The Pace of Progress and Funding

The slow pace of development has caused resentment. There is criticism that the promises made at the 2002 Tokyo Donors Conference on Afghanistan Reconstruction have not been kept (Calas, 2004:85). NGOs and aid organisations need funding. Many aid organisations and NGOs get a large majority of their funding from donor governments, governments that have a military force involved in the conflict area in which the NGOs are working. Jurisic, a widely experienced author on the civilian- military relationship argues that, in cases, NGOs work in countries in need, accepting governmental funding, allowing governments to shirk their political responsibilities by promoting a media image that things are being done (Jurisic, 2004:6). The NGO thus becomes a politicised tool and not an independent or neutral actor simply as an excuse for state inaction (Jurisic, 2004:6). Afghanistan has received less funding than many other recently conflict-riddled states such as Yugoslavia, East Timor, the West Bank and Gaza and Rwanda (Rashid, 2006). The lack of security, especially in the southern states, has meant that the UN and NGO reconstruction teams have been unable to access the areas in which they need to implement their projects (Rashid, 2006). The Afghan Government’s plan for reconstruction asks for one-hundred and eighty-two US dollars per capita, per year, which is well below the level of reconstruction capital given to the other countries mentioned above. Rashid believes that if reconstruction and funding for an effective state is not implemented, complimented by civil society and civic pride and confidence in their government then the population will become disillusioned and bitter at yet another failed leadership and return to opium production.

Rashid believes that “the West’s refusal to invest in agricultural schemes in Afghanistan” (Rashid, 2006:1) has been a major contributing factor to the return to poppy cultivation by a large number of impoverished farmers. This is vital in a country where seventy percent of the population relies on agriculture for a living. Nawa bolsters Rashid’s argument with criticism of inappropriate agricultural projects and the non- communication with local people about their needs (Nawa, 2006). These failures to communicate with the local people and the inappropriateness of the projects have resulted in abandoned buildings and silos and these buildings act as visible markers to the Afghan people to see exactly where their aid money has been wasted. The lack of thought displayed by some of the project implementers leaves Nawa in shock. For example, a project implemented by Chemonics and funded by USAID built irrigation

channels for farmers in Helmand province. Helmand is the largest poppy growing area in Afghanistan and, despite the project implementers best intentions, the irrigation was used to grow more opium. This holds a certain irony as Chemonics’ task was to offer alternative livelihoods to farmers so as to reduce opium production (Nawa, 2006:21-23).

The reconstruction has been recognised by some to be simply a box-ticking exercise rather than participatory and locally owned projects. Slim is very aware of the scepticism that surrounds the awarding of lucrative contracts in Iraq and Afghanistan to American and British companies when it would bolster the economies if more local firms could be used (Slim, 2004:44-45). Senlis, an international policy think tank undertaking research on counter-narcotics, military, and development policies and their consequences on Afghanistan’s reconstruction efforts, agrees with slim. It is the opinion of Senlis that the visible gap between international expenditure on security in comparison to reconstruction is a sign of the US-led Coalition’s real agenda. The focus has been on security and the pursuit of insurgents and not addressing the poverty of the Afghan people. This preoccupation with security, Senlis argues, is due to the US’s need and desire for homeland security, which is clearly where their focus lies. Five years on, the people of Afghanistan are plagued by poverty and now a drought threatens to kill many. Despite the millions spent on security the country has slipped further and further into chaos, not only resulting in Coalition soldier and aid worker deaths, but the deaths of local people. The military funding outstrips the development budget by over nine hundred percent. Senlis argues that one of the key problems is that the country has not been given a stabilised base of poverty relief and now all the trappings of democracy, opium eradication and security efforts rest on a shaky base of a starving and disillusioned Afghan populous (Senlis, 2006b:191-192). The other main issue is that out of the twenty billion dollars pledged by the international community, only 7.3 billion dollars has actually been given as development aid (Senlis, 2006b:203). The amounts of money being spent on reconstruction in the country fall very short of the estimated amount that the World Bank and United Nations Development Program believe will be needed. The fact that there is no mechanism to oversee pledges to payment means that there is currently a thirty percent discrepancy between pledges and disbursement (Senlis, 2006b:203). Senlis also believes that it is bizarre that the international community is trying to bolster the power, capacity and reach of the Afghan Government, yet only twenty-five percent of international aid is dispersed officially

through the Afghan Government, which undermines its legitimacy. The second argument is that, due to the inefficiency of the aid process due to money loss in various levels of contractors, the process may well be more efficient if distributed through the Afghan Government (Senlis, 2006: 203). The more legitimacy the Afghan government looses the more support the insurgents gain.