Non-Representational Theory and the representational souvenir

Given my interest in tourist souvenirs and their

might seem contradictory to draw upon Non-Representational Theory. However, in this section I discuss how this broad body of literature can help inform a more dynamic approach to understanding souvenirs, their representational capacities and relation with place. In particular, I suggest that actuality

(Dewsbury et al. 2002:438) can help move beyond fixed notions of authenticity and cultural commodification. It is necessary to address how Non-Representational Theory is conceived, before considering how this helps to create a more dynamic understanding of objects and materiality. It is then possible to see how this thesis gains a great deal of

insight from the disjuncture between the representational souvenir and Non-Representational concerns

As a broad field of study, Non-Representational Theory¹ emerged as an attempt in terms of how knowledge is produced and constructed (Dewsbury et al. 2002; Lorimer 2005; Thrift 2000b). Advocates of this approach have criticised work in social and cultural geography for an over-reliance upon discourse analysis and textual meanings for converting p

representations according to categorical politics of identity. This is argued to perpetuate a stable, fixed (structural) ontology whereby meaning can only be created, understood and resisted in this context, presupposing itself (Dewsbury 2003; Lorimer 2005;

Massumi 2002a; Thrift and Dewsbury 2000). As such, representational thinking is criticised for perpetuating impoverished understandings of the body, space, place and materiality by assuming these only acquire significance through discourse (Anderson and Tolia-Kelly 2004; Massumi 2002b). Work in Non-Representational Theory therefore attempts

(Dewsbury 2003:1911 also see; Harrison 2000; Lorimer 2005). Broadly the focus of this work is:

routines, fleeting encounters, embodied movements, pre-cognitive triggers, practical skills, affective intensities, enduring urges, unexceptional interactions

(Lorimer 2005:84).

Its starting point is the phenomenological space of immediate bodily experience, offering an apprehension of space, time and the world as we inhabit them, rather than theoretically assume them to be. This is based on the princi

comes fr longer necessary to differentiate between

which matters, pointing to the constitutive taking place of their relation (Dewsbury 2003:1912). Whilst the concern of ANT was how things were related, work in Non-Representational Theory focuses upon relations themselves as a way of apprehending the vitality and open-ended generative processes of everyday life. It is for this reason that Non-Representational advocates have critiqued representations, because they are

1

-than-Dewsbury at al. 2002) to recognise its diverse set of unified interests beyond, rather than against, representation. However, I refer to Non-Representational Theory because coherent theoretical approaches are apparent in this body of literature, particularly concerning representation (following Thrift 2007).

(Massumi 2002b:4-5). However, this does not preclude or exclude representational concerns.

Instead, representations might be thought of:

Not as a code to be broken or as an illusion to be dispelled rather representations are apprehended as performative in themselves; as doings. The point here is to redirect attention from the posited meanings towards material compositions and conduct of representati (Dewsbury et al. 2002:438).

Following these insights, I suggest that souvenirs can be reconceptualised as performative representatio Adopting this approach translates into empirical research which considers exploring the role of souvenirs within the everyday encounters and events which surround them. As a result a Non-Representational approach towards the representational souvenir expands the remit of this research, directing attention to the significance of fleeting interactions and encounters between people and objects.

However, most work in Non-Representational Theory has shied away from more onal concerns, focusing instead upon expressive performance arts such as drama and dance (McCormack 2002, 2003; Thrift 1997). Whilst Lorimer

(2005) has suggested that Non-Representational T

-than-

Non-Representational approaches with representational concerns. One decade after its inception there also remains little consensus surrounding what the narrowly named Non-Representational Theory refers to, particularly as debates continue to be caught up with theoretical intent and the conditions necessary for succession (Lorimer 2005).

Furthermore, empirical research which draws upon Non-Representational Theory, such as studies of allotment gardening (Crouch 2003), boredom (Anderson 2003), listening to music (Anderson 2004), walking (Edensor 2000), commuting (Bissell 2008) and landscape (Wylie 2006), tend to be overly concerned with discussing the theoretical implications of their research for Non-Representational Theory.

Consequently, this thesis is cautiously informed by work in Non-Representational Theory, rather than solely drawing upon or being directly situated within this body of literature. I use Non-Representational Theory as a way to think about souvenirs differently in both my methodological and interpretive approaches (see chapter 3). In other words, the theoretical concerns of this thesis are developed through the souvenir as a particular type of relational object, rather than being led by any one

theoretical approach, such as Non-Representational Theory or ANT. In particular, I suggest that notions of affectivity offer a useful way to reconceptualise how objects have presence and the capacity to enact

performative of particular relations rather than a self evident representation thereof.

