In the previous chapter, I have discussed how the nation-state ideology has impacted language policy discourses and practices. While critically analyzing the invention and legitimization of Nepali as a national and official language, I have also analyzed how the on- going minoritized language policies and discourses are not adequate to address the linguistic complexities in indigenous/minoritized communities. In this chapter, I focus on how the nation- state ideology co-opts Western colonial ideologies such as neoliberalism, to shape local language education policies and practices. I particularly focus on how neoliberal ideology, and particularly the discourse of development and privatization, has naturalized the role of English as a natural medium-of-instruction in education. As Piller and Cho (2013) assert, “to understand the spread of English—despite its obvious costs—one has to look outside language and link language explicitly to the socio-economic order” (p. 24). To this end, I look at the discourses of
development and socioeconomic contexts—particularly the role of migrant laborers—and link them with language education policies. I begin with the historical construction of neoliberalism in Nepal
Donors-Driven Bikaas and Neoliberal Ideologies
Since the early 1990s, Nepal has adopted the neoliberal ideology of desh bikās (national development). Building on the Structural Adjustment Program of the World Bank and the
International Monetary Fund (IMF), the state has restructured its national economic, educational, and other social institutions to adopt market-led approaches to bikās (development). The state reformed its nationalized banking system to open up space for direct foreign investment and involvement of both national and international non-governmental organizations (NGOs and
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INGOs) in banking activities (Rankin, 2004). Under the broad discourse of bikās, both governmental banks and non-governmental organizations are focusing on ‘garībī niwāraṇ’
(poverty alleviation) and ‘grāmiṇ bikās’ (rural development) by adopting various market-led neoliberal economic ideologies. More than six thousand NGOs and some two hundred INGOs, popularly known as bikāse ssã thā (developmental organizations) are supported by foreign donors to engage in bikās-related activities with the poor, indigenous people, women, Dalits, and people from rural areas.
Currently, Nepal receives over $1 billion in foreign aid every year, contributing to about a quarter of the government’s bikās budget (Bell, 2015). Statistics show that Nepal owes $3.8 billion in debt to various multilateral agencies, such as the World Bank, Asian Development Bank, and IMF (Pant, 2015). This foreign investment is in the form of loans and grants which are based on the World Bank’s Structural Adjustment Loan and the IMF’s Structural Adjustment Facility. In order to achieve assistance from both the World Bank and the IMF, the Nepal government has to reform its economic and other major structural policies. Following these organizations’ policy guidelines, Nepal embraces neoliberal economic policy with an emphasis on massive privatization, free market-oriented price systems, and a greater reduction in tariffs. Based on the World Bank’s structural reform policies, the state reduces its budget on public services, such as subsidies to farmers, public education, and heath, among others, to promote a competitive and free-market approach to development. Consequently, the country is
experiencing foreign investment, donor-driven development initiatives, and privatization of public institutions (Pandey, 2012).
Known as ‘the least-developed country’ in the Human Development Index (UNDP, 2014), the current neoliberal ideology of bikās has constructed new discourses, epistemologies,
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and worldviews regarding what counts as development in Nepal. Garībī niwāraṇ and grāmiṇ bikās enter into Nepal’s national developmental discourse. Under this discourse, foreign-aid
agencies are investing huge amounts of money towards restructuring Nepal’s rural agrarian society (Rankin, 2004; Sugden, 2009). Statistics show that more than 80% of Nepal’s total populations are from rural agrarian areas. Foreign donors, (I)NGOs, and the government are launching various programs such as microcredit self-help groups, income-generating activities, and other capitalist modes of poverty alleviation programs. Consequently, growing attempts have been made towards integrating the traditional non-capitalist modes of agricultural productions into the global capitalist economy (Rankin, 2004) which derecognizes the non-capitalist forms of agrarian economic activities.
Neoliberal discourse of development has discursively constructed new social imaginary of bikās as “commodities that come from elsewhere” and as an indexicality of modernity (Pigg, 1993, p. 48). In this imaginary world of development, rural villages are categorized as “...a space of backwardness--a physical space that imprisons people in what is considered inferior and outmoded way of life…” (Pigg, 1992, p. 507). In other words, the neoliberal discourses discursively construct the perceived belief that living a rural agrarian lifestyle is a symbol of poverty. Villages are viewed as an underdeveloped space needing external support from the government, donor agencies, and non-government organizations. Since neoliberal development discourses support Western and modern modes of knowledge, technology, and policies (Escobar, 1995), local knowledge, traditional practices, and indigenous technology are constructed as inappropriate and underdeveloped to support development initiatives. Consequently, Western modes of epistemologies and perspectives about social progress, education, and development become hegemonic among the common public and policy makers (Rappleye, 2011).
