A note on power

Power is a spontaneously emergent multiplicity of unequal force relations. This, at least, is my own distillation of Foucault’s ‘theory’ of power—inasmuch as he had one. Foucault was at pains to stress that he did not intend to provide a theory of power itself; “not a part or even the start of such a theory” (2007, p. 1). Rather, he was interested in the moments at which social practices became implicated in power, or the procedures and technologies developed in the exercise of power. But for a view of what he thought about power itself—as an ontological object or entity of sorts—we must make inferences from the great amount that he wrote and said around the topic. What follows in this section is one such outline of an ontology of power, which I shall explain working backwards through each element: a spontaneously emergent; multiplicity; of unequal; force; relations.

Relations: Power is a relational concept. It is not a substance; you cannot pick it up or put it down. It cannot be given or taken, won or lost. You cannot ‘have’ power (1978, p. 94; 2007, p. 2). Power is not a ‘thing’ in that sense, rather it is a concept we use to understand a relationship between things—between people and other people, between people and institutions, between people and practices. For this reason, power itself cannot be ‘seen’ in any direct sense, for it has no substance. As Foucault points out, the entities normally marked as the location of power—such as the state, or the law, or any

identifiable instance of its exercise—are in fact what he calls the “terminal forms” of power (1978, p. 92). They are its effects, its outcomes, they are the traces it leaves behind in its wake; but they are also the only evidence of its existence. As a consequence of this relational ontology, we cannot know power by its measurement, we cannot interrogate or observe it directly; we can only really know power it by its effects.

Force: The type of relation that the concept of power represents is one of force. ‘Force relations’ in this context refers specifically to political power, which excludes the types of power that might propel an engine or illuminate a bulb, but is not limited to the politics of parliaments and senates. Political power in this context simply means getting someone to do something that they would not otherwise have done. Making something happen requires the application of force, but this need not have negative connotations. It could be by force of argument, or force of personality, rather than mere brute force. Indeed, Foucault describes the use or threat of overwhelming violence as among the least stable forms of power, simply because it cannot sustain itself (1982, p. 789). When the threat of violence is removed the effect ceases, and the imminent desire to develop new forms of resistance works to continually undermine its effectiveness. If, by contrast, one applies the force of argument, or of belief, then the impetus for action can be internalised and reproduced without continuous reinforcement—it is self-sustaining. Of course, reality is never quite so simple, but this is the basic principle at work, the crucial point being that the ‘force’ of the relation is neither good nor evil, it is simply effective—or to paraphrase Foucault, power is not always repressive; but it is always productive.

Unequal: In order for a force relation to have an effect it must be unequal. One part of the relation must produce a force greater than the other’s ability to resist. This inequality sets the direction of the causal chain that constitutes the exercise of power. Again, this need not be a repressive act, it need only be productive; the application of a force that makes something happen by overcoming other forces in its way. It is the inequality of force relations that engender states of power, but those states are always local, and always unstable (1978, p. 93). There is no hegemonic force relation between one entity and all others; there are only locally specific force relations borne of a particular context at a particular time. The exercise of power necessarily causes change, consequently altering its own context, which alters the balance of force relations. In this way power relations are inherently unstable.

Multiplicity: In reality, power does not occur in simple bilateral forms, rather it exists as a multiplicity of unequal force relations—a network of connections. Indeed, for

Foucault, power is omni-present, it is in every social interaction (ibid., p. 93). Power is everywhere, not in the sense that it arrives from outside to pervade and infiltrate, but in the sense that it comes from everywhere. Power is produced by social interaction; it is a product of society. The multiplicity of unequal force relations that weave the fabric of power’s composition serve as the platform of its exercise, the routes of its movement, and the arena of its conflicts. The exercise of power is a strategic enterprise, and an accurate reading of the multiplicity is what enables the design and deployment of successful strategies. To exercise power—as opposed to merely being swept along by it—is to manipulate existing force relations toward a desired result, and the multiplicity of unequal force relations pre-determines where, when, and how that manipulation can occur.

Spontaneously emergent: As a product of society, power comes into being spontaneously at the moment of social interaction. At any given moment, in any given social configuration, power spontaneously emerges as a result of the inequalities inherent in social relations. Power cannot exist on its own; it is continually produced and reproduced by the presence of societal connections. As the number of connections—or the size of society—increases, so too does the complexity of the force relations. Despite being spontaneously emergent and dependent upon social interaction, however, power does find continuity in the structures, institutions, and shared practices of society. In Foucault’s words, power is ‘crystallised’ in institutions such as the state, or the law, or any of the other ‘terminal forms’ by which power is normally recognised (ibid., p. 93). But in its essence, its operation, and its ontology, power does not exist as a stable entity that survives outside of society, it spontaneously emerges out of specific social configurations, and is continually renewed by the presence of social interaction. In short: power is a spontaneously emergent multiplicity of unequal force relations.

These arguments combine to form Foucault’s view of power—and it is what I mean when I talk about power throughout this research. It is not a view of what people think power is, or how people talk about power, or even how people experience power; rather, it is an ontological appraisal of what power is. Any research that simply asks people how they think or talk about or experience power to be is not research about power itself, it is about people and their thoughts, words, and experiences (cf. Schiffer, 2007). To research power itself, the only data available are its effects, its terminal forms, its signature. The analytics of power are central to the method of genealogy.