The outbreak of the Sino-Soviet border clashes 1 The Sino-Soviet border clashes in March

On March 2, 1969, the Sino-Soviet border dispute worsened when Chinese and Soviet patrolling troops exchanged fire at Chenpao (in Chinese)/Damansky (in Russian), an island on the Ussuri River.43 The New York Times reported that: “Soviets and Chinese Clash on Border; Each Lists Deaths in Siberian Encounter.”44 The State Department’s intelligence analysts estimated that the clash was the result o f “persistent efforts by both sides to establish control” over the islands in the Ussuri and was not likely to lead to “wider fighting in the near future,” however, that similar incidents could be expected from time to time.45 Beijing had launched its “most extensive anti-Soviet denunciation campaign since January-February 1967.5,46

On March 4, 1969, during a briefing to the Congressional leaders on his trip to Europe, Nixon expressed that to side with the Soviets against the Chinese might be good short-range policy. However, it would be a suicidal long-range policy, for the Russians were “extremely sensitive” about this possibility. It was his experience that

43 Among recent works on this subject see, for example, Yang Kuisong, “The Sino-Soviet Border Clash o f 1969: From Zhenbao Island to Sino-American Rapprochement,” Cold War History, Vol. 1, No. 1, August 2000; W illiam Burr, “Sino-American Rapprochement, 1969: The Sino-Soviet Border War and Steps towards Rapprochement,” Cold War History, V o l.l, N o.3, April 2001; and Evelyn (Chui-Ling) Goh, “From ‘Red M enace’ to ‘Tacit’ Ally: Constructing the Rapprochement with China, 1961-1974” PhD thesis, N uffield College, Oxford University, 2001. See also Tyler, A Great Wall, pp.47-49. 44 The N ew York Times, March 3, 1969.

45 Intelligence Note, Bureau o f Intelligence and Research (INR), Department o f State, “USSR/China: Soviet and Chinese Forces Clash on the U ssun River,” March 4, 1969, p .l, POL 32-1 Chicom-USSR, 1967-69, B ox 1975, SNF, STATE-RG59, NA.

46 Intelligence Note, INR, “Communist China: Millions Denounce M oscow ,” March 7, 1969, p .l, POL Chicom-USSR, 1967-69, Box 1975, SNF, STATE-RG59, NA.

“fights between members o f the same ideologies were more severe usually than fights between members o f differing ideologies or religions.”47

On March 15 and 17, the second and third Sino-Soviet border clash erupted at Chenpao/Damansky in a much larger scale. The State Department’s intelligence officials judged that Beijing responded to the March 15 and 17 border clashes with a “less threatening tone and far less internal propaganda exploitation.”48 It appeared that Beijing sensed a “greater danger of military escalation” than it did immediately after the March 2 clash and was assessing the problem in a “much more sober fashion.”49 Moreover, CIA intelligence officers concluded that it was the Chinese side that “triggered the initial clash” and thus the battle was the Chinese attempt to “contest” the Soviet presence.50

47 Patrick Buchanan to Nixon (Buchanan’s notes o f the second bipartisan leadership meeting), March 4, 1969, pp. 18-19, Box 77, Memoranda for the President (MemforP), Records o f Meetings, President’s Office Files (POF), White House Central Files (WHCF), NPMS, NA.

48 Intelligence Note, INR, “Sino-Soviet Border: “Has Peking Bitten O ff More Than It Can Chew?” March 18, 1969, p .l, POL Chicom-USSR, 1967-69, B ox 1975, SNF, STATE-RG59, NA. Initially, the Chinese leadership, Mao and Zhou were “very poorly informed.” The Chinese Foreign Ministry ceased its function during that period. There was only an element o f the intelligence apparatus, which later became the China Institute o f Contemporary International Relations (CICIR). At that time, CICIR was a part o f the investigation department o f the Central Committee o f the Chinese Communist Party, and was the only institute that functioned. After the Sino-Soviet border clashes o f March 1969, several members o f that institution were brought back to Beijing to “brief Mao and the leadership specifically on world affairs, including the Soviet Union, the United States, and Japan.” David Shambaugh, Interview with Komine, October 15, 2003. In late February, following M ao’s instructions, Zhou told the four Marshals to meet “once in a week” to discuss “important international issues” and provide the Party Central Committee with their options. On March 18, they finished their first report, “An Analysis o f War Situation in the World”; eleven days later they had completed their second report, “The Zhenbao Island as a Tree in the Forest o f the Whole World.” Chen, M a o ’s China and the C old War,

p.246.

49 Ibid., pp.2-3.

50 Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate o f Intelligence, “W eekly Review ,” 21 March 1969, p. 12, CIA Freedom o f Information release to National Security Archive. On March 15, 1969, Mao gave instruction for the preparation for the outbreak o f war: “The northeast, the north, and the northwest should be prepared.... We will try to gain mastery by striking the enemy only after he has struck.” “Mao Zedong’s Talk at a Meeting o f the Central Cultural Revolution Group” March 15, 1969 Chen Jian and David L. W ilson (eds.), ‘“ All Under the Heaven is Great Chaos’— Beijing, the Sino— Soviet Border Clashes, and the Turn Toward Sino-American Rapprochement, 1968-69,” p. 162, Bulletin 11, Cold War International History Project (CWIHP), Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars.

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Kissinger recalls that after the Ussuri River clashes, “ambiguity vanished, and we moved without further hesitation toward a momentous change in global diplomacy.”51 Kissinger’s memoirs thus create a misleading impression that the March border clashes were the decisive events for the administration to comprehend the depth of Sino-Soviet mutual hostility. In reality, however, since January 1969, the State Department, the Defense Department, and the CIA had already engaged in a series o f research studies on the Sino-Soviet border dispute.52 In contrast, at this stage, Kissinger was still sceptical of a new China initiative.

On March 31, the day after Eisenhower’s funeral in Washington D.C., President Nixon held talks with French President De Gaulle.53 Nixon asked De Gaulle to play the role o f a go-between and inform the Chinese o f the U.S. decision for a withdrawal from the Vietnam War and of Washington’s desire to improve its relations with Beijing.54 Accordingly, on April 23, De Gaulle instructed the French Ambassador in Beijing, Etienne M. Manach to deliver Nixon’s private message to the Chinese leaders at the highest official level.55

Hereafter, Nixon and Kissinger spent until September 1969 to assess the nature o f Sino-Soviet relations and their possible impact on U.S. policy toward Asia. Therefore,