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The neoliberal development discourses have also changed the people’s subject positions. Sugden’s (2009) analysis shows that neoliberal discourse on development has shifted the identity of rural people from ‘citizens’ to ‘entrepreneurial subjects’ who, including the poor, are
“encouraged to find their own solutions to their livelihood needs through utilizing one’s own skills and resources to seize the opportunities made available by the global economy” (Sugden, 2009, p. 636). In a neoliberal economy, the state’s role is only to open up the free-market and to facilitate the free-flow of people, capital, and technology globally (Appadurai, 2006; Harvey, 2005). In capitalist mode of knowledge and economy, the identity of the rural citizens is discursively constructed as people who lack ‘consciousness’ or ‘awareness’ of modern
knowledge, literacy, and technology (Fujikura, 2001). Since neoliberalism focuses on economic capital as a sole indicator of development, rural people who lack the economic capital are discursively identified as ‘poor’, ‘backward’, and “trapped in a vicious circle of poverty” (Ghimire, 2009, p. 224).
‘Failed Development’: Neoliberalism and Sociopolitical Inequalities
Building on Ferguson’s (2005) critical analysis of Western discourses of development in Africa, Carney and Rappleye (2011) describe Nepal’s on-going development discourses as a form of colonialism. They argue that
[…] ‘development’, like its predecessor ‘colonialism’, can been seen as a ‘regime of representation’ promising a range of images of the self and of society that are seductive, but which are necessarily and inextricably bound up in systems of power that are
inherently unequal and exploitative. (Carney & Rappleye, 2011, p. 5)
As neoliberalism dominates the discourse of development, sociopolitical, educational, and economic inequalities are often obscured. Income inequalities among Nepalis are on the rise. Recent data show that 47% of Nepal’s national resources are consumed by the richest 20% of the
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people, while only 8% of resources are distributed among 20% of the poorest population (Census Report, 2011). The Census data also reveal that about one-fourth of indigenous people are living in extreme poverty and are deprived of equal access to educational and economic resources. For example, the literate population of the indigenous people who have School Leaving Certificates or higher degrees is only about 11% while 54% of the high-caste (hill Brahmins-Chetris) people are literate with the same degree.
Both Nepali and foreign scholars have critically examined the role of neoliberalism and argued that it is doing more harm than good, particularly for rural populations and working class families. Two Nepali scholars Dor Bahadur Bista (1991) and Devendra Raj Pandey (1999) have been critical of foreign-aided neoliberalized development since the 1990s. Both of these scholars argue that foreign-aid agencies often lack critical understanding of local socio-political
inequalities and thus the ideologies of development they have promoted have merely contributed to Nepal’s ‘failed development’ (Pandey, 1999, 2012). As Pandey (2012) argues, foreign-aided development initiatives have become the most effective means for foreign donors to impose their own ideologies, agendas, and interests rather than paying attention to the social transformation and empowerment of marginalized communities. Therefore, the neoliberal development projects are under ‘elite capture’ (Pandey, 2012) and make very little difference in the lives of socio- politically and economically marginalized people.
Dixit (1997)and Mishra (2007) argue that foreign-aid-based development has promoted a dependency syndrome and erased the collective principle of the people. These scholars contend that neoliberal development discourse has not addressed the historical-structural inequalities between the rich and the poor, and between the urban and the rural villages. Shakya’s (2013) ethnographic study reveals that neoliberal economic reforms have supported the privilege of
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ruling elites by supporting their disproportionate representation in policy-making processes. She argues that without addressing the unequal structure in Nepali communities, it is hard to achieve the goal of development projects. At the worst level, Leve’s (2007) analysis points out that neoliberal development efforts have contributed to the decade-long Maoists insurgency in the country.
