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CHAPTER III – MEASURING PARTY SYSTEM INSTITUTIONALIZATION IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

3.1 Party system institutionalization: The framework for analysis

The first research question – “to what extent are party systems in Sub-Saharan Africa institutionalized?” – is not a new one. In fact, it has been answered in the past by Welfling (1973) and more recently by Kuenzi and Lambright (2001), Basedau (2007), Lindberg (2007) and Riedl (2008). These studies are relevant since they have tested existing frameworks and have put forward new dimensions and indicators to compare party systems in Sub-Saharan Africa. Even if focusing on different time periods and covering different sets of countries they have disclosed important features about how party systems in contemporary Africa work, both from a longitudinal and from a comparative perspective (see Chapter I). Furthermore, they

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have revealed interesting aspects regarding the relationship between institutionalization, time and democratization. More precisely, they have noted that time per se may not lead to higher levels of institutionalization given that some African party systems seem to be institutionalized from the onset of multipartism or seem to develop in a non-linear fashion. Despite the clear contribute of these studies; they still reflect some of the dilemmas that have permeated this field of studies since the 1960s. Indeed, a conflict between the levels, the elements and the dimensions of institutionalization is still visible, and it goes beyond the studies just mentioned. In what follows, we briefly recover this debate to explain how we tackled each of these dilemmas and to justify the proposal of a new measurement of institutionalization. Later we, argue about its advantages vis-à-vis other measurements.

3.1.1 Theoretical and methodological foundations

The levels and arenas of analysis. In Parties and Party Systems (1976) Sartori provided one of the most enduring and often-cited definitions of parties and party systems. He defined political parties as functional, representative and expressive agencies that develop a set of tasks (of social and institutional nature) linking the citizens to a government (Sartori 1976, 24-28) and party systems, as «the system of interactions resulting from interparty competition» (Sartori 1976, 44). This distinction is highly relevant for political analysis and particularly for this study. As previously noted, in several studies that follow Mainwaring and Scully’s (1995) seminal framework, party institutionalization and PSI are usually measured interchangeably; that is, we find dimensions and indicators that measure both the institutionalization of parties (e.g. party organization) and of party systems (e.g. stability of interparty competition) in the same model. Kuenzi and Lambright’s (2001) adaptation of Mainwaring and Scully (1995) is a clear example of this situation. To measure stable roots in society they use a systemic indicator – share of seats for parties founded until 1970 – combined with an individual one – average age of parties. This is relevant if one takes for granted that in a competitive party system which is institutionalized, there is stability and continuity among political alternatives, or that individual political parties are likely to be institutionalized where there are stable patterns of party support (Randall and Svåsand 2002). Nevertheless, these inferences from the ecological to the individual level, and vice versa, cannot be assumed without appropriate research. Indeed, party institutionalization may either be mutually supportive or at least compatible with PSI or be at odds with it. In fact, there are cases of continuity between these two poles, but there are also cases of uneven party system

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development (Randall and Svåsand 2002b). The relationship between the institutionalization of individual parties and PSI is, thus, highly complex and difficult to tackle, and it becomes even worse when both levels are mixed under the same framework. In light of this, Randall and Svåsand (2002b) sustain that the best thing to do is to conceptually disconnect these two poles and then to verify the conditions under which there is continuity or rupture between them. While this debate has had several contributors since the 1960s (e.g. Welfling 1973; Levitsky 1998; Levitsky 2009), it is remains crucial, for it frames our choice for a systemic approach. A systemic approach of institutionalization is one that goes beyond the individual political parties per se and takes into account patterns of behavior or interactions that allow certain rules of the game to become routinized or entrenched (Levitsky 1998; Levitsky 2009). In Mair and Bardi’s (2008) words, this implies moving from the set of parties approach, which is linked to the traditional numerical classification of party systems, to the system of parties approach, which is «[...] less evidently concerned with the number of parties as such and more with their patterns of interaction» (Bardi and Mair 2008, 152). This being said, where can we search for patterns of behavior or interactions that express the systemic crystallization of certain rules of the game? Political parties, it is known, operate across different arenas (electoral, parliamentary and governmental) and territorial levels within a polity (subnational and national). As a result parties’ interactions can be discovered along the different arenas within a polity, with varying degrees of depth (Bardi and Mair 2008). In this sense, it is possible that:

a party system as such may not exist in the electoral arena, where the set of parties approach would offer a more accurate depiction, such a system may nevertheless exist in the parliamentary or governmental arenas, where identifying the pattern of interactions between the parties would prove an essential key to understanding (Bardi and Mair 2008, 154).

