Operational Non-Uniformity

It is also interesting to know that there is no uniformity in the operational mode of the business. Though post-amnesty era had seen a more decentralized structural mechanism underpinning theft of crude oil, as against its earlier centralized image under a camp ‘Commandant' or ‘General,' there are parallels in how the business is conducted. For instance, in Bayelsa, some areas operate the small-scale buying and refining of crude oil for sale; some engage in direct stealing from pipelines and refining in their camps for sale. Some others only concentrate on crude stealing and selling to both local and foreign buyers without bothering themselves with ‘downstream' bush refining (RIND8). Such stratifications are not disposed to mapping according to communities, and in any case, the different observable practices exist across the region, especially Bayelsa and Delta.

There is also a lack of operational uniformity regarding petro-piracy. Though West Africa pirates are violent and have engaged security patrol teams in gun-battle, with reported cases of deaths as seen in the cases of Malta-flagged Greek MT KALAMOS and German-owned SP

154 Brussels, some pirates would rather kidnap for ransom instead of, or alongside hijack of vessels. Though a recent phenomenon, ostensibly in response to falling prices of crude, which have made crude harder to sell and less profitable, ransom payouts could be as high as $400,000 in one incident (Reuters, 2016). However, it should be said that the region has a rich history kidnap-for-ransom as ransoms were known to have been paid to secure the release of kidnapped oil company workers in Nigeria (ABC News, 2013). ‘’Kidnapping sailors appears to be faster and less risky for the pirates, and the likelihood of success is higher.” (VOA, 2016). Nevertheless, regardless of the underpinning objective, pirates in West Africa follow similar tactical procedures (Starr, 2014).

3.7.5 ENTRY BARRIERS, AND FREE EXIT

The enterprise is not open to all comers. Except for small scale oil theft operations and illegal trade in fuel (smuggling) characterized by low entry barriers such as basic material requirement, there are roadblocks which hinder free access to the criminality, and thus make the market less competitive. For instance, to gain access to vessels on the high sea or stolen oil, the starting point is usually by providing such ancillary services as security or work as a ‘boy' to the already established group (Katsouris and Sayne, 2013; Ngwu, 2014). Also, the enterprise especially oil theft is reportedly regulated by a ‘union,' made up of some high-level and corrupt security officers operating under JTF, who administer a tolling system or ‘tax regime' on oil bunkering; tap operation, refining and other components of the business. While ‘taxes' are paid based on a number of trips, weekly, or even monthly, and the amount paid is a function of the volume of stolen oil and the number of barges and vessels involved (ibid). There are consequences for default, however, which could result in the business being shut down, arrest and prosecution. Such a closed and regulated system makes entry difficult.

155 Entry into the business, in some cases, is characterised by the use of force, depending on the scale of operation, which further attests to difficulties in joining the enterprise. Some ex- militants had joined the illegal business through the threat of pipeline vandalisation to frustrate legitimate business or actual use of force. Similar instruments were used in securing pipeline protection contracts from the government. Because it often involves serious penalties when apprehended, either through prosecution and prison sentence, or death, in the case of petro-pirates on the high sea, very few people especially those who are not risk averse would venture into the enterprise. It is for this reason that such operations are underpinned by oath-taking as obtained in fraternities, to ensure the sacrosanctity of the business in the event of arrest and prosecution.

The business does, however, enjoy free exit. Once a transaction is completed, and proceeds shared, a member may choose to discontinue his participation in the racket. Membership is also not permanent. Exit could quickly be effected as the influence of actors wanes. Such inherent flexibility in membership may also be as a result of an arrest by security operatives, and the illegal nature of the business.

3.7.6 INNOVATIONS IN TECHNOLOGY

The enterprise is also characterized by innovations and advancement in technology. Well paid specialists using advanced know-how handle the tapping operations to steal crude, as discussed in the next chapter. Artisanal refining of stolen crude is also underpinned by local refining technology and distillation processes discussed in the next chapter. Some pirates have communications know-how which enables them to operate a vessel or manipulate and disable its central control system.

156 3.7.7 DEMAND DRIVEN

Another feature of the enterprise which is complicit in its dynamism and sustainability is that it is demand-push. As noted earlier, the illegal enterprise in the region is sustained by a thriving crude black market, without which there may not be thieves and pirates. The internationalisation of the business adds another layer of need and demand for crude oil and refined petroleum. Understanding the demand side of the enterprise is, therefore, key in evolving the right intervention framework towards addressing the phenomenon adequately.