Most importantly, neoliberalized development efforts are not making the state itself responsible for addressing the sociopolitical inequalities, but rather they are promoting the ideology of self-help and individualism. Based on an ethnographic study of developmental projects for rural women, Rankin (2004) argues that the neoliberal ideology of development has discursively constructed the identity of women as a ‘client’ whose social capital is used to serve the neoliberal market. Indeed, neoliberal development projects are promoting ‘social Darwinism’ (Kulic, 2004); individuals are responsible for their own failure in the competitive market
economy. Therefore, Rankin (2004) claims that neoliberal development has not been able to challenge, but instead reproduce, historical caste-based privileges and inequalities. Sharma (2014) makes a succinct analysis of the growing influence of neoliberalism in national policies and claims that foreign-aid-based development has promoted the Nepali people’s ‘sense of helpless’. For him, neoliberal development efforts have benefitted people involved in (I)NGOs, while the poor and other marginalized communities are even more vulnerable and disadvantaged.
Bell (2015) blames aid agencies for pouring in money without understanding the actual needs of the country. The recent foreign debt of the country is about $4 billion. Pant48 (2015) argues that the bilateral and multilateral monetary agencies, such as the World Bank and Asian Development, should not ‘suck’ money from the ‘poorest country’ like Nepal in the name of
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‘debt servicing’ (n.p.). His point is similar to that of Bell, who critiques that money is not the problem, but rather the real problem is the way in which monies are invested without
understating the local situation.
Modern Slavery: Migrant Laborers and Neoliberal Markets
One major aspect of global neoliberalism is the free flow of cheap laborers across national borders. After Nepal adopted a global neoliberal ideology for national development in the early 1990s, the country also developed policies and created institutions to facilitate the ‘labor migration’ of Nepalis in foreign countries. Some major migrant laborer employment- related policies include: the Nepal Labor Act (1992); the Labor Regulations (1993); the National Labor Policy (1999), and the Foreign Employment Act (2007). The government has also
established the Department of Foreign Employment to implement plans and policies related to labor migration. More importantly, the government provides private recruiting agencies, famously known in Nepal as manpower companies, with licenses to send laborers to various foreign countries.
As employment opportunities are rare in rural areas, the government of Nepal claims that “[labor] migration and foreign employment have provided alternative livelihood opportunities to many people in the face of slow socio-economic growth” (Ministry of Labor and Employment, 2014, p. 1). The government further claims that “the international distribution of labor is an integral component of the globalization process, and migration and foreign employment have characterized much of Nepal’s immersion with modernity” (p. 1). The Department of Foreign Employment reports that about 1,500 Nepali youth leave for the country for foreign employment every day. In the 2011-12 fiscal year alone, 384,665 youth have joined the foreign labor market. The 2010-11 Nepal Living Standards Survey shows that 55.8% of households receive
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remittances annually. Statistics show that remittance contributes to about 30% of the country’s total gross domestic product49. Moreover, Seddon, Adhikari, and Gurung (2002) reveal that 57%
of the economy of rural households is contributed to by the individual remittances sent by people working elsewhere in Nepal. The largest remittance-providing countries include India (18.6%), Malaysia (4.4%), and Saudi Arabia and Qatar (11.2%), with the remaining percentage covered by countries like Afghanistan, Israel, Kuwait, Canada, South Korea, and Japan.
Although the national economy heavily relies on remittances, the degree of exploitation Nepali migrant laborers have to face in the neoliberal market is often overlooked in government policies and plans. On the one hand, these young Nepalis are exploited at home by recruiting agencies50. In many cases, these agencies not only provide false information and promises of lucrative jobs, but also charge expensive fees for the services they provide. Each Nepali youth pays more than $1,400 (three times more than the average national income) for a job in Qatar while they earn between $8-10 per day (see Pattison, 2013). Amnesty International (2011) reveals that the majority of migrant workers are paid much less than what was promised by recruiting agencies and so they are forced to work without breaks and to work on weekends; moreover, they do receive good food to eat nor are provided a place to live. Most of these
migrant workers are employed in large, multinational construction companies, while others work as drivers, security guards, and camel herders. The money they earn is just enough to pay off the loans they borrowed to cover the service charges of recruiting agencies. Even worst, their
companies did not allow these migrant laborers to join their families during the 2015 devastating earthquakes that hit Nepal (Chaudhary, 2015).
49 Nepal is one of the top 10 countries with the highest share of remittance in their national GDP. 50 There are more than 760 recruiting agencies throughout the country.