According to Smith (1989, 349-350), a definition of party system must be based on the kind of interaction (cooperation or hostility) taking place between political parties, but also on the level of the political system in which it occurs, as patterns of interaction can result in subnational or national party systems. Together, these studies suggest that it is not enough to clarify whether we opt for an individual or a systemic approach. It is then also necessary to define both the territorial levels and the arenas within the polity that shall be observed.

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The number of dimensions and indicators. The majority of studies reviewed in Chapter I tend to follow a multidimensional approach of PSI. This is, in our opinion, the most appropriate approach to study a multilayered concept such as this one. What seems to be missing, however, in some studies, especially in those focusing on African party systems, is the observation of certain arenas of institutionalization. For instance, competition for government has never been measured in this region, despite being considered one of the most fundamental arenas of interparty competition (Sartori 1976; Mair 1996; Mair 1997; Casal Bértoa 2009; Enyedi and Casal Bértoa 2010). The same can be said about the organizational component. It is, in fact, considered in Mainwaring and Scully’s (1995) original framework, but Kuenzi and Lambright (2001) exclude it from their analysis, under the argument that it was linked with party – instead of party system – institutionalization. Basedau (2007) also left this dimension out of his study not because he identified a conflict between levels, but because of the lack of data available (e.g. concerning the number of card-carrying members, funds, (paid) full-time party officials). Given the theoretical and empirical difficulties to approach this dimension, we found Janda’s (1970) seminal conceptualization of organizational continuity (measured by the number of splits and mergers) and Welfling’s (1973) revision and application of these indicators to African party systems extremely relevant and valid. Based upon their proposals, we have included the organizational component as well as the governmental arena in our study, the latter also considered in Mair’s (1996) approach.

The elements. The choice between structural institutionalization, attitudinal institutionalization or both has also proven critical. The great majority of studies focus either on the structural element alone (e.g. Mair 1996; Mair 1997; Casal Bértoa 2009; Enyedi and Casal Bértoa 2010; Lindberg 2007) or lump the two together (e.g. Mainwaring and Scully 1995; Kuenzi and Lambright 2001; Basedau 2007). The attitudinal element has never been analyzed autonomously and, in fact, it has been measured more ambiguously. For example, Mainwaring and Scully (1995) suggest indicators such as sympathy index towards parties, whether respondents approved of dissolution of parties and parliaments, or whether they believed democracy could exist without political parties (see Table 1.3). Kuenzi and Lambright (2001) and Riedl (2008) take into consideration whether elections were free and fair, if parties accepted the results, or if they boycotted the elections whereas Basedau (2007) uses only electoral turnout. Even though we have done the same in past studies (Sanches 2008; Sanches 2011) we now reckon as these indicators say more about parties’ attitudes towards the rules of the democratic regime and mass mobilization than about PSI itself

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(Wolinetz 2006). As a result, in this study we focus solely on the structural element given that the kind of data we have is not sufficient to measure the attitudinal one. We do this bearing in mind that these two elements of institutionalization should be measured separately as they refer to distinct organizational phenomena (Levitsky 1998; Levitsky 2009; Randall and Svåsand 2002b).

Building upon this debate, we propose a partly new multidimensional framework of PSI that measures the structural institutionalization of national party systems across the most relevant arenas of competition. Its elaboration is partly based on studies of Welfling (1973), Mainwaring and Scully (1995), Mair (1996), Kuenzi and Lambright (2001) and Lindberg (2007). It is, however, more precise and complete than the preceding ones because (i) it addresses some of the dilemmas enclosed in the study of institutionalization; (ii) and it observes, for the first time, the governmental, the parliamentary, the electoral and the organizational arenas, including a wider range of observations/elections per country. Moreover, despite the changes introduced, our measure allows some degree of comparison since it includes some of the indicators that have been integrated in previous measures.