synthesising or systematically critiquing science in a transparent way may, therefore, be a critical function for engagement with decision-maker publics. Robust engagement processes may help decision-makers interpret the synthesized evidence presented through dialogue and deliberation as well as interrogate the value judgments and assumptions that are inevitably part of such expert assessments.

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The case studies also illustrate the underlying complexity of a seemingly simple idea like ‘decision-making’. Multiple decisions are made that may not be cumulative or linear before a piece of science may inform on-ground actions to manage natural resources. There are immediate implications of this for evaluation. ‘On-ground impact’ such as species conservation was commonly valued by decision-makers but will be difficult to attribute to a given engagement exercise for multiple reasons including the complexity of decision-making processes illustrated in Figure 7. The idea of limitations to decision-maker power also raises the question of the diversity of decision-makers and whether the nature and function of engagement with science varies with the type of decision-maker at different hierarchical levels or types of institution. For example, what does engagement look like for elected government representatives/politicians, public servants in different policy domains, or institutionally-based decision-makers outside the public policy sphere. While I can’t make definitive statements about these other types of decision-maker from my data, important factors may be the degree of education and experience pertinent to the policy domain of other decision-makers, and their sources of science. Politicians for example may be less likely to have scientific training than the decision makers from my case studies—only 8% of MPs in the UK for example (Goodwin, 2015). Because of this, and their different roles, politicians may not be invited to participate in knowledge co-production processes. However, media sources may be more important in shaping their attitudes and behaviour toward science and science-informed policy (e.g. Petersen et al., 2010).

In sum, NRM decision-makers displayed all the key characteristics of publics except for being located in the public sphere. Their complex decision-contexts mean that despite high levels of education and expertise they are lay or non-expert in many communication contexts. They are often unknown or unknowable and will form and re-form according to the changing needs of their institutions and personal interest. They also satisfy the definition of publics by virtue of being addressed – often by scientists in processes that aren’t currently recognised as being essentially communicative (knowledge co-production and transdisciplinary research).

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Figure 7: Some of the decision-making processes involved in the funding and implementation of the AdaptNRM project [sources: (Commonwealth of Australia, 2012a, 2012b); interview transcripts]

Federal government prioritises climate change as an issue

scientific research recognises human- induced climate change

Links representing complex sets of decisions

Clean Energy Future package

developed by Federal government to address

climate change

Land-sector measures

carbon tax pricing mechanism various incentives

6 other implementation

mechanisms

Regional Natural Resource