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5.3 Should we be more open-minded?

5.3.5 Open-mindedness and science

Some of the ideas I’ve explored in this chapter, and in this thesis more broadly, also seem to echo some discussion in the philosophy of science, and particularly the work of

Kuhn (1962, 1963, 1979). Philosophers of science have long been concerned with how theories and paradigms guide knowledge but can also constrain our viewpoints, how to treat anomalies and how many anomalies have to build up before we consider revising

for scientific innovation. Here, as with thinking and learning more broadly, there is no straightforward answer: Kuhn talks about what he calls an “essential tension” between

tradition and innovation in science - we need tradition and established theories in order to make ‘normal’ progress, but innovative scientific discoveries require the ability to

break from this tradition (Kuhn, 1962, 1979).

In particular, Kuhn suggests that the importance of tradition for scientific progress

has been relatively undervalued, compared to the amount of focus there is on open- mindedness, creativity, and innovation - asserting that, “both my own experience in

scientific research and my reading of the history of sciences lead me to wonder whether flexibility and open-mindedness have not been too exclusively emphasised as the char-

acteristics requisite for basic research.” (Kuhn, 1979, p.139) Kuhn argues that science ideally progresses in two distinct modes: ‘normal science’, which progresses firmly on

the basis of past discoveries and widely accepted base assumptions - and ‘revolution- ary science’ - where the most fundamental discoveries and assumptions are questioned,

occasionally resulting in a complete overthrow or rethink of the currently prevailing paradigm (Kuhn, 1962). Though he emphasises how crucial scientific revolutions are

- indeed, much of his most famous work focuses on them - he believes it is essential that they are accompanied by extended periods of ‘normal science’. In “The function

of dogma in scientific research”, he emphasises the importance of paradigms, theories, and assumptions: “nature is vastly too complex to be explored even approximately at

random... something must tell the scientist where to look and what to look for.” (Kuhn, 1963, p.363) This seems closely related to many of the points we have discussed about

the importance of assumptions for making sense of the world - and the notion of an “essential tension” between tradition and innovation closely analogous to the idea of a

difficult tradeoff between the benefits of open- and closed-mindedness.

One idea we might usefully take from Kuhn’s work is that thinking needs both ‘nor-

mal’ and ‘revolutionary’ stages - but both do not need to occur (and perhaps cannot occur) at the same time. Just as science might go through long periods of incremental

progress based on a prevailing paradigm before that paradigm is challenged, we might do something similar in our own thinking. Most of the time, we can go about our lives

not questioning our most fundamental beliefs and theories, building on our assump- tions and learning within those constraints (to be constantly questioning these seems impossibly cognitively demanding and perhaps even incapacitating). However, we also

need occasional ‘revolutionary’ periods where we question even our most fundamental assumptions, and genuinely explore the possibility that an alternative perspective might

be better. Of course, the really challenging question is when these ‘revolutionary’ peri- ods should occur, how often, and what prompts them. As Kuhn suggests with science,

we might look out for anomalies - things that don’t quite fit with our current beliefs - and when a certain number build up, recognise the importance of taking a step back.

Or we might even decide (as individuals, groups, or society) to schedule times at reg- ular intervals - every few months, every year, or longer, depending on the issue - for

challenging our assumptions.

Before we even get to the question of when and how to challenge our assumptions, there

is a simpler challenge: simply being aware of what our assumptions are. By their nature, assumptions are things we rarely think about, and are often not aware we’re making.

If we’re not even aware of what our assumptions are, then it seems impossible that we’ll ever change them. Rather than saying that people should be “more open-minded”

or “less biased”, therefore, I think a more actionable and clearly beneficial goal would to help people recognise what their assumptions are, when they are making them - so that they can actually notice when they have experiences that conflict with them, when anomalies arise.

A final interesting point that Kuhn makes is that rather than expecting individual scientists to balance this tension between tradition and innovation, we might simply want

different kinds of scientists for different kinds of research. The ‘inventive personality’, he suggests, may simply be a very different kind of person from the basic scientist -

and both are equally valuable to the progress of science in different ways (Kuhn, 1979). Similarly, from the perspective of societal progress, perhaps it is less important that

each individual person get the perfect balance between open- and closed-mindedness - and more crucial that we have societies and institutions that balance different kinds of

personalities on these dimensions: open-minded, innovative thinkers on the one hand and traditionalists who are very good at working within constraints on the other. We

might be concerned that certain kinds of institutions and jobs are particularly likely to attract one or the other kind of person - more closed-minded and traditionalist types

being attracted to large, bureaucratic institutions like government (and thus continuing those traditions), and more innovative and open-minded types being attracted to more creative and novel industries. If there genuinely is a stable personality difference here

that we could measure, capturing the benefits of both open- and closed-mindedness and not necessarily suggesting one is better than the other, then we might be able to

explore this concern, and the possibility that a better balance here might lead to better outcomes.