Patterns in the Data

Several contributions in the sociological and economic literature studied marital assorta- tiveness along spouses cultural-ethnic identities, mainly within the US environment. They provide evidence in favour of positive assortative mating along cultural lines in terms of racial identities, but also in terms of spouses’ ethnicities and linguistic lines [Fu and Heaton

(2008); Fryer (2007) and Schwartz (2013)]. Schwartz (2013), in particular, underlines the parallel between ethnic and linguistic homogamy, where both ethnicity and spoken lan- guage are relevant culturally specific attributes and both allow the direct transmission of cultural characteristic across generations. By looking at the Italian marriage market, we document the existence of a strong preference for homogamy along cultural-ethnic lines. Figure 2.2 reports the observed homogamy rates by spouses’ ethnic group. Except for the majoritarian group of Italians, for all other ethnic groups in the analysis, homogamy rates are significantly higher compared to random matching rates, as represented by the 45 de- gree line. Strong preferences for positive sorting along cultural lines are common to all marriage markets within Italy, with heterogeneity even considering markets with similar population distribution. Moreover, we observe that mating preferences are heterogeneous across ethnic-groups, as they are particularly high for Other Africa and East Asia minorities. Does marital matching influence later intra-household decisions? By reporting the fer- tility rate by parents ethnic group, separately for homogamous and heterogamous families, Table 2.1 documents the presence of asymmetries in childbirth investments across families. Comparing homogamous and heterogamous families, we observe a significant differential in fertility rates at the intensive margin for all ethnic groups. For instance the probability of

having at least one child in a homogeneous Italian family is of 73.5% while, the equivalent probability in a family with at least one Italian spouse is of 41.8%. We report in Column (3) fertility estimates for heterogamous families excluding families involving at least one Italian spouse, in order to control for external social incentives or economic differential opportunities. Results remain consistent. A similar pattern is evidenced at the extensive margin, looking at the average number of children, conditional on having a positive fer- tility. Observed asymmetries in fertility rates across family types support the hypothesis that spouses cultural differences lower the investment in marital-specific capital, possibly in anticipation of higher marital instability.

We investigate marital dissolution, by looking at separation rates. Separation rates are quite low in Italy and especially so for homogamous marriages. We report separation rates by family type and ethnic group in Table 2.2. We observe a positive differential in marital instability of heterogamous marriages as compared to culturally homogeneous unions, in line with previous results [Becker et al.(1977);Kalmijn et al.(2005),Bratter and King(2008) andZhang and Van Hook(2009)]. For instance, the probability of marital dissolution in ho- mogamous Italian families is equal to 6.4%, while in mixed families with at least one Italian spouse it increases to 7.5%. Larger differences across families are uncovered for the remain- ing ethnic groups, i.e. the gap for the European group is of 3.7%, 3.9% for Other European, 7.3% for North Africa, 6.6% for other Africa, 5.4% for West Asia, 4.1% for East Asia and 3.5% for America. Moreover, by looking at ethnic group variability across homogamous unions, we report evidence that the separation rate of Italian families, as the majoritarian group, is higher with respect to those of homogamous minorities. The evidence is consis- tence with theoretical predictions, because the horizontal socialization makes dissolution choices less riskier for the majoritarian group in terms of children cultural transmission. We exclude that differences in instability across ethnic groups are driven by a carry-over of preferences towards marital dissolution of migrants, as the Italian divorce rate is particu- larly low compared to the average divorce rates in migrants countries of origin16. The evi- dence, discussed so far, documents the existence of strong preference for homogamy along cultural-ethnic lines and show a differential in household investments and stability across family types. The scope of the research is to investigate the role of the cultural socialization channel, in explaining the observed patterns.

We proxy the cultural-ethnic transmission by the language spoken at home by parents with children. By looking at the probability of speaking Italian at home, we show that socialization rates are quite low in Italy, in particular for homogamous unions of spouses belonging to minorities. Homogamous minorities families have a strong preference toward

16_{Divorce rates data come from the World Marriage Data 2008. United Nations, Department of Economic}

the transmission of their own language to children, hence Italian frequencies are lower com- pared to those of heterogamous families. For instance, the probability that a European par- ent speaks Italian with his/her child is equal to 38.1% in a homogamous marriage, whereas it increases to 90.7% in a heterogamous marriage, and it remains quite high to 69.8% ex- cluding mixed marriages with an Italian spouse. Across group variability is particularly high. The probability that a South-West Asia parent speaks Italian with his child is equal to 21.4% in a homogamous marriage, whereas it increases to 92.1% in a heterogamous mar- riage. Estimates point out that homogamous and heterogamous couples are endowed with different vertical technologies of cultural transmission. Conflicting incentives in the social- ization of children for mixed unions lead to less efficient vertical transmission technologies as compared with homogamous families, which benefit from coordinated incentives.

Italian language socialization frequencies by spouses ethnic group and marital status are consistent with our model. Divorced homogamous families have less efficient socialization technologies as compared to married homogamous families. For example, the probability that a child speaks Italian is equal to 36.4% in a European homogamous married family and it increases to 43.6% for the same family under divorce. Vice versa, divorced heterogamous families have more efficient socialization technologies as compared their married counter- part, hence for a comparable European heterogamous families, the probability that a child speaks Italian is equal to 92.2% and 79.5%, respectively, in case of marital stability or not.