Third-Party Intervention

Third-party intervention represents another negotiation strategy but is treated separately here because of the volume of literature devoted to it, in particular to mediation. When

279 _{Cohen, “Aspects of International Mediation”, p. 118.} 280 _{Rabie, Conflict Resolution and Ethnicity, p. 75.} 281 _{Cohen, “Aspects of International Mediation”, p. 113.}

282 _{Peter J. Carnevale and Sharon Arad, “Bias and Impartiality in International Mediation”, in Jacob}

Bercovitch, ed., Resolving International Conflicts: The Theory and Practice of Mediation (London: Lynne Rienner, 1996), p. 113.

282 _{Saner, The Expert Negotiator, p.252.} 283 _{Ibid., p.252.}

88

the disputants become deadlocked, a third party enters the negotiation process as a mediator between the disputed parties. According to Pruitt and Carnevale,

in mediation, the negotiation continues but is helped along by the third party. Mediation can be distinguished from arbitration, where the third party makes a binding decision about the issues in dispute. Mediation preserves the voluntary, joint-decision features of negotiation –– the disputants retain the right to accept or reject any suggestion made by the mediator.284

Another third-party intervention is conciliation, usually an informal procedure in which the disputants speak for themselves. Mediation, however, has advantages over both arbitration and conciliation. It is less time-consuming than arbitration, and in addition, according to Rangajarn, “unlike a conciliator, a mediator need not do all his work with both parties present; he can act as a communicator, meet the disputants individually and put forward different proposals.”285

4.4.1 Mediation

Parties choose mediation in negotiation for a number of reasons. Their negotiating positions may be hardened and irreconcilable. The parties may feel they lack the negotiating skills to resolve the conflict successfully. Alternatively, they may believe that mutual cooperation is necessary to achieve their respective goals.286 A party may seek mediation to end a conflict. A mediator is also sought in the hope the mediator will serve as the guarantor of an agreement that is reached through negotiation.287

In addition, Ramundo argues that

mediation can be useful to bridge a personality or emotional clash between the sides or their negotiators. It can also be helpful when there is a disparity of power between the sides; that is, it can be used by the weaker side to protect its position against the stronger side. The stronger side may be willing to accept the mediator’s participation because it will have a basis (and a witness) for claiming that there was no duress in reaching consensus.288

284 _{Pruitt and Carnevale, Negotiation in Social Conflict, p. 165.} 285 _{Rangarajan, Limitation of Conflict, p. 261.}

286 _{Sharon C. Leviton and James L. Greenstone, Elements of Mediation (London: Brooks/Cole Publishing}

Company, 1997), p. 9.

287 _{Wilkenfeld et al., “Mediating International Crises,” pp.282-283.} 288 _{Ramundo, Effective Negotiation, pp. 24-25.}

89

With respect to Ramundo’s comments on the effect of unequal power on willingness to accept mediation, this chapter argues that the UAE might seek mediation to offset Saudi Arabia’s superior power, and that Saudi Arabia might accept mediation as a way to give legitimacy to an agreement that results from negotiation.

A mediator’s role may be passive or active.289 Passive mediation involves the mediator serving as a communication channel between or among the parties to a negotiation. The mediator as facilitator makes no real contribution to the negotiation process. However, the active mediator goes beyond the monitoring role and becomes involved in the negotiation process. Active mediation includes two main roles: formulation and manipulation. Formulation involves developing and proposing tentative solutions to the conflict, whereas manipulation involves both formulation and the application of resources to force parties towards an agreement.290 In addition to performing the roles of facilitator, formulator, and manipulator, mediators will occasionally “attempt to remedy power imbalances.”291 Given the imbalance of power between Saudi Arabia and Abu Dhabi, it would be reasonable to assume that Abu Dhabi and (after 1971) the UAE, would seek mediation to offset Saudi power, an assumption that is the tenth element of this analytical framework. The choice of mediator from 1970 to 1 December 1971 would probably be Great Britain, a further assumption based on Abu Dhabi’s historical dependence on Britain. It also assumes that Arab mediators might play a role and be involved in the UAE-Saudi case after Britain’s withdrawal from the Gulf.

