The Outlook: Does China view the SCO as a Defensive

Walt’s explanation for how states’ calculate threat and make alignment choices is based on aggregate power, proximity, offensive capability and offensive intentions; offensive intentions being the key variable. Throughout the Cold War, the U.S. had an aggregate power advantage over China. Additionally, the U.S. demonstrated its offensive capabilities throughout the 1990s culminating in the Air War over Yugoslavia. The U.S. military presence in Central Asia after September 11, 2001, added proximity to Chinese perceptions of threat from the U.S. Finally, China viewed a perceived U.S. containment strategy as a looming threat and as its offensive intention against China. Nevertheless, do these four variables of balance of threat mean that China intends to use the SCO as a defensive alliance against the U.S.?

The Chinese have already used the SCO to promote its strategic incentives and foreign policy interests in Central Asia. China’s influence is evident in the language used for SCO joint declarations, especially as a means for voicing opposition to U.S. foreign policy. So far, the SCO has come out in opposition to America’s decision to scrap the ABM, as well as the U.S. NMD initiative. SCO declarations have also committed the regional group to a “One China” policy and support for China’s claims to Taiwan. These examples are evidence of the SCO becoming a multilateral platform for prompting Chinese national interests. Indeed this behavior may be latently anti-American in nature, but from China’s standpoint, the SCO should not be classified as a defensive alliance. Instead, there is evidence of a prestige factor associated with how the Chinese political elite think about the SCO.

The SCO is a prestigious intergovernmental organization, which happens to support the broad spectrum of Chinese national security interests. China is rapidly emerging as a world power. In a decade or two, it might directly challenge the supremacy

260 _{Niklas Swanstrom, cited in Jeremy Bransten, “Central Asia: China's Mounting Influence, Part 1 --} An Overview.”

of the United States, Japan and Europe. But before this can happen, Beijing’s leaders will need to help stabilize the region, while creating good neighborly ties with the countries surrounding China’s borders. In the future, this could ultimately give China political support, as well as economic leverage. This objective has led Beijing to set up trade missions in every Central Asian country, invest in local enterprises, donate money to aid projects and give special attention to a high profile to new bodies, such as the SCO. Beijing views Central Asia as a bright spot in its foreign policy and China is eager to highlight the positive impact of the SCO. The successes and recognition of the SCO has increased Chinese prestige both regionally and internationally, which China has cashed in on for furthering its foreign policy agenda and meeting its strategic incentives.

China’s plans for the future of the SCO can be seen from remarks made at the August 2004 seminar entitled “SCO: New Model for Regional Cooperation.”261 _The

SCO’s Chinese Secretary-General, Zhang Deguang, commented on the SCO’s role as a new model for regional cooperation. Deguang’s remarks focused on the existing cooperation in the political and economic arenas, as well as other areas such as science and technology, culture, education, energy, transportation and environmental protection in preparation for the SCO governmental heads’ meeting in September 2004.262

General Xiong Guangkai, Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and president of the China International Strategy Society, provided comments on the future of the SCO as well. General Guangkai’s speech entitled “Develop the ‘Shanghai Spirit,’ Promote Peaceful Development,” focused on the developmental perspectives for the SCO. Highlighted were the implications for political, economic and trade, security and humanitarian concerns.263 _{China recognizes that the}

SCO is at a critical juncture and the near term steps for focusing and expanding its mission and organization will determine the road map for the next several decades. The initial establishment of good neighborly ties had brought about a wide-range of consensus

261 _{The China Institute for International Strategic Studies and Konrad Adenauer Foundation of} Germany sponsored this seminar.

262 _{Du Yan and Qi Bin, “Xiong Guangkai Says Shanghai Cooperation Organization Has Bright} Future,” Beijing Zhongguo Xinwen She in Chinese, 17 August 2004, FBIS Document ID: CPP20040817000197.

among SCO members. The SCO’s solid institutional foundation ensures its healthy development and is a springboard for the SCO having “a broad and bright future.”264

The PLA Chief of Staff further posited that the SCO “will have a positive impact on further safeguarding world peace and promoting the process of international political democratization.”265 _{China is also solidifying its position within the international}

community by promoting the SCO as a new model for post-Cold War multilateralism. Geopolitical undertones are rampant in the Chinese articulations of what the SCO is about and its potential. Nevertheless, the economic and regional security variables have been the items stressed by the Chinese political elite. The next two sections will consider how these variables might provide a better explanation of Chinese interests in Central Asia, and thus, their view of the SCO and its purpose.