THE OPPOSITIONAL DISCOURSE

With the exception of three participants, all the other participants appeared to make an implicit assumption that the character of older women's eggs was different from younger women so that the probability of older women conceiving babies with

chromosomal anomalies increased. In this way the majority of participants deployed the

medical genetic discourse in their texts. The two women, Emma and Rosalie, who distanced themselves from the medical genetic discourse were multiparas. Emma explained to me why she did not believe she was at risk of having a baby with chromosomal abnormalities at the age of 35:

I don't think it really changes things once you are 35. Although I think that this is where people have got it wrong. Just because you're 35 doesn't mean that you're going to have a Down syndrome or whatever. I don't feel that just because you're 35 you're going to have an abnormal baby. It can happen in your 20s.

Emma, multipara Rosalie recalled that when pregnant with her second child at the age of 39, she felt that the likelihood of her having a baby with 'abnormalities' was low and she attributed this to her lifestyle:

I felt that the chance of me having a baby with Down's was pretty

low, because I had always followed a healthy diet. I had read that X­

rays and radiation, that a build up of radiation in the body could affect

the genes of the eggs that the mother stores. I had had a few dental X­

lifestyle. We had eaten a lot of organic food. Even that I would think would help. It made me feel more confident, even if in reality it didn't.

Rosalie, multipara. Rosalie constructs the changes in women's eggs as being brought about by external factors rather than as an inherent unstoppable biological process. She believes that her body will have had reduced exposure to the chemicals associated with non­ organic products. Consequently, the genetic material within her eggs has not been affected. Her belief in the theory of the affects of pesticides and other chemicals used in food production on the human body also influenced her decision against having amniocentesis.

It is interesting to note, however, that in the last sentence of her statement, "even if in reality it didn 't " Rosalie contradicts her belief. Her confidence that she would not have a Down syndrome baby because of her diet and lifestyle, she reflects, may have been misplaced. She alludes to the possibility that her second daughter was not born with chromosomal abnormalities because of chance. By contradicting her belief, the status of her experience as evidence that Down syndrome may be prevented by an organic diet is diminished. The medical genetic discourse remains unchallenged and supenor.

A third aspect influences her decision-making and that is the wish not to have medical interference. When explaining her decision not to have an amniocentesis, at one point Rosalie said "But also I didn 't want to have any medical interference. " Taylor (2000) makes the point that in choosing particular prenatal cares and kinds of birth, women are constructing identities for themselves. In this light, Rosalie can be seen to be positioning herself in more than one discourse to explain her reasons for not seeking prenatal genetic diagnosis. Here she draws on the normal birth discourse which argues against the use of unnecessary intervention during pregnancy and birth. For Rosalie, an amniocentesis signifies medical intervention that she regards as undesirable.

6.9 SUMMARY

With the exception of two women, it was common for the remaining 1 3 women in this study to have considered the issue of prenatal genetic diagnosis prior to their becoming pregnant. Their increased risk of having a child with chromosomal abnormalities was regarded by most of the women as an issue that women in their age group needed to have thought about. That the majority of women were aware of the

results of such medical epidemiological research and had thought about its relevance to them reflects the hegemonic nature of the medical genetic discourse.

In this chapter, I have identified two subject positions that the women deployed in recalling their decision regarding prenatal genetic diagnosis: the unconditional mother and the conditional mother. These contradicting views show that the mothering of disabled children is contested terrain. For the women who identified themselves as unconditional mothers, a desire for motherhood was dominant and was one that permitted them to perceive that their capacity to care for a disabled child was intrinsic and unlimited. Furthermore, their notion of a disabled child was one which resisted that of the discourse of disability. In contrast, the conditional mothers perceived their capacity for mothering as limited and the disabled child as excessively burdensome.

That the majority of women chose to undergo prenatal genetic diagnosis shows that the intersection of the discourses of disability and motherhood as a chosen role rather than dictated by biology, was dominant amongst the participants.

Whichever discursive position the women situated themselves in, I believe that it was a consequence of reflection and evaluation influenced by the women's perceptions of themselves and their ideas of living with a child with intellectual disabilities. The latter were based on both direct and indirect understandings. The positioning of self as mother is one of relationship with another, the child. Each woman assessed her capability to mother a disabled child and in doing so judged herself as being either capable or incapable.

For the two different identities, the meaning of the knowledge that the prenatal genetic diagnosis offered to them regarding the condition of their fetus was contestable. For the conditional mothers, the test result allowed them the opportunity to ensure that they gave birth to a child without chromosomal abnormalities. Only one woman, who remained uncertain about whether or not she would have terminated the pregnancy, saw the test as an opportunity for knowledge itself about the fetus.

I have argued that the position of unconditional mother offers women the opportunity to elude the normalizing gaze of surveillance. In perceiving that the importance of the fetus' life outweighs either the knowledge gained from, or the choice provided by the test, women are able to refuse having the test. In this way, a space for avoiding the test is created and the fetus escapes examination and possible termination.

In deciding whether to undergo genetic diagnosis, women are called on to evaluate themselves as mothers. For the women in this study, a variety of discourses

came into play in their consideration of prenatal genetic diagnosis. When explaining their decision the women situated themselves in multiple subject positions revealing the fragmentary, and sometimes contradictory nature of subjectivity.

The consideration of prenatal genetic diagnosis is one that I have shown to be currently almost compulsory for women aged 35 and over. Instrumental in ensuring that women are aware of the availability of prenatal genetic diagnosis are the maternity practitioners. In the next chapter I explore and analyse the discourses deployed by the practitioners when describing their practice of caring for pregnant women aged 35 or over.