new hope? – lessons for the future

However naïve it may sound, the Berlin process may well be the biggest hope for genuine change in the Western Balkans. This may be the only way out of the situation where the EU countries ‘pretend that they still want the Western Balkans to join, and that the elites in the region pretend that they are seriously tackling their multiple and chronic economic and political problems’,262 _even

despite the hiccups experienced by the Anglo-German initiative.

The offer of a more pragmatic approach presented by Philip Hammond and Frank-Walter Steinmeier seems to be the only viable one. It has to be consistent and cannot get lost in the existing mechanisms of the EU’s approach towards BiH. The mechanism of the European Commission providing tutelage in Brus- sels whenever there is an internal dispute should be abandoned. If the rule of

261 _{I. Jovanovic, Merkel: summit has shown EU commitment to Balkans, http://www.balkaninsight.}

com/en/article/western-balkans-to-have-clear-european-future-merkel-says-08-27-2015

262 _{P. van Ham, Gridlock, Corruption and crime in the Western Balkans. Why the EU must ac-}

knowledge its limits, http://www.clingendael.nl/sites/default/files/Gridlock%20Corrup- tion%20and%20Crime%20in%20the%20Western%20Balkans.pdf

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law and the strength of state institutions is in the EU’s interest, words should be backed up by actions.

The UK – German proposal had several highly significant elements and these should now be consistently pursued. It has shown that the EU can be flexible in terms of conditionality, which might work to the advantage of BiH. It has also shown it is willing to focus on the most urgent needs (stimulating the economy, creating jobs, strengthening the rule of law, reducing bureaucracy), moving the controversial ones (e.g. constitutional changes) to a later stage.

An innovative SEESOX workshop report on new international thinking on Bosnia and Herzegovina adds a few relatively inexpensive and potentially highly impactful recommendations. The key one involves the international community needing to be ready to name and shame those public figures who are responsible for any backlogs in BiH’s EU integration process.263 _Although

many might dismiss it as interfering in Bosnian domestic affairs (which West- ern institutions do regularly anyway), this might be a very practical tool for informing Bosnian society about the realities of BiH’s European path.

European Union support cannot be limited only to providing funds – Bos- nian politicians may be very eager to accept them, without giving much in re- turn. The same applies to other countries in the region covered by the Berlin process. Ultimately the only way Bosnia’s political system can be changed is through public pressure. Bosnia needs a ‘constituency for change’.264 _{More ef-}

ficient investments in civil society (e.g. through the Erasmus Plus programme) combined with the pressure for transparency and the naming and shaming of all those who create backlogs might be the cheapest and most effective way of changing Bosnia’s political culture. The EU has to stop thinking in terms of ‘this time is different’. It is not and will not be. Twenty years of cementing of Bosnia’s political system after the Dayton Peace Agreement has made it highly resilient to conventional changes. Supporting institutions, not politicians, and strengthening civil society (especially in terms of requesting transparency and accountability from their elected representatives) may well be the only way to create a ‘constituency for change’. In the end it is the Bosnians them- selves who should feel the need for change and be willing to join the EU.

263 _{Bosnia and Herzegovina – new international…, op. cit., p. 14.}

264 _{F. de Borja Lasheras, Can Steinmeier and Hammond reset Bosnia?, http://www.ecfr.eu/ar-}

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Bosnia and Herzegovina cannot be ‘fixed’ without ‘fixing’ the whole Western Balkans. The Berlin process creates a specific context of regional cooperation, supported by the EU. Belgrade and Zagreb may be only too eager to explore and exploit their influence in BiH (as could be vividly seen in the Croatian presi- dential and parliamentary campaigns), which makes the EU’s role even more important. Getting Belgrade and Zagreb on the same page with Brussels would be bring added value, and this is something the Berlin process should be able to facilitate. The biggest advantage of the Berlin process lies in its flexibility (no one in Berlin a year ago would have thought that discussions in Vienna would focus on cooperation in the face of a refugee crisis in the Balkans). Ultimately, the closer Serbia and the other Western Balkan countries are to the EU, the better for BiH’s European path.

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