A note on the practice of deterrence

Especially in the US, the theory and policy of deterrence came to be progressively intertwined. However, there has often been a deep distinction between the theory and the practice of deterrence.34 ‘Deterrence became prominent in part because of its importance in avoiding nuclear war, but it also received a boost because it fit well with the larger U.S. grand strategy of containment.’35 Therefore, a momentous debate focused on the policy application of the concept of deterrence. Is it better to threaten a massive retaliation to any kind of provocation or rather employ a flexible response according to the interests at stake? And how to translate Schelling’s suggestion to rely on the ‘threat that leaves something to chance’? Finally, what are the quantitative and qualitative requirements to maintain deterrence (i.e. the value of superiority)?

Washington’s initial monopoly allowed it to remain rather vague on the strategic prevision of atomic use. However, the Soviet Union rapidly caught up and, faced with a nuclear-armed opponent, MAD became the frame of reference for strategic and operational developments. A deterrence relationship developed between the US and the Soviet Union after the latter’s first nuclear test in 1949, after which the two got involved in an arms race

34 _{Keith Krause, ‘Rationality and deterrence in theory and practice,’ in Contemporary Security and} Strategy, ed. Craig Snyder (London: Macmillan Press, 1997).

35 _{Jeffrey Knopf, ‘Three Items in One: Deterrence as Concept, Research Program, and Political Issue,’}

in Complex Deterrence: Strategy in the Global Age, eds. T.V. Paul, Patrick M. Morgan, and James J. Wirtz (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2009), 46.

that brought them to fill their arsenals with ever more and increasingly sophisticated atomic weapons. The logic of second-strike capability, in fact, says little as to the quantitative requirements of deterrence. Being able to survive and retaliate was the push behind the arms race, with the US arsenal steadily increasing throughout the 1950s and reaching a peak in 1967 with over 31,000 warheads.36 In practice, both the US and the Soviet Union quickly acquired overkill, meaning enough capability to destroy each other several times over. It also spread across the so-called Triad of land-based missiles, submarines, and aircraft. With the rise of the arms race came the need to manage the nuclear relationship through a variety of arms control initiatives that will be discussed later.

The strategic posture to be adopted was also left an open question by deterrence theorising. The concept of massive retaliation was made policy by the Eisenhower Administration after the Korean War. Accordingly, any attack – even a minor conventional offensive – would be met with all-out nuclear retaliation, especially counter-city attacks.37 That, however, created huge problems for stability and credibility. Given the irrationality of nuclear war and significant escalation, states could end up being self-deterred from using their atomic arms, risking to pave the way for lesser confrontations. As Snyder put it: ‘The Soviets probably feel, considering the massive retaliation threat alone, that there is a range of minor ventures which they can

36 _{The US all-time high arrived in 1987 with over 23,000 warheads, while the world-wide peak would}

be reached in 1986 with over 64,000 nuclear warheads globally. See Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris, ‘Nuclear Notebook: Nuclear Arsenals of the World,’ Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, http://thebulletin.org/nuclear-notebook-multimedia (last accessed November 3, 2016).

37 _{For a criticism of massive retaliation, see William Kaufman, Military Policy and National Security}

undertake with impunity, despite the objective existence of some probability of retaliation.’38

Massive retaliation was substituted by flexible response by the Kennedy Administration, right after the Cuban missile crisis had put deterrence under pressure and evidenced the folly of risking a nuclear war.39 It relies on tailored counter-threats commensurate to the incoming menace, maintaining the ability to respond at different levels of violence with both conventional and unconventional means.40 However, problems of credibility came from the application of extended deterrence. That theory, in fact, gave no indication on how to operate a nuclear alliance, something that became evident in the case of the North-Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO): how to ensure the credibility of collective defence under a nuclear shadow and how to extend a nuclear umbrella to Europe? Practical examples of answering those questions were Kennedy stating ‘Ich bin ein Berliner,’41 but also the deployment of troops to West Germany and the rest of Europe, as well as the basing of tactical nuclear weapons in several NATO states.

Both massive retaliation and flexible response were harshly criticised by Colin Gray and others, who insisted that a nuclear war might indeed have to be fought. Accordingly, any war would risk going nuclear, thus resting on the

38 _{As this quote shows, most works of deterrence theory have a US focus and offer policy}

prescriptions, even when they purport to offer universal theories devoid of normativity. Glenn Snyder, Deterrence and Defense (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1961), 226.

39 _{This shift was more rhetorical than practical, as evidenced by Francis Gavin’s chapter on ‘The Myth}

of Flexible Response’; Francis J. Gavin, Nuclear Statecraft: History and Strategy in America’s Atomic Age (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2012).

40 _{On these and other strategies, see Paul Nitze, ‘Assuring Strategic Stability in an Era of}

Détente,’ Foreign Affairs, 54 n° 2 (1976). For reasons of space, we cannot get into too much detail but it is worth mentioning minimum deterrence, which previews the sole purpose of nuclear arsenals as retaliation to a nuclear first strike.

41 _{Declaring to come from Berlin, Kennedy was stating his commitment to the defence of West}

assumption that atomic attack is impossible makes for a dangerous strategy. On this basis, Gray recommended the development of war-fighting capabilities to make sure that denial, and not just punishment, were components of deterrence.42 A similar view has been put forward by Lieber and Press: ‘The most logical conclusions to make are that a nuclear-war- fighting capability remains a key component of the United States’ military doctrine and that nuclear primacy remains a goal of the United States.’ 43

The position in favour of war-fighting, however, has been remarkably marginal, with academic discussion agreeing that nuclear weapons are primarily useful for war-avoidance and nuclear doctrine of President after President confirming that. Ronald Reagan would come to take only half of their advice: nuclear wars cannot be won, he maintained but primacy could be achieved by escaping the nuclear riddle. On that basis, he initiated the Strategic Defense Initiative, designed to protect from ballistic missiles and thus eliminating the mutual vulnerability that is so crucial for deterrence.44 The connection between nuclear and other weapon systems, indeed, created further issues for the operationalization of deterrence. A nuclear retaliatory attack, for instance, has been sometimes proposed against attacks using other weapons of mass destruction – a proposal that was turned into policy under President Clinton.45 With that came the concern that deterrence has been asked to do progressively more.46

42 _{Herman Kahn is a prominent representatives of the war-fighting school.}

43 _{Keir Lieber and Daryl Press,‘The Rise of U.S. Nuclear Primacy,’ Foreign Affairs (March /April 2006),}

53.

44 _{However, also rejecting the idea of living under the threat of nuclear weapons, he pursued}

disarmament talks, although the Reykjavík Summit between him and Gorbachev ultimately failed.

45 _{Patricia Lewis, ‘A New Approach to Nuclear Disarmament: Learning from International}

As this section has outlined with some selected examples, the theory of nuclear deterrence created immense problems and disagreements when it came to putting it into practice. The examples have been drawn from the US case because of ease, but similar issues are conceivably present in other nuclear-armed countries.