Organizational development under persecution

One important reason for Hamas’s inconsistent ideological development and incoherent strategy throughout the Oslo years can be found in its poor organizational state. Although Hamas initially was a rather well-run organization, its organizational coherence and capacity had suffered serious setbacks during the first intifada as its members and leaders were imprisoned and deported en masse. And as Israel—now aided by the PA—intensified its persecution of Hamas throughout the Oslo period, both with crackdowns on its militant Mohammad Ghazal interviewed in Nablus, April 17, 2011 and Dr. Aziz Dweik interviewed in Hebron, April 13, 2011. See also Gunning (2008, 112), ICG (2004, 11), and Usher (1995b, 73).

activists and the continued imprisonment of its top leader, Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, its efforts to build and develop its organizational structure was seriously obstructed. The situation made it exceedingly difficult for the movement to respond to environmental shocks and challenges and develop its organization in a well considered and coherent manner. This, in turn, had ramifications both for the way in which it recruited new members, mobilized its current members, and the efficiency and effectiveness of its decision-making procedures.

The formal structure and intra-party democracy

Although detailed in the previous chapter, a brief recap of Hamas’s organizational structure is in order before delving into the development in the Oslo years. In short, Hamas inherited the organizational structure of the Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood. And while the branches in Gaza and the West Bank at first differed somewhat, having been associated with the Egyptian and Jordanian Brotherhoods respectively, their organizational makeup soon came to be rather similar. By the end of the first intifada, Hamas was organized in a federated and hierarchical

—if stratified—manner, as indicated in Figure 6 below.³⁰² The description of Hamas’s organizational structure is based on data from the relevant literature, in particular Gunning (2008), Mishal and Sela (2000), and Tamimi (2007), supplemented by information provided by interviews with current and former Hamas members. As for the organogram depicted in Figure 6, various versions based on information gleaned from the literature were shown during interviews with Hamas members, and based on their input the one below was created.

Note that because the bylaws and exact organizational structure of Hamas are kept secret for reasons of security, both the description and the organogram should be considered as suggestive.

At the bottom of the pyramid was the usra, or family. These can be thought of as cells, and are the basic organizational units in Hamas. Each cell has approximately four members, one of which is the elected leader, naqib. He, in turn, represents his cell at the district assembly, called the shuba. The Gaza Strip is divided into seven districts, while the West Bank has five.

The leaders of these district assemblies in turn make up the regional shura councils, one on the West Bank and one in Gaza. Together with Hamas representatives abroad and the prisoner committees, these regional councils elect the Consultative Council, called the Majlis al-Shura. The Consultative Council is the topmost body in Hamas, responsible for deciding

302 The stratified characteristic of Hamas’s hierarchical structure refers to the high degree of autonomy enjoyed by the lower organizational units.

Figure 6: Hamas organogram at the end of the 1990s

(Source: Based on interviewed Hamas members and supplemented by information gleaned from the relevant literature. Usra is Arabic for family, shuba means division, and shura translates into consultation.)

on overarching political aims and strategies. Finally, this council elects the Political Bureau, which in essence is the executive branch in Hamas, tasked with the day-to-day management of the organization (Ma’an 2009c).

Hamas’s military wing, the al-Qassam Brigades, is suspected to operate as a parallel organization, with its own infrastructure and decision-making capabilities. Given the obvious need for the Brigades to operate in secret, the details of its organizational makeup are difficult to ascertain. And while the Brigades ostensibly has no direct ties to the political organization, it is widely assumed that it is subordinate to the political leadership, and more specifically the Political Bureau.

Importantly, the organizational design of Hamas is one in which legitimacy and authority are derived from the bottom-up. Advancement from one level to another takes place through elections. This provides the leadership with a high degree of internal legitimacy. In addition, Hamas has adopted the Brotherhood tradition of consulting its rank-and-file when deliberating on important decisions.³⁰³ Such an inclusive decision-making procedure also gives legitimacy for the final decision, even among those that initially were opposed. The strong emphasis on internal elections and consultation is taken as evidence that Hamas highly valued internal democracy. And by placing a premium on intra-party democracy and internal legitimacy, Hamas has managed to avoid the fragmentation and fractionalization so common among Palestinian liberation movements (Gunning 2008, 112).³⁰⁴

