New Labour and the extension of conditionality: containing the

By 1997, public spending on disability benefits had escalated substantially. While the period from 1974 to 1982 saw spending remain steady at around £700 million per anum, by 1997 it had exceeded £2 billion. The election of the Labour Government in 1997 saw a renewed effort to tackle this expansion, with disabled people becoming subject to conditionality for the first time (Dwyer 2010; Roulstone & Prideaux 2012). This was embodied in the

introduction of the ‘New Deal for Disabled People’ (NDDP) as the cornerstone of their approach (Dwyer 2010; Roulstone & Prideaux 2012). The ‘New Deals’ played a central role in the Labour Government’s commitment to tackling ‘social exclusion’ focusing on tackling the barriers that young people, disabled people, and lone parents faced in gaining and sustaining employment (Grover & Piggot 2005). Policies included the introduction of tax credits to make work more financially rewarding, as well as providing training and skills for the workplace (ibid). The reforms were therefore firmly focused on work as the route out of exclusion. The NDDP reflected two important trends that are discussed in Chapter 3: firstly, restricting eligibility through an increased reliance on medical testing, and secondly, the introduction of work-focused interviews requiring participation in activities designed to prepare individuals for the labour market (Stanley 2005).

The adoption of conditionality for disabled people in the UK has met with a range of criticisms. These have included concerns that focusing on

‘employability’ overlooks the very real barriers that disabled people face in entering employment (Page 2002). Writers from within the social model tradition (see section 1.3) have argued that the emphasis on labour market participation as the prerequisite to social rights has served to exclude disabled people from being able to participate in the labour market on an equal basis (Barnes & Mercer 2005). Discriminatory attitudes of employers surrounding disabled people’s perceived capacity for work, as well as physical barriers in relation to access to buildings and workspaces, mean that disabled people do not compete on an equal basis (Barnes & Mercer 2005). Similarly, the

organization of public transport may serve as a further barrier to disabled people’s ability to engage in work. The buoyancy of local labour markets is a further factor. When work is scarce, such as during an economic downturn or in areas with high unemployment, disabled people are frequently placed at the back of the queue (Grover & Piggott 2007).

The centrality given to participation in paid work in conditionality policy also been viewed as disadvantageous to disabled people. Page (2002) has argued that conditionality has created a new form of employment-based citizenship,

the consequence of which has been to undermine the value of other forms of contribution. Similarly, Morris (2005) has argued that disabled people can and do make significant contributions to their local communities and to society as a whole (see section 5.3.3), and are increasingly taking on new roles,

including that of employer (Barnes & Mercer 2005; Roulstone & Prideaux 2012; see also sections 2.6.2.2 and 7.4.1), though these positive roles are rarely recognized.

These concerns are echoed by Wright (2009), who has argued conditionality has been presented as a unique solution while failing to fully address issues such as in-work poverty. In Wright’s view, such failings are exacerbated by a discourse that leaves little room for disagreement. As a result, disabled people are increasingly portrayed as a drain on society’s resources rather than being recognized for the many and varied contributions they make to society (Barnes & Roulstone 2005). Barnes and Roulstone (2005) have called for a reframing of citizenship and the paid work/social security binary to

recognize the range of ways disabled people contribute to society. This echoes Drake’s (1999) calls for the development of a rights-based citizenship agenda in disability policy (see section 2.6).

Although the Labour Government (1997–2010) introduced new equalities legislation aimed at reducing discriminatory attitudes among employers (see section 2.6.2.1), it has been suggested that not enough was done to address barriers to work (Roulstone & Prideaux 2012). NDDP resources were targeted at individual supply side measures such as employment and job search skills (Roulstone & Prideaux 2012; Lindsay et al. 2007; Patrick 2011a; Weston 2012). Consistent with Drake’s analysis of social security as a means to rehabilitate disabled people into society, Warren (2005) has argued that this placed the onus on disabled people to alter their behaviour in relation to employment, rather than on employers to change their attitudes towards disabled people. In addition, the quality of support available to disabled people looking to enter work provided in such schemes has also been called into question (Riddell & Banks 2005). Process such as ‘creaming and parking’ (Finn 2008), focusing resources on those who are already closest to the

labour market, while ignoring those who face greater challenges finding and retaining work, have also been disadvantageous to disabled people. This has been particularly common in programmes run by private sector organisations under contract to the state, which often operate under financial incentives from government for the number of ‘positive’ labour market interventions they make (Riddell & Banks 2005; Finn 2008).

The fairness and indeed efficacy of sanctioning disability benefits has also been critiqued, particularly given the lack of evidence to support their use (Lister & Bennett 2010; Weston 2012). Research has demonstrated that claimants are often unaware of the expectations placed on them or the reason for a sanction being imposed (Handler 2003; Griggs & Evans 2010). The threat of sanctions may therefore cause benefits users to disengage from the process rather than increase efforts to search for work. The evidence base for worklessness as an ‘intergenerational culture’, which underpins the

‘underclass model’ has also been contested (Shildrick et al. 2012). This has caused Patrick (2011b) to describe conditionality as ‘the wrong prescription’ for disabled people.