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More strikingly, young migrant laborers die every year due to difficult and dangerous working conditions. Doward (2014) reveals that about 400 Nepali workers died in the time between 2010 and 2013, while working as part of Qatar’s construction projects in preparation for the 2022 FIFA World Cup. Furthermore, Pokhrel (2015) reports that on average two Nepali workers die in Qatar every three days; with regard to the causes of death, he cites what the former ambassador to Qatar said: “In general, it is due to tension led by exploitation, adverse climate, poor working and living conditions and alcoholic intoxication” (n.p.). The death of their main breadwinner impacts families in many ways. On the one hand, they should bear the burden of reimbursing the loan monies paid to the recruiting agencies and, on the other, they endure deep psycho-social problems in the loss of their family members. The neoliberal development discourses have not paid much attention to these issues.
As Nepal continues to remain one of the major countries in South Asia to supply young laborers to the neoliberal market economy, rural and low-class people in particular have been enduring social, cultural, and economic challenges. These migrant laborers have also contributed to bring modernity to rural villages. Most of the returnees bring cell phones, TVs, and other modern items, including food and fashion. All of these contribute to connect villagers with the outside world. More strikingly, as most young people leave for foreign employment, the productive farmlands are increasingly becoming barren due to lack of people to farm them; consequently, the traditional subsistence farmers are becoming more dependent on food supplied in the market.
Ideology of English-as-Capital and the Language of Development
Scholars around the globe have discussed how the discourse of development has contributed to the expansion of English in developing countries. Coleman (2011) reveals that
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developing countries introduce English from the early grades because they consider it as a language to fulfill the ‘dream’ of development, both human and national. Seargeant and Erling (2011) critically examine the ‘emergent ideology’ of English as a language for international development in Bangladesh. Their study reveals that the discourse of development has deeply influenced the ideology of English in developing countries like Bangladesh. Although
international donor agencies invest in English language projects as their efforts towards supporting developing countries in their development initiatives, Seargeant and Erling (2011) and Wedell (2011) find such projects fail to fulfill such dreams due to a lack of the projects’ understanding about local sociopolitical, cultural, and linguistic contexts.
In Nepal, the on-going discourse of development has discursively constructed the ideology of English as ‘capital’ (Bourdieu, 1991). Aid-agencies and (I)NGOs hire candidates who are proficient in English (Eagle, 2000); although some NGOs have started using local languages in their community-based programs, they plan projects and write reports in English to communicate with donor agencies. More importantly, studies have shown that most
developmental organizations are under the control of high class/caste elites and are based in urban areas (Pandey, 2012). Heaton-Shrestha (2006) considers (I)NGOs an urban middle-class phenomenon and argues that they prefer the employees who speak ‘good English’; in other words, “competence in English meant [means] that NGO members could partake fully of life in development circles, where English was [is] still the lingua franca” (Heaton-Shrestha, 2006, p. 200). The (I)NGOs develop their project proposals, reports, newsletters, brochures, and memos in standard English. As the aid-workers and (I)NGOs reach out to the community, they show very little attention to linguistic, epistemological, and cultural sensitivity towards local
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communities; instead, they additionally prefer to organize seminars, workshops, and other programs in English and Nepali rather than in the local languages.
As (I)NGOs continue to expand their presence in local and rural communities, the common public, including the poor, assume that English is the language for development. For example, during an interview, one local community leader said:
I’ve attended many goṣṭhi (seminars) on various issues such as literacy, community building and peace organized by NGOs. Most seminars are in English and sometimes in Nepali. Most concepts are English.…NGOs also bring foreigners in the village. They speak in English. We don’t understand much English…but local boys interpret in Nepali. We don’t need to speak English in community, but knowing English has become
compulsory to work in NGOs.
This community leader further asserts that people who work in “projects51 are jānne
(knowledgeable/smart)” because they speak in “English with bideshī (foreigner)”; he assumes, “they earn much money”. As the leader says, the development discourses have discursively constructed the indexicality of English as a language of ‘projects’ that employ only ‘smart’ people with English language proficiency. However, Dahal’s (2014) analysis shows massive inequalities between the salaries of local and expatriate NGO workers. He argues that an expatriate receives a salary as much as thirty times higher than their local counterparts. Calling them ‘profit-making organizations’, Dahal (2014) further argues that (I)NGOs spend much more