In the literature of negotiation that is discussed in depth, the idea of the “neutral mediator” suggests that the ideal negotiator should be perfectly impartial with respect to the disputants involved in a conflict. Researchers have challenged the assumption of impartiality. For example, Carnevale and Arad comment that “some conflicts, especially international ones, involve not only the partisans but others who are not directly involved but who have interests that derive from human welfare concerns or from strategic, political, and economic factors.”292 In a further elaboration of the argument against the ideal of impartiality, Princen writes that

Differences in interests and capabilities distinguish two kinds of intermediaries. The principal [emphasis added] mediator has

289 _{Ibid., p. 23.}

290 _{Wilkenfeld et al., “Mediation in International Crises”, p. 283.} 291 _{Pruitt and Carnevale, Negotiation in Social Conflict, p. 171.}

90

interests in the disputed issues and can bring resources to bear; the neutral [emphasis added] has neither but can offer a low-risk environment. The distinction is important for dispute resolution, however, only insofar as it shows how the disputants and, in particular, their interaction, are affected by the intervention. Thus, it is the target of the intervention that is critical for understanding not only differences among intermediaries but how their interventions serve to overcome impediments to reaching agreement.293

If Princen’s distinction between principal and neutral mediators is applied to the case of the UAE-Saudi territorial dispute, Great Britain, as a former disputant in the Anglo- Saudi phases of the dispute during 1935-55 would, because of British oil companies’ interests and its treaty relationship with Abu Dhabi, be a principal mediator. If Saudi Arabia brought in the United States to perform mediation, the US would also be a principal mediator, due to its Aramco Company’s interests in Saudi Arabia. Both Great Britain and the United States would be principal mediators because of the direct involvement of British and American oil companies in the disputed territories, and would have resources to influence the outcome of the negotiations.

By contrast, if the Arab League entered the negotiations hoping, for example, to promote Arab solidarity, it would be a neutral mediator with no interest in the dispute. As a neutral mediator, the Arab League would not be perceived as biasing the negotiation process in favour of either the UAE or Saudi Arabia. Based on Abu Dhabi’s historical dependence on Britain and British representation of Abu Dhabi during the Anglo-Saudi phases of the dispute from 1935 to1955, it assumes that the British would play a role of “principal mediator” to the case study of the Abu Dhabi-Saudi border dispute.

Princen also comments that it is extremely important to understand that “all third-party interveners –– disputants, principal mediators, neutral mediators –– are self-interested. They may seek concrete gains for themselves or simply the satisfaction of settling a dispute, but they have interests. Most importantly, the specific nature of those interests will determine the kind of intervention and its effectiveness.”294 Thus, if Great Britain were to intervene in UAE-Saudi territorial negotiations, Britain would be a principal

mediator with direct interests in the outcome of the negotiations, because British oil

companies, primarily the Abu Dhabi Petroleum Company, were involved in the

293_{Thomas Princen, Intermediaries in International Conflict (Princeton University Press, 1992), p. 23.} 294_{Princen, Intermediaries in International Conflict, p. 49.}

91

disputed areas. It would be reasonable to assume that Britain would play the principal

mediator to the case of the UAE-Saudi territorial dispute.

Menawhile, Rangarajan states that: “in any bargaining situation with more than two [negotiators], there is a phase of coalition-formation.”295 It seems reasonable to suggest that Great Britain, as a principal mediator, could (due to its interests) also be drawn into a coalition. Pruitt and Rubin propose a situation in which

there is a bond between parties A and X and antagonism between parties B and X. In this case, we can predict the development of antagonism and consequential escalation in the A-B relationship. This is partly because A and B perceive dissimilarity in their attitudes toward X. It is also partly because X will often try to recruit A into the campaign against B. In other words, A’s bonds with X are likely to draw A into a coalition against B.296

In the case of the UAE-Saudi territorial dispute, let us suppose that X is Abu Dhabi, A is Great Britain, and B is Saudi Arabia. Whereas Abu Dhabi and Britain had a longstanding positive relationship, historically Great Britain and Saudi Arabia had been opponents. The model proposed by Pruitt and Rubin suggests why Saudi Arabia would have good reason to resist mediation by Great Britain.

4.5 Factors Affect the UAE-Saudi Negotiation Process (1970-74)