Affectivity can loosely be understood as intensities which can be felt and enacted through the body but are not self-contained within it (Massumi 2002; Thrift 2004). This is often described through (1998:27) notion of levels, where affectivity is a certain

These do not belong to the body or the object but are the sensible field through which the body, spatiality and temporality emerge (Anderson 2006; Anderson and Wylie 2009; McCormack 2003; Wylie 2006).

Anderson (2003) work demonstrates how these abstract theoretical ideas might translate empirically, as his work describes how boredom takes place. He explains how this occurs through barely sensed orderings of time-space stilling and slowing, related to repetitive (mundane) embodied practices (such as chopping carrots and preparing food) and a breakdown of capacity to frame these. In this context, affectivity

eal trace in creating barely sensed feelings of boredom.

Affect is also pre-cognitive, as much of what happens before and after the articulated

makes sense through its embodied capacity to affect and be affected, felt (although not self-contained) as ways of going on in the world (McCormack 2003). As such, a

of the body. Of it, but n This

understanding of affectivity recognises how immateriality is central to materiality, directing attention towards relations between people and objects.

I draw upon these concerns throughout this thesis, to consider how objects have an affective presence

recognised ethnographically as objects disrupt and deflect everyday practices and interactions (Pels et al. 2002). However, my point of departure with Non-Representational Theory and concerns with affectivity is the constant emphasis on the eventfulness of life which is then always ceaselessly becoming. If nothing is fixed or apparent the question inevitably emerges as to how we might acknowledge a consistency or continuity of particular relations (Bell 1999). This problem inflects both ANT and Non-Representational Theory, as well as social and cultural geography more generally, where the celebratory claim that everything is relational is becoming

increasingly prominent (Harrison 2007a; Nash 2000). As Harrison (2007a:590) discusses:

Indeed it should perhaps be a cause for some concern that so many diverse theoretical strands, from constructivist analyses of the formations of identity, to the material semiotics of actor-network theory, to questions of scale and debates over the spatiality of the political, to the vitalistic monism of Deleuze, have all converged in geography at least - on this one term.

It seems the pendulum has swung too far the other way, whereby any notion of essence is feared for its implication of fixity and the impossibility of change. Furthermore, this emphasis on fleeting encounters is a danger of denying and ignoring the historical and political inheritance from which particular events emerge.

place, in part, because of a consistency in their affective presence and their capacity to provoke particular types of habitual practices and interactions (Harrison 2000). As discussed in 2.2.1, a central concern is the capacity for stability and change in the meanings and types of relations the souvenir creates. This is particularly pertinent in chapter 5, where I discuss how objects take place as souvenirs within habitual encounters. I therefore draw upon complementary ways of understanding how thought and action, representation and practice, interact as a way of taking a more dynamic approach to understanding souvenirs in this thesis. I also demonstrate how the souvenir is ideally positioned to develop an imagination of materiality premised on relationality.

Rather than simply presuming objects and subjects are seamlessly connected, I foreground the capacities of the souvenir to create complex relations between people and objects as well as objects and places. I how and where these relations were awkward, uncertain, hesitant, overwhelming, partial or unrelated (Harrison 2007a; Hetherington and Law 2000), challenging the idea that objects might simply be appropriated into tourism practices, the home or by producers.

For instance, in chapter 8 I explore how objects proliferate beyond producers attempts to manage and trace them. I suggest that the relations created as a result of materiality

place.

The discussions in this section have highlighted how there is an unhelpful division between word and world, discourse and practice, which underpins notions of would simply be more real, grounded and empirical by focusing on objects rather than discourse, creating an

unproblematic substitution between materiality and physicality (Anderson and Wylie 2009; Kearns 2003). In contrast, I in this thesis as a renewed questioning of what souvenirs do as performative representations. I focus upon how objects are affective within various encounters, to consider when and where materiality has the capacity to forge rather than assuming this a priori (Anderson and Tolia-Kelly 2004; Jackson 2000). This thesis therefore gains and develops a great deal of theoretical insight from the fissure between Non-Representational concerns and the representational inheritance of the souvenir.