97 ; Many philosophers nowadays are very sure that philosophers, what ever they ,
3 ' find themselves under a necessity of being governed by it in their practice".
1. Reid's and Stewart's misunderstanding was intermittent; Beattie!s and Oswald's rarely falters. The following is typically Beattie and Oswald: "Thai we cannot' do some things,, but have it in our power to do others, .is what no man in his senses will hesitate to affirm. I can take up my staff from the ground, but I cannot lift a stone of a thousand weight... « When a ihan asks me a question, I ' have it in my power to answer or be silent, te^-answer-èr-4;eri5l^^ to answer, softly or roughlÿ, in terms of respect or in-terms of contempt. Ibrequent /'t temptations to vice fall in my way; I may yield or I may resist. ...But this
idea fof powerj has had the misfortune to come under the examination of Mr. ' HUME..." (immutable Truth Pt. II, Ch.II, See. Ill, pp. 29W93.) '7
2. Inquiry, Ch.V. Sec. VIIyn.l27. .
'Criterioh, . Re M and .Ms-school are opposing a . Metàphv sirelly
l^ded o.o^oh- sense to. phenomenalism and to a version Oi::'cOimoh' sense that ifould ' / ' h iit ill: Mt h phenomenalism,' Half in the dark about what, thëy âre doing, they - - , ^ - . adopt ; the phenomeiialist criterion of meaning end truth as their'criterion of
/ 'the.meaning and truth of the propositions/of common sense, it is'tautological that the phenomenâi oohtent of a belief is ei%>irically veriiffable) and IsMolo^^- icar that .empirical verification could,not establish; that a belief so much as had ahMetapi^SicM .content. We\shall indeed never open the door .quick enough to /:/. catch tablesyànd chair# snapping hack into existence,,,or/alternatively waitin;_, .
f or us with a .continuot^ duration' T a phenomonalist metaphysics is no more empirical -than its contrary.- ;But what the 0 onnTion Sense philosophers had more , formdably tjo reckon with is not a,phenomenalistic metaphysics, but an interpret-^ : ation;'hf‘'.iho .beliefs of commonlsehse that is not Ihconsistent with it, an inter-
pretatidn of them'as altogether metaphysically neutral, not going beyond phenom
ena either, positively or negatively, "
beliefs of commop sense,. Reid says, are reflected'.in thO structure of
language, in-its universal grammar. It. is usually taken for granted thaL any , ' opinion, whether true or false, can be expressed equally in any language which ;■ has.-sufficient words for the purpose. There ife a most. important exception to
f; this general rule; "There'are certain, common opinions of viankind, upon which
" / .c . ' \ . . %/'! .
the .stricture and grafmmryOf all languages are.,founded." All languages are - " recalcitrant to the expression of opinions which are at'variance with these
... cqmmohnpiniohs'; :
' ' ' "hahgua^e is. the express,image and- picture of human thoughts'; and from ttie picture we may draw some,pertain conclusiohsnonoefhihg.the original#
f ' - )'V7e. find in all' languages the- same parts' pf spbech;\ we find; nouns, substantive andiad^ectivei^.verbs;,;^^^ a^d. passive/in their Vdri^^ numbers and
119
moods0 Some rules of syntax are the same in all languages,
"Now what is common in the structure of languages, indicates an uniformity of - opinion in those things upon which the structure is grounded. --
"The distinction between substances and the qualities belonging to them;
between thought andüie being that thinks; between thought and the objects of 'B thought; is to be found in the structure of all languages. And, therefore,
systems of philosophy, which abolish those distinctions, wage war with the common '
T
X . k
sense of mani-cind."
It is not to the ordinary use of ordinary words that Reid is going for ^ philosophical illumination here and elsewhere when he speaks in the same way; it i is to supposedly common features of the grammar of all languages, "The philosophy of grammar, and that of human understanding, are more nearly allied than is
2
.
commonly imagined." The metaphysical doctrines of causation, of substance and its"
■ : i t 5
modifications and of the independence of the objects of cognition from cognition - are in front of anyone who knows how to phrse. Reid is not always so naive. "be can only expect in the structure of languages, those distinctions which all man-
3. kind in the common business of life have occasion to make,"
Beattie also wrote on universal grammar, but without looking for the confirm ation of the metaphysical beliefs of common sense, ¥e might compare, for instance, what he thought of the import of substantives with Reid's opinion. There must be substantives. "Men could not speak of one another, or of anything without
substantives." A substantive is "a word denoting a substance"; or more properly j is "a word denoting a thing spoken of". Now the things we speak of either have a i real existence, as man, tree, house, hatchet; or have had a real existence, as
I
Babylon, Eden, Caesar; or are spoken of as if they had existed, or did exist, as “] Jupiter, Fairy, Lilliput; or are conceived by the mind as having at least the ^1. Intellectual Powers, VI, Ch.IV, p.440.
2. Brief Account of. Aristotle's Logic, Sec.V, p.692.
y
3# Intellectual Powers, I, Ch.V, p.238.120