Other Relevant Theoretical Approaches Complementing the

Before turning to these more sociological approaches, I want to discuss how political economy research has been supplemented by the perspectives of key philosophers and social theorists. These theorists have been used by analysts of third sector media and cultural organisations to argue the value of such institutions. For example, third sector media and cultural organisations have been seen as potentially enhancing the public sphere, the ‘social space where information, ideas, and debate can circulate in society and where political opinion can be formed’ (Dahlgren 1995: ix). In contemporary liberal-democratic Western European societies, this ‘social space’ is meant to be inclusive of all members of society and it is a space where, ideally, ‘access is guaranteed to all citizens’ (Eley, 1992: 289).

However, as we have seen above, the reality is that these societies are characterised by inequalities and marginalisation which subsequently deny critical views and marginal groups access to and participation in the public sphere. For Fraser then, since ‘full parity of participation in public debate and deliberation is not within the reach of possibility’ for marginalised views and groups owing to ‘the basic institutional framework [which] generates unequal social groups in structural relations of dominance and subordination’ (1992: 121), she advocates what she calls ‘alternative publics’ or

‘subaltern counter-publics’. Third sector media and cultural organisations can be seen as offering such ‘counter-publics’, which marginalised groups can own and use as a platform to articulate and express their opinions, needs and interests.

Despite critique⁷, Fraser contends that it is only through such ‘publics’ that marginal interests can be expressed and defended since this is not always possible in the public sphere (Ibid.: 122). Furthermore, these ‘publics’, according to Habermas, enhance ‘communicative rationality’ necessary for democratic communication to take place outside of the ‘re-feudalised’ (1989/[1962]: 150/175 – 178) mainstream public service and commercial media organisations owned and controlled by proprietary and political interests. This kind of understanding informs the forms of ownership and organisation in third sector media and cultural production.

Another relevant notion from social and political theory is the Gramscian concept of hegemony. Gramsci contended that dominant groups in society establish their supremacy by seeking ‘intellectual and moral leadership’ through persuasion rather than suppression (Eley, 1992: 323). This results in a situation where ‘ruling elites are necessarily at their most secure (and so can use less coercion) when they succeed in naturalising their preferred discourses and practices with three key groups of people:

7 Gitlin (1998: 173) argues that multiple public spheres, to which he refers as ‘public sphericules’, weaken the public sphere and thus threaten democratic practice.

the gatekeepers of the culture industry; those who manage, hire and fire these gatekeepers; and those who train and educate these gatekeepers’ (Louw, 2001: 169).

Such views are consistent with a Marxian political economy view of the link between the control of the means of production and the production of dominant ideas (Hesmondhalgh, 2006b: 23).

For hegemony to be a successful condition, it ‘has to be won, secured and constantly defended’ (Eley, 1992: 324) in order for it to become ‘adaptive’ and

‘responsive to changing conditions’ (O’Connor and Downing, 1995: 16). This, however, does not wipe out discontent with ‘the dominant ideological frameworks’

(Downing et al., 2001) which may be channelled into ‘counter-hegemonic cultural activity’ (O’Connor and Downing, 1995: 16). It has often been the need to challenge such ‘dominant ideological frameworks’ through oppositional communicative spaces that has driven marginalised groups to establish the ownership and management of their own sites of media and cultural production on their own terms and away from dominant (proprietary and political) power and control.

These theoretical propositions, along with the political economy perspective, have been crucial in situating, understanding and evaluating the social and cultural significance of third sector media and cultural organisations in modern societies.

Drawing on the work of Raymond Williams and James Hamilton, Atton has built on these theoretical approaches by highlighting the practical reality of third sector media and cultural companies. He argues that for democratic communication to take place effectively, such companies ‘must be de-professionalised’ meaning that ‘they must be available to ordinary people without the necessity of professional training’. He notes further that such companies must be ‘de-capitalised’ ensuring that they are ‘without excessive capital outlay’ and also ‘de-institutionalised’ compelling them to ‘take place in settings other than media institutions or similar settings’ (2002: 25). The rationale for

this is to avert the sort of commercial and political power and control inherent in mainstream public service and commercial media from being replicated in third sector media and cultural organisations.

As we shall see, third sector media and cultural companies in Britain and Germany in the early 2000s are far from being ‘de-professionalised’, ‘de-capitalised’ or even ‘de-institutionalised’. The evidence suggests that many of these companies have actually been moving in the opposite direction as a result of changing socio-economic and socio-political circumstances some of which date as far back as the late 1970s. I illuminate these evolving circumstances when I chart the emergence of the professional, artistic and commercial imperatives in the organisational and production processes of third sector media and cultural organisations in the empirical chapters of this thesis. For now, I briefly review relevant research on the implications of ‘de-professionalisation’, ‘de-capitalisation’ and ‘de-institutionalisation’ for the sector.