It is also pertinent to note here that there are a number of challenges intrinsic to Hamas’s organizational design. For one, the procedures by which candidates rise up through the rungs of Hamas are deemed to be somewhat problematic. Briefly, to be voted into a higher position, a member must first be nominated by an election committee established by the local leadership. Members cannot put forward their own candidacy (Gunning 2008, 107). After nomination, a candidate must be endorsed by the leadership at the level to which he can be elected. This means that a candidate challenging the position of a current leader is unlikely to succeed. In essence, the upwards mobility of Hamas cadres takes on a centripetal motion, in that the only way for a member to advance is by allowing himself to be co-opted by the leadership (Panebianco 1988, 60–61). As such, Hamas does not allow for truly open and free competition for leadership positions (Gunning 2008, 108–9). These limits that Hamas places on its democratic procedures, however, made it more closely conform to the cadre structure associated with revolutionary and militant movements than that of truly democratic movement organizations (Close and Prevost 2008).

Also, the inclusive decision-making procedures through consultation are associated with certain challenges. It is assumed that there is a tradeoff between democracy and legitimacy on the one hand, and decisiveness and efficiency on the other. As long as Hamas’s overall strategy allows for a suitable response to a given challenge, there is no need for consultation.

303 The decision to boycott the 1996 elections was, for example, taken in consultation with its base, although, as will be covered below, the dominance of the Political Bureau and the al-Qassam Brigades influenced the outcome of the internal referendum (Gunning 2008, 110–12).

304 This might also be due to the fact that Hamas originated from a social movement with a clear ideological grounding and identity, a legacy many of the other Palestinian liberation movements lack. It is also noteworthy that such an emphasis on internal democracy is not a characteristic Hamas shares with the typical militant and revolutionary movement (de Zeeuw 2008b, 14–15).

Yet, when Hamas has faced more fundamental challenges, the consultative nature of decision-making has negatively affected its responsiveness. Furthermore, these consultative procedures have at times given rise to intra-party competition (Gunning 2008, 110–10). For, although Hamas leaders both outside and inside the occupied territories stress the unity and coherence of their organization, tension and competition between the branches have emerged numerous times—in particular when the movement has faced principally important issues such as the question of electoral participation in 1996 and the merit of suicide operations (Gunning 2008, 40–41, 114; Mishal and Sela 2000, 163–66).

The federated structure of Hamas has contributed to this tendency of organizational infighting. Power struggles between the branches have emerged and intensified partly because they operate under widely different conditions: Israel frequently targets the Gaza wing; the West Bank branch, those in the refugee camps abroad, and the prisoners’ committees are fragmented and at times marginalized; whereas the external leadership has largely been out of reach from Israeli persecution (ICG 2004, 11).³⁰⁵ In addition, the branches might adopt different positions because of their distinct legacies. This is particularly relevant for the Gaza and West Bank branches. Because of its historical links to the Egyptian Brotherhood, which has been outlawed by the Egyptian government for large parts of its history, the Gaza branch has experience in running a decentralized and clandestine organization (Robinson 2004, 120).

Furthermore, the long history of persecution has forced the Gaza leaders to adopt pragmatic policies simply to survive. However, this same persecution has also worked to instill a commitment to the cause among its leaders. And finally, it has robbed them of the political experience enjoyed by their West Bank brethren. As related by Dr. Mohammad Ghazal,

throughout our history, during the rule of the Egyptians and Jordanians, we in West Bank were more relaxed than Gaza. We in West Bank, we were politically active while those Gaza weren’t. So, we were more advanced in politics. Due to their situation, the Gazans were more militant.³⁰⁶

However, as a consequence of being allowed to run its network of religious and social institutions openly, the West Bank branch has less experience in operating underground (Robinson 2004, 120). And having suffered comparatively less from Israeli persecution, many of the traditional West Bank leaders were more focused on the absolutist and religious aims of 305 An important exception was the failed assassination attempt in 1997 on the leader of the Political Bureau of

Hamas in Amman, Khaled Meshaal. See McGeough (2010).

306 Dr. Mohammad Ghazal, interviewed in Nablus, April 17, 2011.

the movement, and arguably less inclined to pragmatism and compromise.

