Figure 10. Ambassador MacWhite’s Network Design
1. Level of Openness
In contrast to the closed embassy network that was cultivated by the previous ambassador to Sarkhan, Ambassador MacWhite purposefully sought out key individuals who he believed could assist him in countering Communist efforts to pull Sarkhan into the Sino-Soviet domain. He adopted two new approaches in his quest to broaden the scope of American influence that would eventually be used against him as his superiors back in Washington began questioning his unconventional methods. First, MacWhite recognized that he needed help and actively sought the advice of a handful of his indigenous Southeast Asian counterparts who had been dealing with Communist aggression in their own countries for some time. Two of the change agents that MacWhite would eventually recruit were recommended to him during these meetings.
Secondly, MacWhite believed that the best way for him to improve his understanding of the Communist situation in Sarkhan was to travel throughout the region and experience first-hand what nations at various stages of Communist insurrection looked like. During
his travels, MacWhite was exposed to several other individuals who further shaped his approach in Sarkhan. He even managed to convince two of them, Homer Atkins and Major Wolchek, to join his network.
Despite his willingness to incorporate a diverse assortment of individuals into his network, MacWhite understood that there were risks associated with his counter-Communist campaign. The network faced challenges both from counter-Communist sympathizers who actively sought to derail its activities and from a large portion of the Foreign Service community who wished to maintain the status quo and did not recognize MacWhite’s efforts as necessary or appropriate in the broader context of executing U.S. foreign policy. Recruitment into the network, therefore, was open to a wide range of innovative, proactive characters but was also tempered by MacWhite’s desire to maintain overall operational security of his comprehensive efforts and his insistence on personally establishing a foundation of person-based trust with each of the change agents that he brought on board.52
2. Level of Formality
While MacWhite’s extended network was not bounded by formal standards and procedures, he understood that the literal and figurative space that the network occupied still existed within the context of his overall diplomatic mission.53 Those change agents that operated out of the U.S. embassy, for instance, could not simply ignore the constraints placed upon them by bureaucratic procedure or the ineptitude of other Americans serving in Sarkhan, they had to deal with them and work their way around them. MacWhite did endeavor, however, to grant the change agents as much freedom of action and delegation of authority as was feasible for someone in his position. This conscious decision to orchestrate a network of networks (i.e., those of the change agents), rather than to micro-manage the affairs of the various activities that were being
52 Person-based trust is often characterized in trust literature as originating primarily from an individual’s favorable assessment of the trustee’s competence, benevolence, and integrity. See Adams and Webb, “Trust in Small Military Teams,” 5–6.
53 For a discussion of the “locus” of networks, which includes the real place or virtual space that an individual network occupies, see Anklam, Net Work, 81–88.
undertaken, allowed each subnetwork to flourish and each change agent to use his or her own unique approach to its fullest capacity.54 MacWhite recognized that this methodology produced a greater number and wider variance of direct challenges to Communist expansionism than he could have created on his own. As will be discussed in detail below, this informal network structure was not without its weaknesses, particularly in matters of resilience at both the local level in Sarkhan and within the broader context of the larger diplomatic effort in which the network ultimately operated.
3. Level of Planning
MacWhite’s extended network can be characterized as slightly more emergent than planned primarily due to his decision to not dictate the manner in which each of the subnetworks executed their individual tasks. The overarching goal of exposing the Sarkhanese population to a wide array of programs championed by Americans and promoting Western ideals was ultimately geared at disrupting Communist efforts to do the same thing for the Soviet cause. This purpose, however, was not central to all of the subnetworks, nor was it necessary for all of the change agents to be dedicated anti-Communists. Homer Atkins, the focus of Chapter VI, and Tom Knox, an agricultural advisor working in Cambodia, approached their tasks from a purely altruistic position and were intent on using their education and expertise to find simple, locally sustainable solutions to basic problems impacting the indigenous populations of Southeast Asia.
Their contributions substantially improved local conditions and, by extension, increased America’s standing in the eyes of the people while contravening much of the anti-Western Communist propaganda directed at the masses that depicted Americans as uncaring, xenophobic capitalists. Unlike Father Finian and John Colvin, however, Atkins and Knox were not risking their lives and livelihood in Southeast Asia solely to impede the spread of Communism—they were there simply to help people who could use their assistance. Ambassador MacWhite recognized the “second-order” effects of these types of efforts and co-opted their use within the larger planned purpose of his extended network.
54 For Anklam’s description of the role of choreographers and orchestrators in network design, see Anklam, Net Work, 137–138.
Table 3. MacWhite’s Network Summary