The above should not be taken as evidence that the branches can be categorized as more or less pragmatic, moderate, or hard-line; they have all at one time or another adopted positions that can be defined as either of these. Rather, it is assumed that their distinct organizational legacies and the respective environments in which they operate can shed light on their thinking and strategizing behind positions adopted on specific issues. Combined with analyses of overall organizational developments, such as changes in the composition of Hamas, as well as investigation of the power balance between the different branches, the above factors can thus aid in explaining the behavior of Hamas.

A new composition: persecution, recruitment, and defection

Initially, Hamas relied on the recruitment procedure inherited from the Muslim Brotherhood.

In short, this was a three-tiered system in which prospective members first were asked to sign on as supporters and donate a small amount of money. Through education and training, they could first advance to become cell members with limited voting rights, before finally becoming established members allowed to stand for election to higher positions and with full voting rights (A. Cohen 1982, 159; Mitchell 1969, 183). In the days of the Brotherhood, it would take up to five years to advance from prospective to established member (IkhwanWeb 2007; Trager 2011). Such an elaborate recruitment procedure worked to indoctrinate and homogenize the rank-and-file, and as long as Hamas kept with these recruitment requirements, it was almost guaranteed a disciplined and committed membership. However, already at the end of the intifada, it was evident that Hamas had begun recruiting new members in a different fashion, allowing recruits to rise through the ranks more rapidly than previously (Robinson 1997, 173). This continued throughout the 1990s, and arguably had negative ramifications for the discipline of the rank-and-file.

There were both pull- and push-factors forcing Hamas to change its recruitment procedures.

For one, Hamas needed new recruits. This demand for new members was primarily created by the intensified persecution of Hamas activists. As hundreds of its members were either imprisoned, assassinated, or deported from the occupied territories, the organizational and military capacities of Hamas were seriously weakened (Tamimi 2007, 195). Hamas could therefore not allow itself to remain too picky when recruiting new members. The demand for new members was also partly a result of a number of Muslim Brothers defecting from Hamas.

While it is hard to get an exact overview of why they defected and how many there were, the

reasons given by a former high-ranking leader of the Brotherhood and Hamas, Dr. Mahmoud al-Habbash, can be informative. In short, al-Habbash said he left Hamas because the religious project of the Brotherhood had been replaced by a political one:

I discovered that they just to use Islam as a bridge to achieve political victories, or serve their political interests. I have said it in the past, and I say it now: There is a difference between those who serve Islam and those who use Islam. There is a big difference. So, in 1994, I made the decision to leave Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood, to become an independent, and to serve my religion.

A long-time member of the Brotherhood and a religious scholar, al-Habbash also indicated a certain frustration with the new leadership in Hamas:

Most of the current leaders in Hamas are not religious men. If you ask them “what about your teaching, what did you learn in the school or at university?,” they are all doctors, engineers, or have other regular professions. Few of them are religious teachers or religious thinkers.³⁰⁷

Such a reason for leaving lends credence to the argument that these defections from Hamas might partly have been a side effect of the way in which Hamas was established. As argued by Robinson (1997), the establishment of Hamas can be seen as a palace coup within the Brotherhood, in which a younger, more radical, and impatient generation took over and changed the Brotherhood’s modus operandi (McGeough 2010, 234). Naturally, those on the losing end, the old guard from the days of the Brotherhood, grew disgruntled as their religious project became undermined by “petty” politics. In addition, they were surpassed by a younger generation of leaders without religious training. Finally, the intense persecution of anyone associated with Hamas of course made the potential cost of remaining a member high, making an exit strategy far more inviting than both loyalty and voice (Hirschman 1970). In short, they had plenty of good reasons to defect.

There was also an external push to make Hamas change its recruitment procedures. By signing the Oslo Accords, the Fatah leadership in effect replaced resistance with negotiations.

This move did not sit well with many Fatah cadres. And as mentioned above, Hamas had positioned itself as the main resistance movement following the signing of the Oslo Accords.

As a consequence, those in Fatah who were disenchanted with their own leadership looked to Hamas for a new home in which they could continue their resistance to the occupation. As 307 Interviewed in Ramallah, May 25, 2011.

summed up by Hamas MP Dr. Ayman Daraghme, “I was a member of Fatah because I admired its resistance to the occupation. But in those days, in the mid-1990s, it was Hamas that focused on resistance. And I joined Hamas because of that.”³⁰⁸ And it was activists such as Daraghme from Fatah who provided the supply of recruits for Hamas (Robinson 1997, 170–71).

It is noteworthy that the Fatah cadres who joined did so for ideological reasons. In terms of Hamas’s institutionalization, they joined out of conviction for a cause, i.e., a liberated Palestine, not to reap any personal benefits. Hence, their incentives to join might have been collective, which stands in contrast to the selective incentives associated with institutionalized organizations. In the lingo of Panebianco, they were believers, at least in the nationalist element of Hamas’s ideology, if not equally convinced of the religious aspects (1988, 24–

27).³⁰⁹

In sum, the composition of Hamas’s rank-and-file changed quite dramatically throughout the Oslo period. At first, the legacy from the Muslim Brotherhood provided Hamas with a disciplined and committed membership base, in effect making it a cadre movement, sharing characteristics with the militant movements described by Close and Prevost (2008).

Responding to endogenous and exogenous challenges, however, Hamas eased its recruitment procedures and requirements. Membership recruitment into Hamas extended beyond Muslim Brotherhood affiliates to include many from Fatah. Instead of the Sheikhs and imams, the base of Hamas came to be increasingly made up of entrepreneurs, engineers, doctors, and shop owners (Kristianasen 1999, 22). And as the membership swelled, Hamas lost its distinctive organizational characteristic, turning from a disciplined and dedicated militant movement, into a less cohesive, mass-based, umbrella movement (Robinson 1997, 173).

The dominance of the Bureau and the Brigades—electoral boycott and violence

In contrast to the rank-and-file, the composition of the top echelons in Hamas did not change much for most of the 1990s. The founding fathers and the first generation of leaders largely remained in charge. What did change, however, was the balance of power between the different leadership branches, as it oscillated back and forth in tandem with external shocks and challenges. Despite attempts to compartmentalize its organizational structure so that the 308 Interviewed in Ramallah, April 10, 2011.

309 It should be mentioned that the military wing of Hamas often relied on volunteers, not recruits, to carry out suicide operations. As one Hamas leader relayed to Nasra Hassan (2001), “[o]ur biggest problem is the hordes of young men who beat on our doors, clamoring to be sent [as human bombers].”

leaderships in Gaza and on the West Bank could operate independently of each other and with a high degree of autonomy, the effectiveness by which Israel and the PA persecuted Hamas in effect decapitated the organization inside the occupied territories (Kristianasen 1999, 21, 28).

As a consequence, the situation for the domestic leadership had become precarious by the mid-1990s.

It was therefore the Political Bureau in Amman that constituted the dominant faction in Hamas from its establishment in 1992 and well into the 1990s. In the words of Ousama Hamdan, a long-standing member of the Political Bureau, “there was no other political leadership in Hamas when the Political Bureau was established.” According to him, the persecution of the internal leadership at the hands of Israel and the PA was so ferocious that they lost most of their operational capacities. This argument is corroborated by numerous sources, both primary and secondary (e.g., Mishal and Sela 2000, 160–66).³¹⁰ And furthermore, Hamdan claimed that even the topmost body in Hamas, the Shura council, which is made up of leaders both from within the occupied territories and the diaspora, was not functioning properly at the time.³¹¹ In part, this was because many of its members also were imprisoned or exiled, and in part because the mentioned consultative decision-making procedure rendered the Consultative Council into a rather slow moving and inefficient governing body.

Added to the above, the ability of the Consultative Council to exercise its authority had been further circumscribed by the fact that it relinquished control of what Panebianco termed

“zones of uncertainty” when it delegated the day-to-day management to the Political Bureau (1988, 33–35). And in Hamas, as in other organizations, authority ultimately rests with the faction in control of these “zones of uncertainty.” Crucially, the Political Bureau controlled much of the financial flow in Hamas (Gunning 2008, 115), often considered to be one of the

“zones of uncertainty” when it delegated the day-to-day management to the Political Bureau (1988, 33–35). And in Hamas, as in other organizations, authority ultimately rests with the faction in control of these “zones of uncertainty.” Crucially, the Political Bureau controlled much of the financial flow in Hamas (Gunning 2008, 115), often considered to be one of the